On some deficiencies regarding the mechanism of individual rights protection in the Constitutional Tribunal procedure

The article discusses some problems regarding the deficiencies of the mechanism of individual rights protection in the procedures before the Constitutional Tribunal. The particular attention is paid to the procedure initiated by a constitutional complaint. One of the essential deficiency of that procedure is its inability to change the legal situation of the constitutional complainant. He or she must initiate the next procedure to obtain the protection of his or her constitutional rights and freedoms. Therefore, according to the author of the article, the Constitutional Tribunal should have the competence to annula legally effective judgment of a court or a final administrative decision that is based on the unconstitutional normative provisions. In such a way the protection would be given to the constitutional complainant directly by the Constitutional Tribunal. The author of the article empathizes that the Tribunal is obligated not only to respect constitutional rights and freedoms of an individual but also to protect them.

The constitutional principle of the reliability and efficiency of public  institutions in the case law of the Constitutional Court in the years 2006–2016

The article presents selected line of jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court with regard to judgments referring to the reliability and efficiency of public institutions. The principle indicated in its title was expressed by Polish constitutional lawmaker in the preamble to the Polish Constitution of 1997. In the introduction, there are identified various positions of doctrine regarding the normative character of the preamble. Due to the lack of a legal definition the author defines the concept of “fairness” and “efficiency”, and “the integrity of the state” and “the efficiency of the state”. This article in its essential part takes into account judgements of the Constitutional Tribunal issued in 2006–2016. Adopted timing is determined by the judgement oth the Tribunal passed in 2006, where the principle of fairness and efficiency has been called the “principle” and where the Court recognised its normative charcter. The judgments are discussed in chronological order. The aim of this article is to show the substantial meaning of the principle of fairness and efficiency of the state which was provided in discussed court cases. The idea is also to draw attention to the Introduction to the Constitution as its important part.

Relations between the principles of proper legislation  and the principles of legislative techniques in the process of law-making

Meaning of the principles of legislative techniques (PLT) and the principles of proper legislation (PPL) should be regarded as a key to the process of lawmaking. These rules are often a guarantee for the protection of human rights. The principles of good legislation are inferred by the Constitutional Court of Art. 2 of the Polish Constitution (the democratic rule of law). The principles of legislative techniques are included in the Annex to the Regulation of the Prime Minister Council of Ministers dated on 20 June 2002 on the principles of legislative technique. The paper presents a characteristics of both disciplines taking into account their specificity and historical background. It was also shown that by joint application of PPL and PLT and their inseparable correlation legislator may establish acts that will guarantee the protection of human rights and will protect the interests of the State. The Author also identified benefits which derive form joint application of both sets of legislative rules and principles.

The Constitution of Hungary as a “political manifesto” of nowadays parliamentary majority

The Fidesz–KDNP coalition won the Hungary parliamentary elections of 2010, which was held in April and May. Coalition capturing two-thirds of seats in National Assembly. Despite the fact that in the Election manifesto were no declarations to change the Fundamental Law, the process of creating the new constitution was started after two months after the election. The final draft of the Basic Law was voted on in National Assembly after less than 9 month after the Election and it’s called “the Fidesz’ Fundamental Law”. During four years (2012–2016) the Parliament passed six amendment acts to the Fundamental Law. Whose main purpose was to adapt it to Fidesz’ political philosophy. Thanks to two-thirds majority, the Government coalition could freely shape the Fundamental Law and (after reform of the judiciary) voluntary in its interpretation.

Constitutional complaint in the Latin America – selected issues

This paper explores some issues, concerning constitutional complaint in the Latin American countries. It starts from the term of constitutional complaint, based both on the Polish and Latin American literature. Such a comparative overview allows then for better understanding the discussed question. Further, there is illustrated different terminology, which is applied in the Latin America. Specifically, there are discussed such issues as the binding legal acts, substantive and procedural premises and the final decisive authorities, which are taking their decisions. This paper also investigates an issue, concerning the function of constitutional complaint in Mexico.

