The Institution of the Oath of Office of Head of State in European States

This article as one of the first in legal – not only polish-language – literature presents a comparative analysis of the issue of a head of state’s oath of office. The paper underlines differences, similarities and peculiarities in legal regulations of the institution of the oath of office in regard to European presidents and monarchs. The study touches especially on such topics as the oath formula, its optional or obligatory religious dimension, the time of taking the oath, the subject which officially receives it, consequences of taking the oath and legal effects of the oath’s infringement. The basic normative analysis, both on constitutional and statutory level, was supplemented with remarks on the practice of the given institution, for example the oath’s taking ceremony. Description of presidential or royal authority in particular states is not complete without a reference to the institution of the oath of office. The arguments undertaken in the article aim to prove that the title subject cumulates several relevant issues, which are noteworthy for jurisprudence. Taking the oath of office by any president or monarch is not so much a solemn symbolic event as conventional activity important in view of the legal order.

The British Monarch and the Safeguards of the Constitution

Under unwritten constitution, part of which are constitutional conventions courts are unable to guarantee obedience to constitutional rules and values. In United Kingdom it is therefore the monarch who stands as a custodian of the constitution. Royal prerogatives that are normally exercised only on advice of responsible ministers can be used to protect constitution. The most important are so-called reserve powers to dismiss prime minister and other ministers, to dissolve parliament and to give royal assent. The Monarch is able to successfully perform this function despite the want of democratic legitimacy but he should always be cautious and act only if he is perfectly positive that his intervention is absolutely necessary. He would therefore be entitled to intervene only in a dire emergency if political actors stood against the fundamental rules of parliamentary democracy, responsible government and sovereignty of the people.