If not the Constitutional Tribunal, then What? On Dispersed Constitutional Review in Poland

The discussion on the model of constitutional review of law in Poland gained a new dimension after 2016 in connection with the ongoing constitutional crisis. First of all, there is a question of whether, irrespective of the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal, on the grounds of the binding constitutional provisions, also courts may review the constitutionality of statutory provisions in the process of their application. Although after 1997 the principle became established that the Constitutional Tribunal had exclusive competence to review the constitutionality of acts in Poland, a clear change in this respect is now visible both in doctrine and jurisprudence. The majority of doctrinal representatives justify the admissibility of dispersed judicial review by the inability of the Constitutional Tribunal to perform its basic function, treating it as something exceptional, incidental, determined by the doctrine of necessity. The aim of this paper is to present the debate on the admissibility of dispersed judicial review on the grounds of the Polish Constitution, as well as to indicate the possible directions of its development.

The Illiberal Constitutional Court in Poland on the Example of the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on Abortion, file ref. no. K 1/20

The paper discusses the characteristics of the Constitutional Tribunal as an illiberal constitutional court. After the political remodelling initiated in 2015 and the capture of the Tribunal, this body gained a new role in developing, protecting and stabilizing illiberal constitutionalism. The Tribunal, as an illiberal constitutional court, often adjudicates in panels inconsistent with constitutional rules, is abusively activated by the ruling option and issues judgments that are beneficial to the rulers and justify their constitutionally questionable actions. How an illiberal constitutional court operates is presented in the example of an abortion judgment, file ref. no. K 1/20. This case also shows the illiberal ground of the new system.

In Search of a Systemic Model for Controlling the Law’s Compliance with the Constitution During the Period of the Second Republic of Polish

Searching a coherent model of the systemic control of the compliance of statutory law with the constitution was an arduous process conducted by theoreticians of law throughout the entire period of forming the system of the Second Polish Republic. The statements which seemed to be correct in the opinion of recognized legal authorities, were not – apart from a few exceptions that overcame the general aversion to such views – adopted by the legislator during the revision of the March constitution. What is more, the control of the constitutionality of the law was not accepted during the work on the April constitution. The reason for that was its ideological conditions, based on the concept of the President’s authoritarian supreme power in terms of state system, which did not allow for appointing a body responsible for examining the compliance of the acts of law with the constitution.

Establishing the Right to Abortion in the Constitutional Principles of Privacy, Equality and Freedom in the US and the Arguments of the Constitutional Tribunal of October 22, 2020

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade ruling was pivotal in American women’s fight for the right to abortion. It was based on the constitutional principle of the right to privacy and was criticized that it would be more appropriate to base it on the principle of equality. The aim of the article is to compare the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court rulings legalizing abortion have been argued with the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s 2020 ruling limiting the already restrictive right to abortion. The article analyzes the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal and presents its potential effects in terms of women’s rights, gender equality and freedom. In its conclusion, the article points to possible legal solutions to the abortion dilemma and addresses the issue of gender discrimination.

On the Possibility for the President to Withdraw the Request to the Constitutional Court Under the Preventive Control Procedure and the Request for Reconsideration of Law

The aim of the article is to draw attention to the issue of the possibility of the President of the Republic of Poland withdrawing a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal in the mode of preventive control and a motion for reconsideration of a law. In this paper the author discusses Art. 122 of the Constitution, in particular the time given to the President to become familiar with the presented regulations and to decide what further action should be taken, i.e. to sign it, to submit a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal, or alternatively to return it to the Sejm for reconsideration, or to exercise a veto. The author focuses primarily on the analysis of regulations concerning the problem in question, extended by a number of doctrinal views.

In this article, the author addresses the issue of state compensation liability. She presents Polish constitutional regulations as well as civil law regulations. In the analysis, she takes into account current problems related to the consequences resulting from the introduction of restrictions on rights and freedoms during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the article, the issue of the relationship between the Polish Constitution and European Union law is analysed from the perspective of its shaping in the adjudication of the Constitutional Tribunal. Firstly, the constitutional regulations that define the relationship between the Constitution and EU law will be analysed. This part of the article also includes the issues relating to the legal basis of the most commonly used instrument that shapes this relationship – the EU-friendly interpretation of the Constitution. Secondly, the contexts in which the Constitutional Tribunal refers to EU law are examined. The case study that is undertaken focuses on the instruments that prevent conflicts between EU law and the Constitution, inter alia legislative and interpretative instruments. The application of these methods in recent controversial judgments Ref. no. P 20/07 and Ref. no. K 3/21 concerning the relationship between the Polish Constitution and the EU law will be analysed.

