Constitutionality of acts of ceremonial deism in the U.S. case law

The paper deals with the notion of ceremonial deism, as it is understood in U.S. case law and jurisprudence. This term describes on kind of the government’s acts of symbolic references to God or religion, for example words „under God” in Pledge of Allegiance or the national motto – „In God We Trust”. American courts hold that particular forms of ceremonial deism are in accordance with the Establishment Clause due to their lack of a religious meaning (secularization thesis), nonsectarian nature, secular aims, historicity, ubiquity and non-controversiality. In the Author’s view, the above mentioned understanding of ceremonial deism is not fully proper. He calls on the rejection of secularization thesis and premise of non-sectarian nature. According to him, the public authorities’ acts of religious references are compliant with the Constitution when they perform significant secular aims, they do not have a devotional character and they constitute a testimony to the history and tradition of a particular country and its citizens. The criteria of ubiquity and non-controversiality may, due to its highly evaluative and subjective character, serve only a supportive role within the verification of the legality of a prima facie religious expression acts of the state. Theory of ceremonial deism, being understood properly, may constitute a valuable tool to evaluate the constitutionality of the public authority’s actions, also outside the United States.

The article deals with the study of the issue of diplomatic counterculture the definition of which the author introduces into scientific use. The breach of protocol takes place either due to its ignorance, which is non-typical for professional politicians, or for a public demonstration of zero tolerance to particular political objectives. In this context, the meeting of the Polish charge d’affaires with a representative of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) in Moscow dated February 1, 1995 is of special interest. The latter demanded from the diplomat to comment behavior of some members of the diplomatic corps, who didn’t stand up when signing the Internationale (anthem in that period) during one of the official events. Another NKID’s complaint against the diplomatic corps concerned the reluctance of diplomats to stand up for greeting the Soviet vozhds (leaders), including J.V. Stalin who didn’t hold any official leadership post in the system of the Soviet state. In the author’s opinion, J.V. Stalin was one among Soviet politicians of the most sophisticated improvisers, professionally manipulating the norms of diplomatic protocol and etiquette. In 1939, J. Ribbentrop had talked about vozhd as a man with extraordinary power. Stalin managed to daze Minister of Foreign Affairs of German and, in August 1942, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom W. Churchill marked Stalin’s hospitality at a dinner in the Kremlin and offered to drink to his health. It has been found that one of the blatant cases of diplomatic counterculture is the conduct of N.S. Khrushchev during the meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in 1960. “Shoe diplomacy” didn’t raise the credibility of the Soviet leader in the minds of the global community. The ignorance of protocol rules may lead to the loss of the reputation of a government leader, and as a consequence, negatively affect the country’s image, its attractiveness, which is a hallmark of the “softpower” of the state.