The article describes and explains the phenomenon of the political myth of Margaret Thatcher – her anti–Scottish attitude and policies and its impact on the process of decomposition of the United Kingdom. The author indicates that the view of Margaret Thatcher’s dominance in Scotland is simplified, stripped of complexity, ignoring significant information conflicting with the thesis, but that also plays an important role in current politics, legitimizing secessionist demands and strengthening the identity of the Scottish community. In the contemporary Scottish debate with its unequivocal defence policy of Thatcher is outside of the discourse, proving its sanctity status. Thatcher could see this special Scottish dimension within the United Kingdom, but treated it rather as a delay in the reforms needed in the country. There are many counterarguments to the validity of the Thatcher myth. Firstly, many negative processes that took place in the 80s were not initiated by Thatcher, only accelerated. Secondly, the Tory decline in popularity in the north began before the leadership of Thatcher and has lasted long after her dismissal. The Conservative Party was permanently seen in Scotland as openly English. Thirdly, there is a lot of accuracy in the opinion that the real division is not between Scotland and England, only between southern England and the rest of the country. Widespread opinion that Thatcher was hostile to Scotland is to a large extent untruthful. She has never retreated radically from any of the Scottish privileges, such as the Barnett formula or the Scottish Development Agency. 

The Welsh identity is undisputable in national (i.e. ethnic), social, cultural and even economic dimensions however it is doubtful in political sphere because vast majority of the Welsh still cannot decide if they are more Welsh or British. The ’double identity’ dilemma was visible especially during devolution referendums voting in 1979, 1997 and 2011 when non–political motives were often much more determinative then the factor of belonging to the Welsh community in political meaning. Thus, answering to the question about devolution referendum role in shaping political dimension of Welshness requires thoroughly analyse of the mentioned referendums results as an evident figures of public support for establishing legal and institutional guarantees of maintaining and developing all aspects of national identity. In the article has been contained description how the Welsh relations to the idea of self–determination (in frames of the wide internal autonomy) have changed by last 35 years. An author shows also barriers and factors fostering this process. 

Terrorist violence has a long history in the United Kingdom and the Government has a long experience in adopting the legal measures to counter the danger. It was the Irish terrorist activity, which started in the XIX century and continued almost till the end of the XX century, that caused the developing of a well – regarded competency in counter – terrorism in the UK. Nevertheless, the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 and attacks in Great Britain on 7 and 21 of July 2005 compiled the UK Government to change its counter – terrorism policy. The UK had to provide legislation which could deal with the new terror provided by extreme radical Islamic networks waging a global jihad. The UK Government started to deal with this new international terrorism, by introducing the new anti – terrorist acts in 2001, 2005 and 2006. The Islamic terrorist treat started to reform the institutions for domestic counter – terrorism and create new international relations among the CT activities of national governments.

Eastern European immigrants coming to the UK since 2004 (in 2/3 from Poland) by their amount of work have concurred to serious growth of the GDP. But simultaneously they have been burden for British welfare system (among others by taking benefits for family members living outside the UK) and taking job even for minimum salary what have caused growth of native British unemployment. In this situation Conservative-Liberal Government leading by David Cameron have decided to limit an access to the UK labour market by language knowledge tests and tightening social benefits policy to job seekers. With informal support of main opposition parties (i.e. the Labour Party and the UKIP) D. Cameron have taken risky game showing he has been able to fight for his nation’s interests even in spite of huge protests of Polish and other Eastern European countries politicians and against the European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014. But when turning out into a defender of Britons’ rights he also has showed that there have been deep divisions between “old” and “new” Europe still after 10 years of the EU’s biggest enlargement in 2004.

Scottish Independence Referendum will take place on 18 September 2014. There would be only one question during referendum: “Should Scotland be an independent country? The reform of devolution established by Scotland Act 2012 is sometimes overlooked by observers as too little too late. The most principal issues of the referendum will be: economy, oil resources, currency, defense and European Union. Main doubt around referendum is whether Scotland would be better economically after Independence. Scotland’s position within the EU is likely to be shaped more by any agreements between the parties than by pre-existing principles of EU law.
Doubts about Scottish membership in the EU have to be viewed in the context of the referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union, that will take place if the Conservative Party wins the 2015. British political class have always behaved differently towards the European integration than continental elites The importance of the European dimension of the Scottish Independence Referendum was proved by Panelbase poll in May 2013.

The abject failure of British Prime Minister Theresa May to get the United Kingdom’s (UK) Withdrawal Agreement from the European Union (EU) through Parliament on 15 January 2019, with MPs overwhelmingly rejecting it by 432 votes to 202, has been put down to a variety of reasons. Primary among them has been the question of the post-Brexit status of the land border between the Republic of Ireland and the UK’s province of Northern Ireland. Although an issue which was initially seen as of minor importance, the significance of the Irish border steadily grew over time until it became the main stumbling block in UKEU Brexit negotiations brought about by the decision of the British people to leave the EU in a referendum held on 23 June 2016. Indeed, the key term of the ensuing debate, namely ‘the Irish backstop’, produced such confusion among politicians, political pundits and the general public that the House of Commons, split between so-called Brexiteers and Remainers, decided to reject May’s deal out of hand. This article seeks to argue that, from June 2016 (the time of the referendum) up to January 2019 (the time of the first vote on May’s Brexit deal in Parliament), the issue of the Irish backstop was seriously underestimated before suddenly taking centre stage and ultimately sabotaging the Withdrawal Agreement from within.

