The institution of oath (affirmation)  and the protection of freedom of conscience and religion

Legal obligation to take the oath may interfere with the fundamental rights of the individual, especially with freedom of conscience and religion. In the particular states there are various ways to remove these type of collision, for example, the ability to take affirmation in place of the oath-taking or the extraordinary admissibility of the oath’s text modification. The given options are anchored in the statute law provisions or in the judicial practice. Not always, however, the indicated solutions are fully responsive to possible conscientious objections. In the author’s view, instead of derogation of the title institution from legal orders, oaths’ texts should attain the “appropriate” form – ie. oath wording refers to a relatively universal values –and a certain degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the law is needed. The obligation to take the oath and obligation to respect fundamental rights may be seen as the optimization requirements, and the most proper way to remove conflicts between them in a particular case is to use the method of proportional weighing in accordance with the Robert Alexy’s theory of legal principles.

Relations between the state and churches and religious associations in Poland

Freedom of conscience and religion is the foundation of the modern concept of a democratic state ruled of law. This concept is a source of limitations for this freedom. This freedom cannot be considered solely in the sphere of the psyche and in the sphere of privacy. The author presents and analyzes the regulation in question against the background of the principles determining the position of churches and religious associations in the state and their relations with the state.

Examining Conscientious Objection as a Mean of Safeguarding Individual Freedom of Conscience: Reflections on Art. 85 of the Polish Constitution

This article examines the conscience clause, which is also known as conscientious objection, and its purpose in protecting an individual’s beliefs when they come into conflict with positive law. Specifically, the author discusses how the conscience clause applies to the constitutional duty to perform military service. In the case of mandatory military service, the legislator recognizes the possibility of a conflict of conscience for an individual when the duty to perform military service would be in conflict with the moral principles upheld by that individual. To address this issue, the legislator has introduced the institution of alternative service. Alternative service, which includes, among other things, work in the fields of environmental protection, fire protection, healthcare, social assistance, and care for people with disabilities or the homeless, has become a constitutional guarantee for the freedom of conscience and religion expressed in Article 53 of the Constitution.