O granicach swobody ustawodawcy w kształtowaniu standardów prawa do sądu
- Institution: Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
- Year of publication: 2016
- Source: Show
- Pages: 31-46
- DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2016.03.02
- PDF: ppk/31/ppk3102.pdf
The limits of legislator’s leeway in regulation of the constitutional right to a fair trial
In Article 45 section 1 and Article 77 section 2 of the Constitution enacts the right to court understood as the right of access to a court, i.e. the right to initiate proceedings before a court, the right to frame a judicial procedure in accordance with the requirements of fairness and transparency, the right to a ruling by independent and impartial court, i.e. the right to obtain a binding resolution of the case by the court within a reasonable period of time and prohibition of disabling legal means serving the pursuit of constitutional rights and freedoms. The right to a fair trial is not absolute and may be restricted by using the rules set out in Article 31 section 3 of the Constitution (restriction can be introduced by statue only when it is justified in democratic state of law it is necessary to secure protection, public order, protection of the environment, health, public morality, and must not violate the essence of the rights and freedoms).