This article concerns the legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (Naczelny Dowódca Sił Zbrojnych). This is one of the most significant state organs for security that is nominated for a time of war. The main elements of his legal status were defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and elaborated in the statutory regulation. Pursuant to these documents this organ is subordinate to the Head of State and his functioning is defined during a war. His basic competences embrace commanding of the Polish Armed Forces together with ensuring the co-operation of the subordinated forces with their allied counterparts in planning and conducting the military operations. He bears the constitutional responsibility for the violation of the Constitution and the statute. Nevertheless, this regulation is neither comprehensive nor holistic. The reason of this is the fact that some of its components require various rules of interpretation (e.g. neutrality concerning the political issues), whereas the other have not been regulated at all (e.g. the demands in respect to the candidates). For these reasons it was demanded to specify the legal status of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. 

Presidential supremacy over the armed forces in Poland after 1989

The primary purpose of considerations undertaken in this article is to identify and analyse the changes of the form and practice of presidential supremacy over the armed forces in Poland after 1989. Thanks to the findings of these consideration the author answered the following research questions: (1) how did presidential powers in the field of the supremacy over armed force change after 1989 (2) how did their practice change? (3) what influence did political practice have on presidential supremacy over armed forces? Thanks to the answers to these question the following hypothesis was verified: although about transformations and form of presidential supremacy over armed forces were determined by changes in the Constitution, very important in this area was also political practice, which decided about real participation of holder of the presidential office in the army management. Considerations have been divided into three parts, which describe the form and the practice of presidential supremacy over the armed forces during the functioning of: the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1952 (amended Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic), Constitutional Law of 17 October 1992 on the Mutual Relations between the Legislative and Executive of the Republic of Poland and local government, as well as the Polish Constitution of 1997. The conclusions of were presented at the end.

Supreme command of the President of the  Republic of Poland of the Armed Forces (selected subjects)

The article presents the status of the President of the Republic of Poland in the executive structure in Poland, taking into account the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the dispute settlement between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of Poland (Kpt 2/08). The author also defines the Presidential power of „supreme command” over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (Polish Constitution, Article 134) and the manner in which it is exercised it in times of peace (through the Minister of National Defence), as well as in times of war (through the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces). The article also shows selected specific powers of the President provided for in the statutory law.

The rights of the President of the Republic of Poland  in the scope of supreme authority over the Armed Forces  during the term of Constitution of 17th March 1921

The article concerns the rights and activities of the president as a superior of the armed forces while the Constitution of 17th March 1921 was in force. The first part of the article is dedicated to a short description of the relation between the legislature and the executive, and the position of the armed forces in the Constitution of 17th March 1921. The second part of the article relates to detailed analysis of the constitutional and the statutory responsibilities of the President as a Superior of the Armed Forces. It was difficult to determine the character of the supreme authority of the President because there was no regulation defining the organization of general military authorities in the country. Formally, in a time of peace, the armed forces were subordinate to the President through the Minister of National Defense, who was liable to Sejm. The third part of the article constitutes the analysis of discussed powers after the constitutional amendment of 2nd August 1926. According to the provisions of the amendment, the President received the rights to issue a regulation with force of statute. His systemic position has strengthened, and as a consequence, it has a major impact on the extension of his rights as far as his authority over the Armed Forces is concerned. Furthermore, the author conducts dogmatic analysis of the regulations and constitu- tional practice concerning the supreme authority.

Meanders in Civilian Control over the Armed Forces in Poland After 1989

The article presents considerations and opinions on the observance of constitutional principles related to civil and democratic control over the armed forces after 1989 in Poland. The control, supremacy, and supervision of the civil authorities over the organs of violence are one of the greatest challenges a democratic state must face. Civilian control of the military is vital today, as NATO has made it a prerequisite for membership. The article aims to present a research problem and answer the question – how each side perceives its role and what function it fulfils in terms of control, authority, and supervision – from the public respect and popularity enjoyed by a given politician, political institution, or armed forces to the administrative or political abilities of the ruling politicians. Civilian control should also be accepted by military commanders and political leaders in power and result from the institutional and legal regulations adopted in a given country and the experience of NATO members. The armed forces are to serve the state, protect its independence, security, and territorial integrity, and therefore maintain political neutrality, not selected political groups (parties) or society. Since there is no uniform model or system of control over the military, there are only common principles necessary to guarantee democratic and civilian control over the armed forces in the state.