The paper discusses some fundamental differences between Aristotelian and modern conceptions of the state. It focuses its attention on the early liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and contrasts the theory of state developed by them with the classical republican ideal described by Aristotle. As I will demonstrate main differences come down to (1) distinct ideas concerning the state’s origins (and especially human motivations behind establishing the state), (2) divergent convictions about the role of the state and its ethical dimension; and finally (3) different beliefs concerning basic feelings and passions which sustain existence of political community. I argue that on the basis of Stagirite’s philosophy it is possible to question whether civic association described by the precursors of liberal political thought is actually the state. In conclusion, I signalize the problem of serious limitations of contemporary liberal democracies (or even their internal contradictions) resulting from their attempt to follow an ideal of an ideologically neutral state. 

The article refers to the class of situations in which abandoning the principle of legalism occurred in connection with the threat to the basic interests of a society and a state. The political history of the United States provides numerous examples of this kind of events. During international armed conflicts involving the US, civil wars or revolutions, the political leaders of this modern constitutional state have often decided to breach the law in order to overcome the danger threatening „the life of the nation”. One of the explanations for this state of affairs was the fact that the constitution of 1787, as distinguished from many other contemporary national constitutions, did not contain detailed solutions for the times of crisis. The activity of American presidents in the area of national security was grounded on expanding interpretations of their competences defined in the Basic Law. One of the theoretical grounds for president’s emergency power doctrine was the theory of prerogative elaborated by John Locke in the late 17th century. The article seeks to provide answer to the following paradox. Why did Locke, despite his involvement in developing the idea of the rule of law, also accept exercising extralegal prerogative powers in cases of emergency? The English philosopher defined the prerogative as „the power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”. The idea of extralegal powers has become a recurring motif in the history of the United States’ liberal political culture. Proponents of this vision were convicted that uncertainty, contingency and an unforeseen cases are an inherent features of social and political life, which in many cases elude legal regulation. Recently, the renaissance of Locke’s theory of prerogative has taken place in connection with the war on terrorism, in form of an extralegal measures doctrine.

The paper reconstructs John Locke’s critique of Edward Herbert’s conception of common notions presented in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Though aimed at the epistemological significance of the term, the critique seems to miss the point, since due to the Platonic character of Herbert’s philosophy, the notions have also a metaphysical and religious significance overlooked by Locke. Thus the attack is justified only in part: for Herbert, the rationality of nature is understood as an ideal and not as a certain historic state of affairs, as Locke seems to suggest. It is an interesting feature of the discussion, that both the common notions and their critique is aimed at justification of religious rationality. The difference between both philosophers seems to have its roots in different understanding of knowledge. For Herbert it relates to an ideal, conceptual structure of reality, whereas for Locke it culminates in natural histories of cumulative character.