The article presents the positions of the UK and Polish governments on the importance of European security management as a factor influencing and shaping the defence doctrine in both states. Building on the systemic nature of European security, security management concepts, as defined in UK and Poland’s strategies for developing defence capabilities, have been examined using a system analysis. The assessment of the issue from the perspective of the UK and Polish governments is based on a decision-making analysis, while differences in the approach to European security are demonstrated through a comparative method. The authors have shown that the actual perception of European security as part of the global order is a factor determining the current involvement of the UK Government in the process of security management. However, the Polish government has shown interest in similar actions only to the extent these are convergent with national security.

The aim this present article is to describe what are the possible consequences may arise from the British Parliament’s amendment to the European Community Act. This includes the so-called “referendum lock” (is requires a referendum after any change in the EU’s institutional and legal status that would lead to an essential transfer of sovereignty to the EU), as well as the “sovereignty clause” (it confirms that it is solely the Parliament that holds direct legislative power within the territory of the United Kingdom). The passing of this act into law may have farreaching consequences for the future of the European Union. The necessity of conducting a referendum in European issues, in light of Britons’ extensive and continuous reluctance to European integration, may result in Great Britain’s exclusion from future pro-integration activities. This, in turn, could shatter the unity of the European nations and effectively lead to the victory of the “multi-speed” idea of integration.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy after its withdrawal from the European Union, which finally took place on February 1, 2020. Brexit made it necessary to redefine British foreign policy, including modification of the strategy aimed not only at maintaining but even strengthening the global position of the United Kingdom. A key element of this new strategy seems to be the strengthening of the US-British alliance, traditionally referred to as the Special Relationship. The author tries to prove the thesis that for the British government, reinforcing the cooperation with the United States is one of the most important ways to counteract the negative effects of Brexit. The experience so far shows, however, that it is not so easy, because after leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom has become for the United States, for many reasons, an increasingly less attractive partner.

The importance of relations with Australia and New Zealand as part of the UK’s post-Brexit engagement in the Indo-Pacific region

In the geopolitical situation in which Great Britain found itself after its withdrawal from the European Union in 2020, it was necessary to develop a new foreign and security policy strategy. The flagship concept of ‘Global Britain’ assumes the reorientation of the United Kingdom outside Europe and greater involvement in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. The article examines to what extent the intention to strengthen relations with as likeminded partners in the Indo-Pacific region coincides with the assumptions of Australian and New Zealand policies. It has been shown that the former British dominions, which are part of the so-called Anglosphere, have been given a vital role in securing the UK’s position as a world leader. From the perspectives of the national interest of both countries, rebuilding ties with the former empire is considered an important strategic element, although giving it a priority in the current geopolitical realities is not possible. Australia and New Zealand put special emphasis on developing cooperation with the Indo-Pacific countries.

The article attempts to answer whether, and if so, to what extent, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union (the so-called Brexit) impacted the British model of democracy. The starting point for the analysis is the famous classification of Arend Lijphart, who distinguished two main models of democracy – Westminster and consensus – identifying the United Kingdom as a prime example of the first of them. Using the method of institutional and legal analysis and the historical method, the author tries to prove the thesis that Brexit has shaken the foundations of the majoritarian democracy in the United Kingdom. However, the transformations of this model are not a new phenomenon, as they are part of the trend of changes occurring in this country, at least since the end of the 1990s. The article also proves the thesis that the serious political and systemic tensions to which Brexit – for very different reasons – led can be treated as temporary, as there is little indication that these tensions would permanently undermine the foundations of the Westminster model of democracy in the United Kingdom.

The „Shadow Cabinet” in the Westminster System of Government

The „shadow cabinet” appointed by the largest opposition party in the House of Commons is an integral part of the Westminster system of government. The practice of its creation originated in the UK in the second half of the 19th century, where it underwent a significant evolution linked to the coordination of the opposition’s strategy enabling it to become a government cabinet, as well as to the official recognition of the position of opposition party leader, who since 1937 has received a fixed salary. The modern and at the same time permanent appointment of shadow ministers who are at the same time spokespersons of the opposition on specific ministerial issues dates back to the long Conservative Party governments (1951–1964) against which the Labour Party formulated an official „shadow cabinet”. The aim of this article was to show the genesis of the „shadow cabinet”, to define its tasks and functions in the Westminster model of parliamentary-cabinet government.

In the 2014 referendum Scottish voters were asked whether Scotland should be an independent country. Several years and one Brexit referendum later Nicola Sturgeon, the then popular and charismatic leader of the Scottish National Party and First Minister of Scotland, was making a convincing case for another independence referendum. She even proposed October 2023 as its date. But the United Kingdom government and successive Conservative prime ministers have consistently said “no”. This article analyses that constitutional and political ‘tug-of-war’ in the context of devolution settlement, pro-independence aspirations of Scottish people, consequences of Brexit, and growing tensions between Edinburgh and London. The most fundamental constitutional question within that frame of reference is what Scotland’s viable path to independence should be and in other words, under what circumstances the independence vision could be implemented.