EEC/EU membership has been one of the thorniest issues in British politics over the last 45 years. The 1975 referendum confirmed the UK’s will to stay in the EEC, but it failed to put to rest the argument over Europe. The 2016 referendum took Britain into the opposite direction, but it also reinstated the issue of the EU to the prime slot in British politics, where it is going to stay for the many years needed to settle the new relationship with the EU. The main drivers behind both referenda were the power struggle between the main parties and the gradual entrenchment of Euroscepticism as the dominating standpoint in British right-wing politics. The substantive concerns with EEC/ EU membership were merely a backdrop to the partisan battles leading to both referenda, but the crucial differentiating factor in 2016 was the Conservative perception of the threat posed by UKIP. The Eurozone crisis and austerity policies at home added to the potent mix of disillusion among the voters, who became receptive to promises of return to past glories of the UK freed from the shackles of Brussels.

The objective of this article is to explain the differing levels of support achieved by Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament elections in Poland for the years 2004, 2009, and 2014. Taking into account the specificity of EP elections, which in theory assign greater importance to European issues, the analysis is conducted using the “Eurosceptic opportunity structure”, which is composed of: political space, social attitudes towards integration, and the external factor (the dynamics of the European integration process). Additionally, there is analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties standing for election. The analysis demonstrates that the supply and demand sides created a similar opportunity structure for Eurosceptic parties in all three elections, while the external factor provided those parties with greater possibilities in 2004 and 2014. Analysis of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties, however, indicated that they had greater chances to attract voters by invoking the European question in 2004 and 2014. The combination of these conclusions along with the support received by Eurosceptics in particular elections confirms the validity and the explanatory function of the adopted assumptions, while emphasizing the fundamental role played by the parties themselves in the examined aspect. Nonetheless, to confirm the primary assumption and state with more certainty the impact of the European issue on electoral behaviours, more in-depth analysis is necessary.

Contemporary extremely nationalistic discourse on the example of the French National Front and the Dutch Party for Freedom

The article describes and compares the two extremely nationalist groups which is: the French National Front, led by Marine Le Pen and the Dutch Freedom Party, founded by Geert Wilders. The publication presented the key demands of the program and forms of action of this organizations. Subsequentliy comparative analysis of these two parties was conducted, which shows that the French formation evolves into softened public discourse, while the Dutch constantly radicalized their message. In the last part of the publication, it will be also outlined the political future of these groups, placed in the broader context of the functioning of the extreme nationalist organizations.