The article is an analysis of strengthening the powers and status of the Federal Security Service. The main context is the new anti-terrorism law adopted in 2016. The main thesis of the article is the belief that the new anti-terrorism law significantly expands the powers, control and a surveillance of the Federal Security Service, which has a dominant role in the system of the Russian secret services. Hypothetical relationship between the new law and the consolidation of influence of Federal Security Service is one of the stages of FSB-fication of power in the Russian Federation.

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie kompetencji, funkcji oraz politycznego potencjału utworzonej w 2016 roku Federalnej Służby Gwardii Narodowej Federacji Rosyjskiej. Powstanie nowej specsłużby jest konceptualizowane jako sformalizowany przykład ewolucyjnej FSB-fikacji władzy w Rosji. Analizowany w artykule casus utworzenia Federalnej Służby Gwardii Narodowej wpisuje się w rosyjską tradycję służb specjalnych jako strategicznego narzędzia zabezpieczającego reżim przed potencjalną destabilizacją w perspektywie elekcji prezydenckiej w 2018 roku.

The significance of Russian-Chechen relations for contemporary international security

The main purpose of my work is to present the determinants and dependencies that characterize the Russian-Chechen relations for international political and economic security in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, especially the Russian Federation.
At the beginning, I intend to trace the process of the Chechen war and consolidate the power of the current leader of the country, Ramzan Kadyrov with the help of the President Russia, Vladimir Putin. At the same time, I will present the geopolitical significance of Chechnya in the international security system. In the following, I would like to present the implications of Russian-Chechen relations for other countries of the former USSR area- Ukraine, where in all probability Chechen “volunteers” participated in the fighting in Donbas. Finally, an important element of this work will be signaling, that President Kadyrov, despite aware of the Kremlin’s dependence on many matters, especially in economic terms, is starting to pursue an increasingly independent policy, as exemplified by the growing islamization of Chechnya, the participation of Chechen the Syrian conflict, Kadyrov active participation in the persecution of the Russian opposition, and finally the defense by the Chechen policy of the Muslim population of Rohingya in Myanmar against Moscow abstemious position. I would like to present the possible consequences of the above actions for the Russian Federation. It is not a secret that President Putin, despite the declared support for Kadyrov, is increasingly disapproving of some of his actions. In addition, it will be reasonable to present the reception of Kadyrov’s activities in other post-Soviet areas.
In summary, I intend to answer the question whether major changes in the relations of both countries should be expected – and whether and how any changes will affect the architecture of international security.

Experts on information competition between Russia and Western countries are convinced that president Vladimir Putin plans a war against the West as a long-term operation. It is directed on two fronts: internal and the more effective external one. Both can be developed in every country of the World; the opponent may be a compatriot but the ally may be a foreigner. Fortunately, in the West the effectiveness of these operations is lower. Confrontation with the West the Kremlin has many advantages: parental and controlled informational space, technical implements, huge experience based on expert knowledge, likewise a longstanding practice in conducting informational operations. Those actions are strongly concentrated and there are widely used digital platforms and also, they popularise the contents in harmony with Russian Federation politics. Their aim is not only forming internal and external public opinion properly and in line with the Kremlin’s interests, because as the annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that their aim is construction of a new reality of the world. Paradoxically, in the Russian Federation’s policy, media freedom and political pluralism are considered as a weakness of the West. Many communities which have different benefits are sensitive to the Kremlin’ s propaganda.

Russia is believed to be back on the world stage. President Vladimir Putin’s policy based on the idea of conservatism, an assertiveness towards the West and the desperation to become an important global player has successfully lifted Russia’s significance in the international scene. To regain the status of a superpower Russia has developed a strategy of counterweighing politically the West and particularly the United States.

Russia’s Foreign Policy. Determinants, Interests, and Measures

The paper addresses the conditions, objectives, and measures of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The first part of the paper presents - both in theoretical and practical terms - foreign policy’s determinants. In particular, it addresses their following types: internal objective, subjective internal, objective external, as well as subjective external ones. The second part of the paper uses the example of Russia to present interests and foreign policy goals constituting an extension of these interests. The author attempts to answer the question how to identify the interests, goals, and values of modern Russia. The final part of the paper presents - again both in theoretical and practical terms - the instruments for achieving the foreign policy objectives.

The aim of our considerations is to present the most important determinants and implications characterizing the views of the young generation of Russians on the political and economic events taking place in the Russian Federation in 2020–2021. The subject of our interest will be the analysis of the causes of growing disapproval of young people towards the president of the country, Vladimir Putin, in this period. At the beginning of this study, we will examine the political situation in Russia following Putin’s next re-election in March 2018 and the deterioration in the economic situation of the country’s young citizens, multiplied by the outbreak and development of the coronavirus pandemic. An important problem that we faced is the attitude towards the return to the country in January 2021 of the oppositionist Alexei Navalny and his immediate detention by repressive state authorities, resulting in social protests, in which young Russians widely participated. It will also be important to analyze the role of social media in shaping the views of Russian youth. In addition, we will discuss the issue of economic problems of the Russian state that are increasing in strength, affecting the condition of the part of Russian society that is entering adulthood. In conclusion, we would like to answer the questions to what extent the disappointment of young Russians towards the person and government of Putin will contribute to the decline in support for him, and whether the Kremlin has real instruments to reverse the trend that is negative for the rulers.

Putin and His Version of “Remembrance Policy” Towards Russians

The Russian “remembrance policy” is an approach to instrumental treating history for creating new image of Russian patriotism after the collapse of the USSR. It has been initiated by Gorbachev, supplemented by Yeltsin, and specified by Putin. The latter has used history for actual politics. It has little to do with the historical truth but that is not important in his “remembrance policy”. Significant is a possibility of placing its elements the “information warfare” that aims to enhance the imperial position of contemporary Russia, also by using military force. A “remembrance policy” understood in this way has served for building strong Russian nationalism.

Russian “historical policy” towards Poland. The “Anti-Katyń” issue

The Russian Federation ruled by Putin seeks to rebuild the superpower position of the USSR, formerly the Russian Empire. A certain difficulty for her is Poland’s attitude and its eastern policy. Hence the use of information warfare means to combat it, including a specific “historical policy” whose origins date back centuries. Due to the need to admit to committing the Katyn massacre, in order to weaken its meaning, the “Anti-Katyń” issue was promoted, based on the alleged genocide of Poles on Russian prisoners of war in 1919–1920. This is a propaganda invention not confirmed by historical facts.