The problem of thorough and ultimate decommunisation in Ukraine got suddenly valid during Euromaidan on the turn of 2013/2014 and after its termination. It became a component of post–revolutionary reforms in the field of policy of memory. A year after Euromaidan Ukraine’s parliament adopted four “decommunisation laws” on 9 April 2015. One of them concerns the condemnation of the Communist regime and prohibition the propaganda of his symbols. The author analysed contents of the law and focused on the results of decommunisation, which included the cleansing the public space from Soviet–era legacy. Full implementation of the law was planned for the year. During this time the goal was almost fully implemented regarding the renaming of many locations and districts. The communist names of thousands streets, squares, urban districts were changed, although this process was delayed. The process of renaming of many institutions, industrial plants and press titles was very slow. 

The Euromaidan revolution totally reoriented Ukraine’s policy in both internal and external dimensions. The new Ukrainian authorities facing Russian aggression and domestic instability started to build a new national identity in order to consolidate social cohesion. Due to the fact that Kiev’s new historical narrative glorifies the Ukrainian nationalists from the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) who contributed to the Holocaust of Jews and committed mass murders on the representatives of other nationalities, such a  policy may be a  serious obstacle in the context of Ukraine’s external relations. The present article investigates particularly Israeli-Ukrainian relations after the Euromaidan revolution. The article analyses the impact of the new Ukrainian identity on bilateral relations as well as attempting to answer whether or not it may influence Kiev’s cooperation with the European Union. The article contains a brief description of the new identity building process in the post-Euromaidan Ukraine with special consideration of those elements of it, which are related to “Ukrainian Nationalism”.

Artykuł prezentuje stanowisko Ukraińskiej Cerkwi Prawosławnej (Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego) wobec Euromajdanu na Ukrainie na przełomie 2013/2014 r. Kościół ten zajął pozycję neutralną, w odróżnieniu od niektórych innych związków wyznaniowych, zwłaszcza tak zwanych Kościołów narodowych, które poparły protestujących. Jego oficjalne stanowisko wyrażało się w apelach do zachowania pokoju, porządku społecznego, integralności terytorialnej i jedności narodu, potępienia przemocy, nawoływania stron konfliktu do rozpoczęcia i kontynuacji dialogu. W artykule szczegółowo przeanalizowano przyczyny i skutki stanowiska Cerkwi.

The objective of this article is to establish the main goal the leaders of the parliamentary opposition wanted to achieve in the negotiations with the government during the Euromaidan. In this study, the following methods were applied: the historical method, data analysis, and case study. In the conclusion, it is noted that the main task of the parliamentary opposition in the negotiations with the government was to restore the Constitution of 2004, which limited the presidential competences in executive power and extended

The aim of this article is to define the role of the organisations established by the parliamentary opposition during the Euromaidan. The political opposition created the National Resistance Headquarters and the All-Ukrainian Union “Maidan” at that time. In the long term, they were supposed to become a tool for the opposition in the upcoming presidential elections. In the short term, in turn, they were to coordinate the actions of protesters during the Euromaidan throughout Ukraine. In order to achieve the research objective, the historical, systemic, and case study methods were used.

The geopolitical location between Russia and Germany has historically determined Poland’s foreign policy, in which Ukraine has been given a privileged place. Polish policy-makers have perceived Ukrainian independence as the main barrier preventing the restoration of Russian imperial ambitions. Consequently, Poland has been unwavering in its commitment to supporting the Ukrainians in their resistance to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This attitude was visible in Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s 2023 lecture at the University of Heidelberg. Nevertheless, relations between Ukraine and Poland and the current Russia-Ukraine conflict are far more complex than is mainly acknowledged. Behind Poland’s support, there is an unhealed wound of Ukrainian nationalism, which the current government in Ukraine does not want to unknowledge. The Ukrainian nationalist ideas, based on the slogan “Nation above all,” are very different from those of the Poles. Upon proper recognition of the multifaceted causes of war and the situation’s complexity, a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could be achieved.