- Author:
Daniel Knaga
- E-mail:
daniel.knaga@op.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Łódzki
- Year of publication:
2017
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
11-33
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2017.01.01
- PDF:
ppk/35/ppk3501.pdf
Evident groundlessness constitutional complaint
Grounds of constitutional complaints admissibility have in majority formal character. According to article 77.3.3 The Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015, the Tribunal shall issue a decision on refusal to proceed with an application of a constitutional complaint, if an application or a constitutional complaint are manifestly unfounded. Evident groundlessness is constitutes a substantial requirement od admissibility. Since it has a character of a general clause, its meaning is determined in the process of application of law. Any doubts whether the complaint is evidently groundless, should result with its consideration in regular proceedings, and full examination of its legitimacy. The possibility of the substantive examination of complaints grounds, at the preliminary stage has an exceptional character, and should be given restrictive interpretation. The practice based on the opposite assumption could change constitutional complaints role as a remedy for constitutional rights and freedoms infringement.
- Author:
Izabela Bernatek-Zaguła
- Institution:
Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Legnicy
- Year of publication:
2010
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
103-124
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2010.04.05
- PDF:
ppk/04/ppk405.pdf
Discretionary power in administrative law as exemplified by general clauses in the Historic Preservation Act
In this article entitled the author discusses the relation between the constitutional directive specified in Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland under which official authorities in Poland must act under and in compliance with law, on the one hand, and discretionary power in administrative law which frequently enables broad interpretation of legal regulations which are general in nature, on the other. The author presents his arguments on the basis of one act, the Historic Pres- ervation Act, and the analysis of its general clauses. In the first part of the article, the author addresses theoretical aspects of general clauses. In the second part, the author illustrates the theoretical concepts with specific examples of general clauses in the said Act and provides an exemplary interpretation of their meaning. The focus is placed on the extensive discretionary powers conferred by the legislator on the authorities applying the Act. Based on the provided examples of general clauses and possible extensive consequences of their application, the author concludes with description of methods and the mechanism of giving a more precise meaning to the general clauses by presenting their application in practice in judicial decisions.
- Author:
Andrzej Bisztyga
- E-mail:
a.bisztyga@wpa.uz.zgora.pl
- Institution:
University of Zielona Góra
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6579-9656
- Year of publication:
2020
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
49-60
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2020.05.03
- PDF:
ppk/57/ppk5703.pdf
The purpose of the article is to conduct an axiological reflection using the notion of public interest, on preparation and the procedure for amending the constitution. The article provides a theoretical attempt to capture and place public interest in the broadly socially and publicly understood process of constitutional change. This attempt is not dictated solely by the desire to conduct theoretical – legal and intellectual speculation. This is supported by the increasing voices of the need to amend the existing constitution, which are often superficial, populist and de facto formulated from the position of the supremacy of the state over the individual. The time-varying connotations of the general public interest clause are related to the axiology of selected constitutional principles. The public interest, understood at a given moment in the development of social life, should be a determinant of the process broadly, i.e. both the social and the legislative sense of the constitutional amendment. Similarly, the very direction of constitutional changes should be an expression of social interest.