Dispute over the Interpretative Verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal –  the Standpoint in the Discussion

The article consists of few parts. At the beginning, the author discusses a definition of interpretative verdicts and a history of the dispute between The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal over this kind of judgments. The author doesn’t present arguments that are described in literature but climes that the dispute concernes three problems: legality of interpretative verdicts, their binding force and interpretative verdicts as a base for reopening proceedings. In the second part, two arguments against delivering interpretative verdicts are formed. The author claims that the Constitutional Tribunal should limit a number of such judgments because there is no legal ground for interpretative verdicts in the Constitution and because they abridge independence of judges of the Supreme Court and other courts. In the last part of the article, the author describes a genetic cause of the litigation between the Tribunal and courts. It is claimed that the dispute has been generated by dissentions between methods of interpretation of legal acts used by the Tribunal and the Supreme Court. The Tribunal takes advantage of the method of derivation and the Supreme Court usually uses the method of clarification. These methods are in contrary to each other and because of this they are the base of the dispute.

In a situation of uniformity of President’s political orientation, of parliamentary majority which means the government, statutory veto motivated by a difference in a substantial evaluation of acts ceases to operate. In such a situation a task to curb the legislative must reside exclusively in the judiciary, thus in particular in the Constitutional Tribunal. In order to fulfil this task effectively the constitutional tribunal must be free from an allegation that its jurisdiction is motivated by anything else than compatibility with the constitution. From this point of view a way in which judges of the Tribunal are appointed has the key meaning. The issue consists in how to free the composition of the Tribunal from the political system existing in parliament.

The limitations of economic activity in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court

Submitted study is an attempt to analyze the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of the freedom of economic activity and its limitations. Both in literature and in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal it is accepted that the constitutional freedom of economic activity is not absolute and must be subject to restrictions. In cases brought before the constitutional court there are cited rules in different configurations. In this text the author wants to expand the subject issue and to discuss various conditions that limit freedom of economic activity (which are: important public interest, statutory form and the requirement of the principle of proportionality).

The constitutional right to social security

The subject of this article is the issue of the constitutional right of citizens to social security when reaching the retirement age. The author points out the constitutional principles which guarantee the protection of pension benefits and gives examples of statements of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal with respect to the issue of social security schemes in their judgments. This article also discusses the scope of freedom which the Constitution grants to a legislator and the boundaries within which a legislator may act as far as the selection of solutions for the implementation of this right is concerned.

About the Concept of the Secondary Unconstitutionality of Law

The concept of the secondary unconstitutionality of law has been appearing over the years in the adjudication of the Polish courts, adjudication of the Constitutional Tribunal and in legal literature. During this time there have been diversified contexts, in which this notion has been used. Shortly after the Constitution from 1997 entered into force, ‘secondary unconstitutionality’ was used to describe an influence of the new constitution on a so-called pre-constitutional law. Nowadays the tendency of understanding this concept is different. On the one hand, it specifies the law, which is a result of a faulty, repeating unconstitutional regulations, activity of the legislator. On the other hand, this notion is used in the situation, when as the consequence of the entry into force a judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal the new law is also unconstitutional. The aim of this article is to propose a comprehensive definition of the concept of the secondary unconstitutionality. Moreover, it will be presented a draft of the sense of this notion for the practice of establishing and applying the law in Poland.

Principle of “lex retro non agit”. Is the Law not Retroactive?

The principle of non-retroactivity is recognized as one of the foundations of the civilized system of the modern state. The essence of the principle of non-retroactivity can be reduced to the assertion that the law should, in principle, act “for the future”, therefore it should not be legal norms that would apply to events that occurred and ended before their entry into force. In other words, the legal consequences of events taking place under the old norms should be assessed according to these norms, even if new regulations are already in force at the moment of making such an assessment. The retroactive act of the regulations is when the lawmaker orders certain relevant legal facts, existing before the day of entry into force of the new provisions, assessed in the light of these new provisions, introducing a fiction that these provisions were already in force on the date of the assessed facts. If the regulation contained in the regulation obviously acts “for the future” and at the same time has legal effects only 3 months after the entry into force of the act, it does not violate the principle of non-retroactivity. This doesn’t mean that without violating the principle of non-retroactivity, the legislator may freely interfere in existing legal relations and modify them freely. The boundary here is, above all, observance of the principle of protection of acquired rights and principles of protection of trust in the state and the law. It is unacceptable to create norms retrospectively, if the entities to whom these standards relate could not rationally anticipate such decisions, and extraordinary circumstances or goods subject to constitutional protection, such decisions do not justify. You can withdraw from it, but only exceptionally and for justified reasons, giving the norms the ability to influence the existing situations, if there were valid reasons, and the interested entities had grounds to expect the adoption of such standards.

