This paper has been based on three assumptions that have been widely discussed in the international political science: (1) there has been a decline of democracy in East–Central Europe (ECE) with the emergence of “velvet dictatorships”, (2) the velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the hard power of state violence that has provoked “cultural wars“ and (3) the basic turning point is the transition from the former modernization narrative to the traditional narrative with “reinventing the past” and “reconceptualising modernity” through the reference to the historically given collective national identity by launching the “politics of historical memory”. The velvet dictatorships have been using and abusing the national history as an ideological drug to consolidate their power. The (social and national) populism and Euroscepticism are the basic twin terms to describe the soft power of the new (semi)authoritarian regimes. They are convertible, the two sides of the same coin, since they express the same divergence from the EU mainstream from inside and outside. Soft power means that the political contest in the new regimes has been transferred from the hard to the soft fields of politics as the fight between the confronting narratives. The victory of the traditionalist–nativist narrative carries also the message that the people are only passive “subjects” and not active citizens, so the field of politics has been extremely narrowed in the “new brave world” in ECE. 

The paper is dealing with the constitutional and historical importance of Act I. of 1946. In 1946 Hungary has changed its form of government. The passage of Act I of 1946 has defined Hungary’s form of government as a republic. In addition to the creation of a republic, the legislation provided powers for the president of the Hungarian Republic. Moreover, the Preamble of Act I. of 1946 was the first document in the Hungarian constitutional history which summarized and declared the most important natural and inalienable rights of the citizens.

For the past decade in many countries in Europe and its close neighborhood we have observed different types of processes which can be named as “de-democratization”. The aim of the article is to analyze the state of elections as the crucial democratic institution which fairness and competitiveness have a substantial impact on the political regime. While Turkey as a “role model” for our analysis remains a main focus of the article, three European countries were selected for a comparison based on their relative similarity to Turkey – Hungary, Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia. The following questions are posed: Are elections in these countries free, fair and competitive? Can some types of electoral malpractice and irregularities be identified? How does the state of elections in terms of their fairness and competitiveness influence the political regime? The main hypothesis is that in the analyzed countries elections competitiveness limited by incumbents can become a factor deciding about the change within the political regime in the long run (loss of democratic quality) and also change the regime (to a less democratic one).

The main aim of the article is to try to analyze the functioning of Victor Orbán’s regime in Hungary in the period from 2010. Analyses oscillate between considering issues such as the development of democracy in Hungary after 1990, history and background of functioning of the Fidesz party, and the course of Orbán’s exercise of power. In the paper, the reasons behind the taking of power by Fidesz party were analyzed by taking into account the specifics of Hungarian democratic experience after 1989, processes of state’s reforms and economic crises. The article ends with the analysis of five pillars of Victor Orbán’s policies.

The main aim of the article is to try to analyze the functioning of Victor Orbán’s regime in Hungary in the period from 2010. Analyses oscillate between considering issues such as the development of democracy in Hungary after 1990, history and background of functioning of the Fidesz party, and the course of Orbán’s exercise of power. In the paper, the reasons behind the taking of power by Fidesz party were analyzed by taking into account the specifics of Hungarian democratic experience after 1989, processes of state’s reforms and economic crises. The article ends with the analysis of five pillars of Victor Orban’s policies.

The aim of the article is to analyse the assessment of Hungary presented in two democracy’s indices: the Freedom in the World Index and the Bertelsmann Stiffung Index in years 2010 - 2016. The research problem is to identify which of the elements shaping the democracy in Hungary in accordance with the indices have deteriorated. The research is based on the analysis of the content and the existing data. The evaluations of Hungary in the indices of democracy have deteriorated since 2010 when Orban and Fidesz won the parliamentary election and gained power (up to 2016). The changes introduced by Orban in the Constitutional Court and the judiciary, the adoption of a new Basic Law, a new electoral law and the media law cast a shadow over Hungarian democracy. Indices show that the four basic principles of a democratic state have been violated, namely 1) the rule of law, 2) the separation of authorities 3) free and fair elections, and 4) freedom of expression.

From making offerings to indigenous gods to sancti reges et duces, or the Arpad adventure with the sacred

The article explores the specificity of early medieval Hungarian Christianity, which lay in the existence of two metropolises in the Kingdom, i.e., Esztergom and Kalocsa, and the belief in the sanctity of the Árpád dynasty, expressed as early as in the second half of the thirteenth century.

