Obtaining judgments of common and administrative courts under the law on access to public information

The purpose of this article is to examine, whether the amendment to the law on access to public information, dated on November 7 th , 2014, directly recognizing the content of judgments for public information, is in accordance with the existing line of case law and views of doctrine. At the same time the article is an invitation to discussion under what circumstances and in what form a refusal to provide the court judgment is allowed, especially for the sake of protection of privacy of individuals or in the case of request for processed information. This research is conducted with the use of legal dogmatic and descriptive method. The key assumption of this article is to state that the content of judgments is an example of simple (unprocessed) public information. Access to public information is not an absolute right, ergo it is subject to restrictions, among which the Author devotes special attention to the protection of privacy. Finally, it should be noted that in some cases, even anonymization of content of the judgment or refusal to make it available may in fact make the protection of privacy only illusory. It is therefore desirable to clarify by the legislator or case law the procedure for access to content of court judgments.

One of the main goals of the General Data Protection Regulation was to harmonize the way personal data is being protected in all Member States. This goal will not be achieved if a similar interpretation of its provisions does not accompany the application of the GDPR. It is particularly important when meaning is assigned to an indefinite phrase that different authorities and entities can understand variously as they apply the same law in each Member State. The phrase in question is that of “disproportionate effort” as used in Art. 14 para. 5 letter b of the GDPR. The article is intended to provide an exemption from complying with the controller’s obligation to provide information (where personal data have been obtained indirectly). Since the right to be informed about collecting and using personal data is one of the fundamental rights granted to the data subject under the GDPR, a uniform application of the standard laid down in Art. 14 of the GDPR is of importance to ensure.

The question of adequacy of data protection model in the United States is one of the most important in transatlantic business and politic relations. The fact that European Commission’s decisions recognizing the adequacy have been annulled twice put relations between EU and US in very difficult phase. In this article I aim to analyse whether basis guarantees for privacy protection in the United States in the shape of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution are adequate in the meaning of data protection model in EU. By looking at the practice of interpreting of the Fourth Amendment and art. 8 of European Convention of Human Rights, in line with police directive and GDPR I try to answer the questions if the Fourth Amendment protection gives enough guarantees to ensure respect towards privacy and data protection rights of individuals.