While the Court has, to some degree, started to protect against discrimination based on birth or nationality, the protection against discrimination on the basis of race until 2005 has been very poor and dubious. Upon reviewing the case law of the ECHR, we find that since the case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of language in education in Belgium” v. Belgium in 1968, the Court has decided to opt in favor of the original English version of art. 14, which underscores that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms must be assured “without discrimination” and defends the concept that equality should be interpreted as non-discrimination, while clarifying that this disposition does not prohibit preferential treatment, such that, in the eyes of the Court, this principle is only violated when preferential treatment implies “a discriminatory treatment”, so the task for us is to determine in detail when the two are correlated. The cited decision is an essential reference as it provides the pointers needed to discern whether or not a violation of art. 14 exists, as in a “test” of equality that entails: (1) whether the distinction in treatment lacks objective justification; (2) whether the difference in treatment results in conformity with the objective of the effects of the measure examined attendant to the principles that generally prevail in democratic societies; (3) whether there exists a reasonable relationship between the means used and the end sought. Despite this interpretational recognition of art. 14, if we analyze in detail the Court’s jurisprudence, how the Court has approached the topic of discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin is somewhat disappointing. The fact that during decades plaintiffs were required to provide proof beyond the shadow of a doubt has restricted the Court’s influence on discriminatory actions based on race or ethnicity; for this reason, it is not unexpected that in time critical dissidence arose, even within the Court itself. A good example of this is given by Judge Bonello in the decision Anguelova vs Bulgaria (2002). Here we analyze how the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg has evolved in the context of discrimination against Roma, so as to ascertain the challenges that remain in this area.

Civil Service in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal

The civil service (c.s.) is a key element of any nation of law. As an institution responsible for exercising the public authority c.s. is not free from political pressure and takeover attempts for the purposes of the party. Polish experience in the creation of a politically neutral c.s. has not been impressive. The first regulation was created during the interwar period. After the World War II, the idea of an independent and professional c.s. was gradually dismantled to be completely abandoned in 1974. After the collapse of PRL, until 1996, there were several unsuccessful attempts to revive c.s. In that year the parliament adopted a basis for the c.s. system but even that attempt was subsequently revised in upcoming years by further changes (three new acts of law). Moreover, it has to be pointed out that during those years the actions of decision-makers concerning the c.s. have been the subject of jurisprudence by the Constitutional Tribunal. The rulings issued by the Tribunal have shaped the operational conditions which are important for c.s. and have developed an interpretation of the constitutional axioms of that institution. Analysis of key sentences of the Constitutional Court is the subject of this paper.

The U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has often delineated the borders of American racial politics. In some way, the Supreme Court decisions reflected economic, political, cultural, and ideological values of the contemporary society. The decision of Plessey v. Ferguson was a symbolic establishment of the separate but equal doctrine. It was also significant from the perspective of American federalism. In the 1950s, several rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court influenced American racial politics and paved the way for changes in the context of the development of civil rights. The decision of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was victory of the civil rights movement. It was perceived as a model for the subsequent cases. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the right of interposition. It was assumed that the power to declare federal laws unconstitutional applied not to the state but only to federal judiciary.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the American reform movements tried to match American ideals with the challenges of the times. Progressive attitudes highlighted the necessity of reforms. The Chinese issue, often risen in the public dialogue, was the subject of deliberation of the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the federal executive branch of government. Chae Chan Ping v. United States and subsequent cases established the doctrine of consular noneviewability referring to immigration law and delineating the scope of judicial review for decisions concerning the admission of immigrants to the United States. They also strengthened the plenary power doctrine. We may ask if the Supreme Court judgments were in conformity with the ideas of American Progressivism. Unfortunately, the Chinese Exclusion Cases were not compatible with the visions of progressive reformers and reflected anti-Chinese sentiment rather than an aspiration for reforms.

The Category of “Legitimation” in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal – Constructive Semantic Conditions

This paper aims to analyze the Constitutional Tribunal’s (CT) jurisprudence regarding the term “legitimation” to reconstruct its definition and compare it with its lexical meaning. Despite its varied use across multiple contexts, the jurisprudence lacks a uniform definition of legitimation. This situation necessitates reliance on diverse semantic intuitions. A doctrinal-legal method combined with logical-linguistic analysis was employed, analyzing 100 CT rulings that used the term “legitimation”. The CT’s jurisprudence shows that the application of the term is not limited to legal legitimacy but also includes broader contexts such as social perception, alignment with the values of the legal system, or the sovereign’s will. It is used in contexts that align with previous lexical findings, suggesting that legitimation can be viewed both as a state and a process. The analysis confirms the need for a terminological distinction, which could help organize discourse around this concept.