The filling composition of the constitutional court in Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries in the context of its independence

Constitutional courts, in order to perform their function of the constitutional review, should be independent of the creator of that law. Independence can be operationalized as a mechanism for filling and changing the composition of courts as defined in the legislation, and also as a difficulty in changing these rules. In this perspective one can describe the extent of independence of the Polish constitutional court against the background of courts in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It can be said that there is a field to increase the independence of the Polish court, eg by increasing the diversity of entities entitled to fill the court or by introducing regular rotation in the positions of the judges at specific dates (instead of individual mandates). But the greatest degree of court independence threatens, compliant with constitution or inconstitutional interference in the composition and constitutional court system, done in the interest of the ruling majority that makes this interference.

Responsibility of the Judicial Power and Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges

Two circumstances: ineffective legal protection system and controversial cases of abandonment of enforcement of judges’ disciplinary liability have become a basis for justifying amendments to regulations on judges’ disciplinary liability. New solutions are characterised by, among other features, the limiting of the independence of the judiciary and subjecting it to increased control exercised by the legislature and the executive. The rationale behind these changes is to be sought for in a claim that courts of law are not a representative of the people which can be considered qual to the other authorities and that, therefore, having been abused by judges, the rights they have enjoyed hitherto (other than the administration of justice) should be constrained. Some judges and representatives of the jurisprudence reject this argumentation pointing out that rather than being conducive to the declared goals of improving the functioning of courts and of judges’ observance of law, the amendments result in the limiting of the citizen’s right to an independent tribunal. In these circumstances, a dispute has arisen over how a judge should act if the law on disciplinary liability prohibits their right to criticise or legally verify regulations depriving them of the guarantee of independence and impartiality. Do the statutable principles of disciplinary liability also determine all the principles of the judiciary liability? What if there is a difference of opinions between the representatives of the legislature and the executive versus those of the judiciary concerning an interpretation of the citizen’s right to a tribunal and of the notion of “independence of a tribunal”? Analysing the legal and doctrinal argumentation offered by both parties may facilitate answering these questions. This approach may also prove useful in determining whether enforcing the new principles of disciplinary liability will resolve the current crisis in the relationship between courts and the other authorities or, on the contrary, initiate its further stage.

On the Compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of the Appointment of Judges – Members of the National Council of the Judiciary by the Sejm

The subject of this text is to determine whether Article 9a of the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary is compatible with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In order to answer this question, the relationship that should prevail between the various authorities in a system based on the principle of separation of powers was analyzed. Then, doubts were resolved as to whether the NCJ is a body appearing in the division of powers of the judiciary. In the end, it was concluded that in the RP, the Sejm should have no other creative powers over the judiciary than those expressly provided for in the Constitution of the RP. Otherwise, the chamber is placed in a position of unjustified supremacy vis-àvis the judiciary, and the judicial power provides no guarantee that human freedoms and rights will be decided by independent and impartial courts staffed by independent judges.