This paper, examining the Hungarian example argues that that the price is high if a constitutional moment to adopt a constitution based on wide societal compromise has been missed. The constitution-making process might then be completed either by activist courts or by activist political forces. Hungary experienced two major constitutional reforms, both missing a consensual constitutional momentum. The first transformation in 1989–90, which replaced the socialist authoritarian system by democracy, was brought about by political elites, lacking democratic legitimacy, keeping the formal legal framework of the socialist constitution. The second reform in 2011 brought a formally new constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), initiated and adopted solely by the governing party (FIDESZ) with a constitutional majority, without consensus. The Constitutional Court both times attempted to play an active, corrective role in the aftermath of the constitution-making.

Direct Effect of Applicability of the Ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal after Publishing it

The subject of this elaboration is legal effect of the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, that arises after it has been published. The purpose of this elaboration is to present doubts related to application of rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal, based on the art. 8 para. 2 of the Constitution due to the art. 118 and 190 of the Constitution. Pursuant to these articles, the ruling is given legal effect after its publication, not earlier. By adjudicating with regard to the provision being at variance with the Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal actually imposes the effect on the legal system in the form of repeal of this provision. On the one hand the legal system becomes constitutional but on the other a legal loophole may arise from lack of regulations.

In this article, the author argues that the introduction of measures in Poland to remedy violations of the rule of law, particularly regarding the judicial system, does not require so far referring to the principles of transitional justice. The author loosely refers to Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of a dual state which is sometimes used to describe the political reality in contemporary Poland. In a dual state, there are two parallel realities, and apart from politicized organs there may also exist institutions that have not yet been captured by the ruling party, i.e. institutions that do not recognise the current, unconstitutional legal order. Therefore, according to the author, the assessment of the legal legitimacy of certain institutions or persons (including judges), after the restoration of the rule of law in the nearest future, may differ from the classic transition from a completely non-democratic to a democratic regime.

A Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument for Protecting Individual Electoral Rights – Comments in the Context of Constitutional Complaints Considered by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2012–2023

It seems that currently any attempt to undertake a substantive assessment of the activity of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, especially after 2015, is doomed to the need to address the problem of the ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland. Nevertheless, the analysis of statistical data allows us to put forward the thesis that the “popularity” of the constitutional complaint as a means of protecting individual freedoms and rights – at least seemingly – has not been completely wasted even in these difficult conditions. It can be concluded that a constitutional complaint is not a commonly used instrument for the protection of an individual’s electoral rights. Nevertheless, given the constitutional problems raised in the constitutional complaints, the structure of this instrument of protection of the constitutional freedoms and rights of the individual prevents effective protection (ie. the possibility of restoring) the infringed electoral rights of the individual.

The Influence of the French Constitutional Court on the National Tax System. Analysis on the Example of the High Income Tax (taxe sur les très hauts revenus)

This publication is a part of the study of the role of French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) in the field of control of tax law regulations. The main purpose of this publication is not only to describe the specificity of the French legal system in this field but in the basis of the functional approach of the comparative legal method, the historical-descriptive and the dogmatic method, the verification of the thesis of the effectiveness of constitutional control of tax regulations in French legal system. This study that was done on the example of the high income tax (fr. taxe sur les très hauts revenus) however, it may be an incentive for further in-depth research in this area.

Gloss to the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2 June 2023 file ref. no. Kpt 1/17

The article refers to the judgment of the Tribunal Court of 2 June 2023, file ref. no. Kpt 1/17. In this jurisdiction, the Tribunal resolves a competence dispute between the Supreme Court and the President of the Republic. In the resolution of 31 May 2017 file ref. no. I KZP 4/17 the Supreme Court climes that The President is not supposed to apply the law of pardon to people, who are not finally sentenced. The Tribunal decides that the Supreme Court doesn’t have a competence, which allows controlling the President’s individual acts. The Author of the article criticizes the Tribunal’s judgment and climes that in this particular case there is no a competence dispute. The Tribunal intends to present formally binding interpretation of the article no 139 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court and common courts are entitled to control President’s applying the right of pardon during fulfilling their function of the administration of justice.

Potential Victim of Human Rights Violations on the Background of the Protection System of the European Convention on Human Rights

The article’s purpose is to present the concept of a potential victim of violations of the rights and freedoms of the European Convention on Human Rights. A group of complainants is treated as a victim, even though the violation affects society. The qualification of complainants as victims of human rights violations can be treated as the creation of European human rights law. The role of the Court is to apply the so-called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, which cannot only effectively contribute to the implementation of the principles of the ECtHR. The article addresses the problem of the assumptions of the living instrument doctrine and the interpretation of the law currently associated with the active activity of judges (judge-made law). The concept of the potential victim of human rights violations represents an opportunity for the postulated expansion of the catalog of fundamental rights.

