Political responsibility of ministers – necessity or political rowdiness?

The institution of individual vote of no confidence is a part of the rationalized cabinet-parliamentary system adopted in Constitution of 1997. Its significance is associated with the ability to control the members of the government, and even to bring about the removal of a minister (or another member of the Council of Ministers), whose activities were negatively evaluated, from the office. In light of current constitutional regulationsit ought to be an institution used in special circumstances, because it interferes with the powers of the Prime Minister to form the personal composition of the Cabinet. Political practice shows, however, that the institution is often used for political purposes, aiming to destabilize the work of the government.

Individual Political Responsibility of the Cabinet Minister in Political Practice under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 2nd April 1997

According to the Constitution of Poland from 2nd April 1997, a cabinet minister is political responsible for the political direction of his office to the Sejm and to the Prime Minister. The main goal of this paper is to show, that in practice, the political responsibility of the ministers before the Sejm is illusory. The majority of the vote required to adopt a motion of no confidence is so high that its vote is only possible in exceptional circumstances. Since 1997, no motion of no confidence have been successful, so the Sejm has never succeeded in enforcing the resignation of a minister. That is why, only the political responsibility of the minister before the Prime Minister has a real meaning. The head of government can lead to the dismissal of each minister at any time. When deciding to file an application to dismiss a minister, the Prime Minister must take into account only whether such a decision does not endanger the political support of the majority of the Sejm.

Sejm after four years from the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon

The article attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of the legal and parliamentary practice in Poland, made after four years from the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. The special focus is given to three issues: regulations of the so-called cooperation law, regulations of the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm for the Committee of the European Union and the practical aspects of proceedings of the EU legislative proposals in the Sejm. The starting point of the above analysis is protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which impose on the EU institutions to directly inform national parliaments of the content of EU legislative proposals for which is provided to express an opinion. Therefore, the Lisbon’s Treaty confers on Polish parliament the power having the nature of a veto in relation to decision reducing sovereign rights of Poland as the one of the member states. However, the present role of the Sejm in the functioning of the EU depends on its ability to exert a real influence on the European policy conducting by the government, which is related with a possibility of concluding the political consensus on the national level. The author suggests that for supervision of the EU’s principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, not only greater activeness of Polish parliament, but also providing mechanisms for the enforcement of the members of the Council of Ministers of the political responsibility for their actions in the EU institutions, is required. Otherwise, the solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon will not affect on the existing European policy way in Poland, which leads government.

On the responsibility of the Speaker of the Sejm – a contribution to the discussion

The Speaker of the Sejm holds a unique political position. It results from the fact that it is a leading body of the Polish Sejm, with a number of competences exceeding the scope of the representative body’s operation. In addition, the Speaker performs the duties of the President of the Republic of Poland in cases specified by the Constitutional Act. The Speaker’s competences were defined very broadly, but he was subsequently not included in the regime of constitutional responsibility. The absence of mechanisms for enforcing the constitutional responsibility of the Speaker of the Sejm is in contradiction with the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, assuming the responsibility of the authorities.

Some remarks about formal requirements of the motion of no confidence to a cabinet minister

According to the Constitution of Poland from 2nd April 1997, a cabinet minister is political responsible to the Sejm and to the Prime Minister. The Sejm has power to lead to the dismissal of each minister by passing a motion of no confidence. The main goal of this paper is to show the formal requirements of an motion of no confidence to a single minister, and to answer questions: what are the reasons explaining to submit this kind of motion and when member of parliament have a right to demand a dismissal of a cabinet minister. In this paper it is shown the results of an analysis of motions of no confidence to a cabinet minister from 1997 to 2015.

„Even the same Ones, who are Established to be Protectors of Law, they Ought to be Their First Preservers”. On the Rule of Law in the Debate and Reform work of Polish Great Sejm (1788–1792)

Although the theoretical assumptions of the concept of the rule of law have been developed in the continental tradition only in the 19th century, its systemic elements have their roots deep in history. In this contribution, the author analyses selected examples from the field of legislation and legal culture of the Great Sejm era (1788–1792). She focuses in particular on the problems of articulation and functioning of the supremacy of the constitution in the legal order and the innovative shaping of the responsibilities of key state authorities. These issues notably seem to reflect the suspension between the domestic heritage and the modernity of constitutionalism. At the same time, both cases prove that the ratio legis of these solutions was primarily of a practical, not conceptual nature.