In my paper I present the electoral transformation of the last three decades by considering the most important impulses and their effects. In doing so, I focus on a few essential elements that are considered to be decisive Hungarian and internationally in terms of both electoral science and election practice. Such are, among others, primarily the nomination system, internationalization of election, the electoral data protection or the evolution of electoral technology.

The article aims to formulate a theoretical category of neo-militant democracy that applies to study the nature and dynamics of democratic regimes after the 2008 economic crisis. It conducts an empirical test to verify the analytical effectiveness of the redeveloped category. The test takes a form of the case study of the Hungarian political system. Apart from a verification-objective, the research aims to identify and account for the dynamics of the Hungarian regime in terms of the neo-militant democracy principle. The qualitative method of source analysis serves to collect data on the processes of becoming neo-militant democracy. The selection of sources is deliberate and oriented on finding information about the implementation of neo-militant democracy measures in Hungary (2008-2019). The technique of qualitative content analysis applies to identify the nature of these processes. The theoretical tool is the category of neo-militant democracy, which simultaneously undergoes the empirical test. The main argument is that the process of becoming neo-militant democracy took a traditional form since the Hungarian neo-militant democracy principle drew on the traditional means introduced by Loewenstein rather than innovations advanced by the current research

The Constitutional Court has functioned in Hungary since 1989. Its activity shaped the frame of democratic state of law and influenced the constitutional order in Hungary. In 2011 the National Assembly passed the new Act on the Constitutional Court that replaced a previous one from 1989. The provisions of the Act and the Fundamental Law reduced the role and position of the Court as a separated body in the tripartite power division. The reduction of competences is accompanied by the diminishing of the concluded cases as well.

Under democratic conditions, the enforcement of educational rights and obligations is one of the guarantees that the education and training system can fulfill its function effectively. In Hungary, the system of educational institutions and legal protection operating within the framework of the rule of law dates back to more than a quarter of a century, but experience in such a short period of time is significant. By presenting some of the rights and obligations related to public education, the paper gives the reader an idea of how a post-socialist country in Central and Eastern Europe operates its public education system and how it was able to adapt to European norms more than 30 years after the public law regime change. At the same time, this approach not only informs about the realization of the second-generation rights to education in Hungary, but also provides insight into the current direction of public education policy, for example through the issue of centralization-decentralization. Therefore, the study examines only those public education legal relations that are the most characteristic in terms of the presentation of the Hungarian system - in the opinion of the author -, and best reflect the public education conditions in Hungary.

The article discusses the issues of evolution of the political position of heads of government in Hungary. The time frame is between 1990 and 2020. A wide historical spectrum is included as well, showing the transformations of the supreme bodies of state power. After 1989, Hungary opted to establish a parliamentary cabinet system, with some strengthening of the government’s powers. The institution of the Prime Minister has become a real instrument of political power for the leaders of political factions in the countries discussed. The analysis takes into account both constitutional regulations and political practice over the past nearly 30 years. A particular strengthening of the political position of the Prime Minister can be seen after 2010.

In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights decided the case of Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary in favor of the two Romani boys who alleged that they had been misdiagnosed as ‘mildly mentally retarded’ and consequently placed and retained in a special school for their whole primary education. This, they claimed, deprived them of the educational opportunity to pursue their chosen vocational interests. In this research note, I will provide a brief view of the history of special education in Hungary, and the history of mental retardation in its medical/pedagogic connections. I will suggest that the Court’s decision, while a positive development, fails to address the fundamental systemic racism of the entire medico/educational system in Hungary, and that until that more radical change is undertaken, a disproportionate number of Romani children will continue to be officially and unofficially treated as mentally deficient.

Territorial and cultural autonomies in Transylvania. The pursuit and interpretations

The article presents the endeavours on the part of the multi-national and multicultural population living in Transylvania to create, within a span of several centuries, various types of autonomies, be it cultural or territorial.

Hungary’s role in the activity of the Ustasha – Croatian Revolutionary Movement (1929–1934)

Hungary’s role in the activity of the Ustasha - Croatian Revolutionary Movement (1929-1934). The Ustasha (Ustaša) movement developed in Hungary, establishing its cadre organisation framework, seeking the support of Croatian migrant communities and training task forces in diversion and terrorist tactics. Following their disclosure, however, they were no longer supported by the Hungarian authorities.

