- Author:
Anna Rakowska-Trela
- Institution:
University of Łódź (Poland)
- Year of publication:
2018
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
457-466
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2018301
- PDF:
ppsy/47-3/ppsy2018301.pdf
In December 2017 and January 2018, the Sejm and Senate, thanks to the votes of the deputies of ruling party Law and Justice, passed hugely controversial law amending inter alia Polish Electoral Code. Its adoption was opposed by the parliamentary opposition, by the electoral administration bodies and by many experts, however unsuccessfully. The enactment of this law destabilises the electoral system without a clear or evident need and treats the electoral code as a political instrument. Secondly, it does not provide the sufficient time for adaptation (vacatio legis), which may jeopardise free and fair local elections and the stability of the political system. Thirdly, the bill contains numerous unclear provisions and is in many parts written in a careless and contradictory way. Such amendments do not correspond with the European standards, described in the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.
- Author:
Jerzy Jaskiernia
- E-mail:
jerzyj@hot.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9401-5999
- Year of publication:
2021
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
203-215
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.05.15
- PDF:
ppk/63/ppk6315.pdf
Poland’s membership in the European Union as a premise for possible changes to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
The analysis addresses the problem of the extent to which the consequences of Poland’s membership in the European Union should be reflected in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The Polish Basic Law, in Art. 90, anticipated Poland’s membership in the EU. However, despite the attempts made, it was not possible – apart from the constitutionalization of the European Arrest Warrant – to introduce changes to the constitution resulting from EU membership. There are a number of regulatory gaps that deserve to be filled even if it is not possible to reach an agreement at the level of 2/3 of the support in the Sejm on the issue of a comprehensive „European clause”. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal should not replace the constitution-maker. It is necessary for the constitution to fulfill its legal, political and educational function.