The Category of “Legitimation” in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal – Constructive Semantic Conditions

This paper aims to analyze the Constitutional Tribunal’s (CT) jurisprudence regarding the term “legitimation” to reconstruct its definition and compare it with its lexical meaning. Despite its varied use across multiple contexts, the jurisprudence lacks a uniform definition of legitimation. This situation necessitates reliance on diverse semantic intuitions. A doctrinal-legal method combined with logical-linguistic analysis was employed, analyzing 100 CT rulings that used the term “legitimation”. The CT’s jurisprudence shows that the application of the term is not limited to legal legitimacy but also includes broader contexts such as social perception, alignment with the values of the legal system, or the sovereign’s will. It is used in contexts that align with previous lexical findings, suggesting that legitimation can be viewed both as a state and a process. The analysis confirms the need for a terminological distinction, which could help organize discourse around this concept.

Problem of the Limits of the Constituional Tribunal Jurisdiction over EU Treaties. Debate Regarding Case file ref. no. K 3/21

The article begins with an examination of the doctrinal debate surrounding the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, which declared certain provisions of the Treaty on European Union to be unconstitutional. The Tribunal took over a year to provide written justification, covering crucial topics in constituional law and the EU law such as primacy, subsidiarity, and constitutional identity. One of the notable changes was the Tribunal’s new approach to jurisdiction over the Treaties. The article, which has a doctrinal and interpretive nature, discusses and critiques the Tribunal’s arguments. The author believes that the question is not whether the Tribunal has the power to review the treaties, but what the constitutional limits of this power are. The article offers suggestions on how to limit the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Constitutional Reformism. On the Independence and Effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal

The focus of remedial actions to align the system with constitutional democracy standards is on restoring the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence. However, this is just a minimum step. For the reform to benefit the state and citizens, it must not only repair post-2015 damages but also modernize the legal environment. The article examines parliamentary bills on the Constitutional Tribunal and and the Constitutional Tribunal Introductory Provisions, submitted on 6 March 2024, alongside a constitutional amendment bill from 56 senators submitted at the same time. The authors suggest expanding reform efforts, using constitutional reformism, which integrates law, political science, and public life practices, to propose solutions for improving the state’s quality.

Customary Law as an Unwritten Source of Law

Legal customs, as the basic regulations of social and legal relations, are considered to be the earliest of source of law. The aim of the article is to show the difference between custom and customary law, based on the features characterizing these concepts and to indicato selected examples of this type of practises occurring within constitutional law. The analisys will not refer to parliamentary customs. The main conclusions include that the existence of customary law is a fact that Carnot be excluded from constitutional practise and that it makes the legal system more flexible. Customary law can be treated as a formal source of law, but only by means of an act of enactment or recognition. Such an interpretation is not excluded by the content of the current Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

The Consequences of the So-called Abortion Judgment (file ref. no. K 1/20) in the Field of Human Legal Personality

In the judgment file ref. no. K 1/20, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that the unborn child has dignity throughout the prenatal period and its life is subject to protection. The ruling moved the moment of acquiring legal personality from the moment of birth to conception. The author concludes that since the nasticurus has dignity, it should also be entitled to the constitutional rights and freedoms. The Correctness of the Tribunal’s ruling means that the legal provisions stating that legal capacity (subjectivity) is acquired at the moment of birth are inconsistent with the Constitution. The author claims the thesis that the implementation of these effects of the ruling would have downright revolutionary consequences for the Polish legal order and would constitute a departure from the traditionally perceived legal subjectivity of man. The author is satisfied that these effects have not been accepted in science, jurisprudence and legislation.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the jurisprudence of Constitutional Tribunal

This paper problematises the role of Universal Declaration of Human Rights with regard to assessing the compliance of a given normative act with the constitutional paradigm of control. It presents the analysis of the legal status of the international legal act in question together with the jurisprudence of Constitutional Tribunal in the scope covered by the discussion. The focus is on Universal Declaration of Human Rights, considered in the context of confirmation, strengthening and extending the constitutional standards. The core thesis posed in the analysis was that Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an essential tool of assessing the constitutional character of the legislation passed in the Republic of Poland. The methodology used in the analysis drew from legal dogmatics and theory of law.