This article critically examines the main features of respective socio-economic legal frameworks to determine whether they constitute the specificity of Polish and Hungarian populism. The principle of equality serves as a theoretical framework for the assessment of both types of social design. Based on this legal criterion, differences in the social visions of both countries emerge, unveiling the perspective of an exclusive and inclusive social design. However, the conclusion appears that it is not the social-economic model itself that determines the specificity of populism in both countries but its juxtaposition with cultural arguments. Polish and Hungarian populisms are thus defined primarily by social frameworks and secondary by the rhetoric’s cultural component. The combination of social issues with those of cultural kind forms the substantive background of populism in its Polish and Hungarian editions.

This paper presents the results of our research related to the motivation of the adults when learning. Our analysis is focused on the comparison of the motivational features of adults learning process in four Eastern and Central European countries (Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine). The research is based on a qualitative survey. We used questionnaire of our design to learn about their motivation to participate in trainings, their interest and the possible hindrances. The subjects of the study are adult learners from the mentioned countries (N=556) who were in contact with the research partner institutions. Our results show that the majority of the respondents looked for pragmatic opportunities in learning useful for work and life, but also wanted to develop their interests and expand their knowledge. No country-specific characteristics were found, and potential differences were only observable in some cases.

The article analyzes the concept of illiberal democracy exemplified by two case studies of Hungary and Poland. The thesis of the paper states that their political systems showed signs of immaturity and institutional weakness of liberal democracy that caused the impossibility of rejection of illiberal project of political changes. To explain the breakdown of liberal democracy the paper aims at revealing both social and institutional aspects of transformation. The conclusions of the research let us to formulate the four-staged concept of the development of illiberal democracy in Hungary and Poland. The concept bases on the trajectory that begins with the social frustration of liberal democracy that leads to support for a populist party, which after victorious elections, implement the illiberal pattern of democracy. Methodologically the research benefits from the analytic and synthetic methods, the comparative method and institutional approach.

Udział organów władzy w stanowieniu prawa na Węgrzech

Na Węgrzech organem władzy ustawodawczej jest Parlament. Według regulacji Konstytucji węgierskiej kompetencję do uchwalania ustawodawstwa przysługuje Parlamentowi, najwyższemu organowi reprezentacji ludowej. Przedmiotem artykułu jest przedstawienie roli organu władzy ustawodawczej w procesie ustawodawczym. Autorzy odwołują się również do udziału innych organów władzy państwowej w stanowieniu prawa.

When analyzing the main problems in the bilateral Slovak-Hungarian relations in 1993–2002 it can be concluded that there were many barriers to an agreement in that period of time. Centuries-long Slovak dependence on Hungary increased the nationalistic tendencies among politicians and the Slovak society. Other factors that affected the mutual antipathy were provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, Benes Decrees, situation of Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the dispute over the dam on the Danube and the position of nationalist groups. The worst situation was during the rule of Vladimír Mečiar (1993–1998). This government’s actions met with a response from the Hungarian government, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. The consequence of this policy was the fact that Slovakia was not invited to the summit in Luxembourg (1997) to start negotiations with the EU. Similar situation happened in the context of the entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): while the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were invited to become member in Madrid in 1997, Slovakia remained as an outsider. Mečiar’s regime was also a period of crisis within the Visegrad Group which could have claimed to solve many bilateral issues. It would seem that after the elections in 1998 and the regime change in Slovakia it could come to the normalization of mutual relations. An important prerequisite for doing so was a coalition government, which included the Slovak Hungarians or with the establishment of a mixed commission to solve the most urgent problems. Both countries were forced to work together to achieve the priority in foreign policy, which was to enter the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For this purpose, the cooperation within the Visegrad Group was renewed. The question is whether it was this factor that caused the normalization of relations? It seems not. Both countries achieved their primary goal, and this cooperation was necessary. It does not change the fact that also during the Dzurinda government, there have been many frictions no longer directly associated with the activities of the government in Bratislava, but rather with the burden of the past. Another aspect was Viktor Orban’s former government in Hungary and the position of the extreme nationalist political parties.