- Author:
Türker Ertaş
- E-mail:
turker.ertas@deu.edu.tr
- Institution:
Dokuz Eylül University in Izmir, Turkey
- Year of publication:
2018
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
11-33
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2018.01.01
- PDF:
ppk/41/ppk4101.pdf
Summary On 12 December 2016, 316 deputies of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey submitted a constitutional amendment proposal which is mainly related to changing the parliamentary features of the system of government. The constitutional amendment bill was accepted by the Committee on Constitution of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with minor changes. Hereafter, the bill was discussed and voted on in the Grand National Assembly. The Grand National Assembly passed the constitution al amendment bill by 339 of 550 votes which is not enough for coming into force but holding a referendum by the President of the Republic2. The constitutional amendment law was promulgated by the President of the Republic on 11 February 2017, and the referendum was held on 16 April 2017. According to the official results declared by the Supreme Electoral Council, 51.41% of the valid votes are in favour, while 48.59% voted for no. Hence, the amendments were approved and are subject to coming into force. This article aims to point out the newly-introduced Turkish system of government by comparing the legislative and executive relations of the relevant constitutional systems which in this case are presidential U.S.A., semi-presidential France and super-presidential Russia. The other purpose of the article is to remark the formation of the judiciary branch of the American, English, German and French constitutional systems for the comparison of the regarding constitutional amendment law provisions. In this respect, the article comprises of a comparative legal/constitutional research in terms of legislative-executive-judiciary relations.
- Author:
Joanna Marszałek-Kawa
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika
- Year of publication:
2014
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
187-213
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2014.02.12
- PDF:
ppk/18/ppk1812.pdf
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 30 August 1995, Kazakhstan has a presidential form of government. The executive power in Kazakhstan has two branches, i.e. it consists of the head of state – the President of the Republic – who is elected for the period of seven years in general, equal, direct and secret elections, and of the government, which is accountable to the President and the Parliament. On the basis of the provisions of chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 28 January 1993, the unicameral parliament called the „Supreme Council” was the only representative and legislative body of the Republic. Two years later, in the referendum held in August 1995, citizens voted for the establishment of a bicameral parliament. The work and activity of the legislative branch, its structure and powers, is regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Constitutional Law № 2529 of 16 October 1996 entitled On the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of Its Deputies as well as other acts, such as parliamentary rules of procedure of both chambers or the Regulations of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted by both chambers of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan at their joint session As stipulated in art. 49 of the Constitution, the bicameral Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the highest representative body of the Republic performing legislative functions. The Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan is a classic example of a passive legislature, which is dominated by the president, the presidential political party, and which has a low level of autonomy. To sum up, it must be noted that parliaments are undoubtedly institutions which should be considered as the bodies conducive to the stability of a political system. According to P. Norton and D.M. Olson, such stability can be achieved when there is the balance of legitimisation within the system.on 20 May 1996. 1
- Author:
Dominika Liszkowska
- Institution:
Politechnika Koszalińska
- Year of publication:
2021
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
234-250
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2021.69.14
- PDF:
apsp/69/apsp6914.pdf
W niniejszym artykule przedstawiono główne cechy tureckiego modelu systemu prezydenckiego, a także historyczne uwarunkowania pozycji prezydenta w strukturze organów państwa w Turcji. Praca składa się z trzech części. W pierwszej z nich omówione zostały podstawy parlamentaryzmu, co jest kluczową kwestią dla ukazania kształtu tureckiego systemu przed reformą. Kolejnym zagadnieniem omawianym w tej części artykułu jest proces ewolucji prezydentury od pierwszych lat powstania Republiki do zmian wprowadzonych po wyborach prezydenckich i parlamentarnych w 2018 r. W drugiej części pracy wskazano uwarunkowania zmiany systemowej. Wreszcie w ostatniej dokonano analizy nowego systemu, określanego jako prezydencjalizm „w stylu tureckim”, i ukazano jego charakterystyczne cechy.