The constitutional principle of equality based upon Act of 4 November 2016 on the support of pregnant women and families „For life”

This contribution presents issue connected to implementation of the constitutional principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination within Act of 4 November 2016 on the support of pregnant women and families „For life”. Author brings regulations concluded in the content of the indicated act closer, thereafter he performs a presentation of the principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination, with an aid of jurisdiction and doctrine standpoints. Final part of contribution consists confrontation between mentioned principle and pointed prohibition with this part of the „For Life” Act, which sketch presumptions allowing to apply for one time benefit, in the amount of 4 000 zloty, for giving birth to alive child, who were diagnosed with severe and irreversible impairment or with incurable illness endangering their life, under a condition that woman would stay under medical healthcare no later than from 10th week of pregnancy till labour.

It is clear that the prohibition of discrimination and the principle of equality are one of the most important principles of human rights. Today, since the number of discrimination issues has increased in the usual flow of life, the matter of how far the valid law can protect individual, who constitutes the core of the society from discrimination is controversial. In Turkish Constitution, there is no independent article which orders the prohibition of discrimination. Cases which relate to the discrimination are considered with the principle of equality in Article 10. The scope of the present paper is to show how the prohibition of discrimination is embodied in Turkish Constitutional Court’s approach and its historical background. Secondarily, the Turkish Constitutional Court’s approach regarding these issues are emphasized and to what extent the decisions given by the Turkish Constitutional Court are similar to the decisions given by ECHR are argued. Comparative and historical method will be used in this paper.

Ombudsman Institutions in Universities and the Principle of Their Autonomy

The constitutionally guaranteed principle of autonomy of universities, necessary for the implementation of the mission of the system of higher education and science means, among other things, that the authorities of higher education institutions must be left with the sphere of free decision on matters of internal organization. In view of the problems that occur in the life of academic communities, related, among others, to the implementation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, the need to provide special protection for persons with disabilities, the authors reflect on the need to create ombudsman institutions in universities, indicating the principles on the basis of which such bodies could be created and operate in such a way that it could be reconciled with the principle of autonomy of universities.

Consiclering legal aspects of non-disrimination clause in the Russian Federation, the Authors starts their assessment from an international law perspective (based on adopted acts). Despite the United Nations’ recomendation the Russian Federation has no act that regulates non-discrimination and anti-discrimination policy

From Constitutionally Derived Accessibility, Towards the Right to Accessibility?

A scholarly assumption that relates to the non-stand-alone character of the category of accessibility, which is a certain normative abstract, was given the form of a research hypothesis. Confirmation or falsification of it will allow us to look at accessibility against the constitutionally determined human rights-related triad of values: human dignity, equality before the law and non-discrimination. This triad, in turn, will be given the status of an axiological ratio of introducing the category of accessibility, both to the multi-centric law system and to the on-going legal discourse on persons with special needs, including those with disabilities. Social determinants of accessibility in genere determine its legal essence. Therefore, striving to equip accessibility with the value of efficiency, would it be justified to place it within a normative framework of the right to accessibility if we were to find de lege lata reasons for it?