Temporary impossibility of performing the functions by the Polish President under the Constitution and the new Constitutional Tribunal Act

This paper discusses temporary impossibility of performing the functions by the Polish President. The Polish Constitution defines three kinds of such impossibility. First of all, there are situations when the President may inform about this impossibility, secondly – when s/he cannot do this, and thirdly – the President may be suspended because of being arraigned before the State Tribunal. Each of these situations is considered in the paper, one by one. The author refers, among others, to the grounds on which impossibility of performing the functions by the Polish President is declared and analyses in detail the provisions of the new Constitutional Tribunal Act concerning this issue. The author’s comments are accompanied by related conclusions and suggestions concerning the amendment of both the Polish Constitution and the said act.

The role of Constitutional Tribunal in the functioning of  Polish political regime described in the Constitution of 1997

The aim of the author of this article is to analyse the role played by the Constitutional Tribunal in the functioning of Polish political regime in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of 1997. Following hypothesis was verified: on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution, Constitutional Tribunal responds to conflicts arising from the dualistic structure of the executive and thus plays an arbitrary role in the functioning of Polish political regime. The article consists of four parts. The first defines the concept of the political regime and characterizes Polish system of government, with particular emphasis on its distinguishing feature – dualistic structure of executive. The second part was devoted to the description of arbitrary function of the Constitutional Tribunal in the Polish political regime. The third one describes ruling of the Tribunal that defines the central constitutional authority of the State that is entitled to represent the Polish Republic in the meetings of the European Council, as an example of the implementation of the aforementioned arbitrary role of Constitutional Tribunal. Findings and conclusions are presented in the end.

Instruments of Constitutional Tribunal enabling  to avoid derogating unconstitutional norms

According to Article 190 para. 1 of the Constitution, Constitutional Tribunal has competences to derogate unconstitutional norms, therefore, to interfere in the legal system directly. However, there can be specified some exceptions to this basic result of Constitutional Court’s judgments. The article indicates that Polish constitutional court has instruments which enable to avoid derogating unconstitutional norms. It is worth underlining, that it is always Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to apply any of them. Especially, it doesn’t depend on petitum of pleading or procedures. In the article, it was taken into consideration: an adjournment of the date of the loss of unconstitutional provision’s binding force, a judgment concerning legislative omission, an affirmative interpretative judgment and a signaling. Their analysis is based on criterion of legal basis, aim and result of their application. It is described influence of these instruments on the legal system and, on the other hand, their significances for the authorities applying the law.

Polish constitutional normalization of the principle  of subsidiarity and its development in law

This paper is an attempt to show regulations on the principle of subsidiarity, enclosed in Polish Constitution and other legal acts. Polish legislation is familiar with the concept of subsidiarity, it is included in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. This provision was intended to emphasize its importance for the implementation of civil rights. It was considered that subsidiarity is important for strengthening the powers of citizens and communities they create. It is present to protect their rights, as well as any action taken by manifestations of civic activity in associations. This imposes an obligation on the legislature for an appropriate division of roles, in carrying out tasks of the local public administration. Applying the method of the institutional and legal analysis, demonstrated the presence and development of subsidiarity in the legislation. Analyzed materials also show the gradual, yet slow development of the principle of subsidiarity in Polish legislation. Its basis can be found in the constitutional law, which is the determinant of the direction of its development. The Constitutional Tribunal is also affecting subsidiarity by its decisions. The first part is a review of the principle of subsidiarity in Polish Constitution. It also expresses the impact of principle on the Republic of Poland. The second part concerns the principle of subsidiarity in the ordinary law. It shows how the principle is being developed since the late 80’s. The last part is an attempt to reveal the implementation of subsidiarity in activities of local governments. It focuses on how subsidiarity can provide the right to operate freely and retain autonomy of actions.

