The referendum on the dissolution of the parliament held in Latvia on July 23, 2011

Of the numerous direct democracy instruments present in the Latvian Satversme, one of the most interesting solutions is the mechanism of a referendum concerning dissolution of the parliament, initiated by the head of state. A spectacular, and so far the only, example of application of this mechanism was the referendum held on 23 July 2011, as a result of which the Latvian Saeima was dissolved. The article analyzes the constitutional provisions that define this form of direct democracy, taking into account the Latvian political practice. The article focuses on the application of this institution in 2011 and emphasizes the associated social and political conditions. On the background of the Latvian constitutional and political system, in particular the mutual relations between the President of the State and the Saeima, the article presents the importance of this instrument to the Latvian political system and an evaluation of its potential with regard to the system of government.

The formula of fixed-term parliament in Great Britain and its constitutional implications

The article raises an issue of legal construction of cadence of the House of Commons under the regime of the Fixed-term Parliament Act 2011. The author examines the legal rules included in the bill, showing all the constitutional consequances that they trigger. First, he makes an explanation what was the change that the lawmaker has decided to apply. Second, he also depicts the results of abolishing the prerogative of monarch for dissolving parliament. Finally, he performs the new procedures on the dissolving parliament, which he makes with an assumption to put emphasis on the meaning of these rules for the constitutional system on the Thames.

In the direction of Scandinavian model of parliamentary monarchy?  Changes in British constitutional law to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

Subject of the paper is Fixed -term Parliaments Act which was adopted in 2011, under which the British monarch lost power to dissolve the parliament, which was in force since the beginning of the English parliamentarism. The author analyzes the few Polish and Anglo-Saxon literature comments to the Act, and also indicates the consequences of different legal solutions to the structure of the British constitution. As a result of the adoption of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 there has been a change in the British Constitution: constitutional convention of Lascelles Principles lost its power, and also the earlier prerogative of the monarch expired and the so-called statute laws was added yet another piece of legislation. The author also notes that the adoption of the Act led to the inhibition of evolutionary strengthening the position of Prime Minister, among other organs of the state.

The aim of this article is to analyze political objectives and repercussions of the dissolutions of the House of Representatives by Prime Ministers Koizumi Jun’ichirō in 2005 and Abe Shinzō in 2014. In both cases dissolutions took place less than two years after the previous elections. The paper argues that the strengthened power of the heads of government after electoral and administrative reforms facilitated them to take advantage of Diet dissolution to overcome opposition by veto players. By appealing to the public Koizumi planned to privatize the Japan Post and Abe intended to postpone the consumption tax hike. In both cases the prime ministers used early elections to enhance their position in the ruling party. As a result, Koizumi managed to overcome pressure from postal employees and Abe gained leverage over Ministry of Finance (MOF) bureaucrats.