The article describes and explains the phenomenon of the political myth of Margaret Thatcher – her anti–Scottish attitude and policies and its impact on the process of decomposition of the United Kingdom. The author indicates that the view of Margaret Thatcher’s dominance in Scotland is simplified, stripped of complexity, ignoring significant information conflicting with the thesis, but that also plays an important role in current politics, legitimizing secessionist demands and strengthening the identity of the Scottish community. In the contemporary Scottish debate with its unequivocal defence policy of Thatcher is outside of the discourse, proving its sanctity status. Thatcher could see this special Scottish dimension within the United Kingdom, but treated it rather as a delay in the reforms needed in the country. There are many counterarguments to the validity of the Thatcher myth. Firstly, many negative processes that took place in the 80s were not initiated by Thatcher, only accelerated. Secondly, the Tory decline in popularity in the north began before the leadership of Thatcher and has lasted long after her dismissal. The Conservative Party was permanently seen in Scotland as openly English. Thirdly, there is a lot of accuracy in the opinion that the real division is not between Scotland and England, only between southern England and the rest of the country. Widespread opinion that Thatcher was hostile to Scotland is to a large extent untruthful. She has never retreated radically from any of the Scottish privileges, such as the Barnett formula or the Scottish Development Agency. 

This article aims to describe the possible variants of the course of events after Brexit, from a Scottish perspective. Three dimensions are taken into the account: future model of UK–EU relations, symmetry of Brexit inside the UK and possibility of the second independence referendum in the near future (less than five years). These dimension have allowed to distinguish three main variants of further development, that are in short named by the author as: passive variant, Scottish exception and another referendum. It seems at this point that the Scottish Government is bound to carry out the second referendum, especially if the British government chooses a variant of the so-called hard Brexit. The European argument, which is so often used by Sturgeon in political debate does not necessarily lead to an increase in support for the independence, especially when eventual membership in the European Union of an independent Scotland is burdened with so many question marks.

Scottish Independence Referendum will take place on 18 September 2014. There would be only one question during referendum: “Should Scotland be an independent country? The reform of devolution established by Scotland Act 2012 is sometimes overlooked by observers as too little too late. The most principal issues of the referendum will be: economy, oil resources, currency, defense and European Union. Main doubt around referendum is whether Scotland would be better economically after Independence. Scotland’s position within the EU is likely to be shaped more by any agreements between the parties than by pre-existing principles of EU law.
Doubts about Scottish membership in the EU have to be viewed in the context of the referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union, that will take place if the Conservative Party wins the 2015. British political class have always behaved differently towards the European integration than continental elites The importance of the European dimension of the Scottish Independence Referendum was proved by Panelbase poll in May 2013.

The upcoming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union is a source of tensions within the political system of the UK. Devolution is most likely to be affected by Brexit which can lead to conflicts between the UK as a whole and Scotland as its part. The Sewel Convention is a political constitutional norm establishing non-legal rules of cooperation between these two political bodies. Despite having been written in a statute, the Sewel Convention remains unenforceable by the courts. Nonetheless, the political consequences of diminishing it may be severe. The discrepancy between the political strength of Scottish nationalism, confirmed in the latest general election, and constitutional lack of Scottish “voice” in regard to Brexit may lead to a severe political crisis within the UK.

The article presents the main parties (i.e. the Conservative Party, Labor Party, Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party) results of the 2019 UK general election as well as an analysis of the most important issues (i.e. correct identification of voters’ expectations, simplicity and clarity of the messages, leaders’ personalities) which determined each party success or loss. The author proves that since Brexit was the primary focus of voters, the level of support for particular parties remained dependent on the solutions presented in this issue. This basis explains why the Conservatives in the whole UK and the SNP in Scotland won (and the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats lost) the battle of Brexit.

Od roku 2011 Szkocka Partia Narodowa prowadzi działania zmierzające do wystąpienia Szkocji ze Zjednoczonego Królestwa. Artykuł przedstawia koncepcje SNP i kolejnych rządów szkockich w dziedzinie polityki obronnej, odpowiadając na pytania, jaką rolę kwestie obronności odgrywają w ich planach oraz, czy realizacja tych planów umożliwi Szkocji zbudowanie sił zbrojnych dostosowanych do długofalowej polityki zagranicznej tego państwa, zmieniającej się sytuacji międzynarodowej oraz nowych zagrożeń.

In the 2014 referendum Scottish voters were asked whether Scotland should be an independent country. Several years and one Brexit referendum later Nicola Sturgeon, the then popular and charismatic leader of the Scottish National Party and First Minister of Scotland, was making a convincing case for another independence referendum. She even proposed October 2023 as its date. But the United Kingdom government and successive Conservative prime ministers have consistently said “no”. This article analyses that constitutional and political ‘tug-of-war’ in the context of devolution settlement, pro-independence aspirations of Scottish people, consequences of Brexit, and growing tensions between Edinburgh and London. The most fundamental constitutional question within that frame of reference is what Scotland’s viable path to independence should be and in other words, under what circumstances the independence vision could be implemented.