Polish Constitutional Tribunal towards European standards of the right to a fair trial

The Constitutional Tribunal (TK) does not exercise justice, however, it is a judicial authority. The right to request an examination of compatibility of the normative act with the Constitution is today an integral part of the democratic rule of law and the right to court. As the analysis of the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal shows, the Polish constitutional court applies the standards of the right to a fair trial established under the Convention and the Charter as well as refers to the case law of the European Courts including the interpretation of the relevant provisions of international law. This practice should be assessed unambiguously positive, because it leads to the creation of a common standard of protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. However respecting the ECHR case-law makes necessary to recognize that in proceedings related to the specific constitutional control before Constitutional Tribunal should be applied the guarantees arising from Art. 6 of the Convention. It is obvious that the TK as a court of law not facts cannot be treated as another instance of appeal and a constitutional complaint should not be used as an instrument for correcting mistakes made in the earlier stages of the proceedings. However, the constitutional position of TK among the judiciary, the legislative shape of the proceedings before the Tribunal, and finally the status of TK judges allow – in my opinion – to put forward the thesis of the need for abandonment of the European standards of the right to a fair trial before TK. Standards that according to the TK case law, are also guaranteed by the provisions of the Constitution.

Relations between the Sejm committees and the Constitutional Court

Relations between the Polish Parliamentary (Sejm) committees and the Polish Constitutional Court. The issues presented in this paper concern the relation between the Parliamentary (Sejm) committees and the Constitutional Court. Special emphasis was put on the problem of influence of herein mentioned committees on the activities of the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court and the control of legislative omissions

The presented consideration involves the possibility of granting to the Constitutional Tribunal a greater role in scope of rulings regarding legislative omission. Legal solutions binding in other countries, which has been presented in this work, allows to defense of the thesis, that there is a practical possibility of ruling in aforementioned scope on level of constitutional judiciary. Polish Constitutional Tribunal has the right to react to such omission by using so called signaling decision, which is not a sufficient solution.

Freedom of Economic Activity in the  Polish Constitutional Tribunal Judicature

The present publication constitutes an attempt of a sectional overview of the previous jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on the subject of freedom of economic activity regulated under article 20 and article 22 of the Polish Constitution. Objective analysis begins with the description of double nature of the freedom of economic activity that is interpreted by the Tribunal as a constitutional principle (rule of law) as well as one of the fundamental rights. The presentation concerns itself also with the type of the interrelationship between these two ways of expression of the analysed freedom. Further on, the presentation concentrates on the admissibility of the limitation of the freedom of economic activity. Analysis of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal indicates, that the legal limits of the legislator’s interference within the scope of the freedom of economic activity comes out not just as „of important public interest” under article 22 of the Polish Constitution, but also has its basis in article 31 section 3, that formulates the principle of proportionality. The article ends up with an attempt to resume the jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on the subject of freedom of the economic activity as well as attempts to answer the question if, under jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal, the present freedom has already taken a fully formed shape and meaning.

Research on the constitutionality of martial law. Remarks based on the  Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 16 March 2011

The Article concerns the power of the Constitutional Tribunal for examination of currently out-of-dated legislation. It was assumed that the judgment of Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 2011 stating unconstitutionality of the State Council decrees of 12 December 1981 on martial law is of fundamental importance. Historical aspects of martial state may still evoke understandable political and ideological emotions, which however should be excluded from legal considerations. The Author reconstructs assumptions presented by the Constitutional Tribunal, and afterwards provides analysis from the point of view of constitutional standards in force. Moreover, the Author is interested in effects of recognition of currently outdated legislation as unconstitutional. The text and presented ideas are constructed to inspire further discussions.