Criminal liability of the head of the state on the example of the President of Romania

The Constitution of Romania of 1991 provides the President with an immunity. Exclusion from prosecution granted by the immunity is not only connected with the lack of legal liability for statements or political opinions stated by the President in the course of his office and after. The President is protected from the liability during the course of office and after his mandate expires also as far as actions and damages inflicted in connection with his powers are concerned. Analysis of the President’s liability requires distinction of constitutional and criminal liability. Constitutional liability includes liability towards the electorate as well as suspension from the office which can result in the recall of the President. Criminal liability, on the other hand, should be associated with the lack of civil and penal liability for actions and opinions stated by the President in the course of his office and after. However, according to the Article 96 (1) of the Constitution the Parliament is entitled to indict the President for the high treason. The constitution limits the President’s criminal liability only to penal liability for the high treason. It does not regulate the President’s immunity in other penal issues.

Criminal liability of the President of Poland 

In this paper, we presented the criminal responsibility of the Republic of Poland President before the Tribunal of State and related issues. Objective scope of this responsibility against other republican European countries was described. Time scope of the criminal responsibility of the president as well as matters related to the procedure and modes of impeachment by the National Assembly have also been mentioned. In the second part of the paper, we presented the right to fair trial issues and characterized the role of the Tribunal of State as the adjudicating body in the criminal proceeding. International Criminal Court judicature was also mentioned.

State Tribunal of the Republic of Poland in Polish political system. Chosen aspects

The article concentrates on issues of the State Tribunal in contemporary political order of the Republic of Poland. In the beginning there was explained the place of the State Tribunal in the system of separated powers. Next, applying the legal-historical method there was reconstructed its model in Polish political regulations, starting from the Constitution on 17 March 1921. Hereinafter there was made analysis of the contemporary position and competence of that State Tribunal and who can be the subject to his cognition. There was distinguished a constitutional and disciplinary responsibility, clarifying the being and premises for each of them. On the basis of made arrangements there was taken an attempt of evaluation of the contemporary constitutional regulation, formulating appropriate conclusions de lege ferenda.

Amendments to the Penal Code of 2020 Based on the So-Called Covid Acts in the Light of the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2020, file ref. no. Kp 1/19

According to the Statute of Sejm, introducing changes to an act, which is a code, requires a special procedure, which purpose is not to make such changes too fast. Meanwhile, in a relatively short period, polish parlament made a numer of changes to the penal code as part of the enactment of laws aimed at combating the coronavirus epidemic. The scope of these changes was relatively large. They concerned important issues not only in the general part of the Penal Code, defining the principles of criminal liability, but also in the specific regulations, modifying statutory threats and introducing new types of crimes. This is particularly important due to the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal issued on July 14, 2020, which also concerned the legislative pace of the 2019 amendment to the Penal Code.

The Notion of Repressive Liability (Article 42 of the Constitution) and the Power of Pardon of the President of the Republic of Poland

The aim of this article is to discover in relation to which sanction it is possible to exercise the right of pardon (art. 139 of the Constitution). Basing on the systemic interpretation of the Constitution, the author argues that the power of pardon is the ‘reverse’ of the notion of repressive liability inferred from art. 42 of the Constitution. Consequently, in relation to all repressive sanctions within the meaning of art. 42 of the Constitution it is allowed to grant a pardon. Therefore it is possible to claim that a power of pardon can be applied to, inter alia, disciplinary penalties, lustration penalties, administrative monetary penalties, tax surcharges and penalties imposed on collective entities. Challenges for the doctrine of law – including possible collisions between exercising power of pardon and other constitutional provisions – are indicated.

This article analyzes the penal provisions of the press law when considering the issue of responsibility for the publication of press material. It presents the cases of the notification of the violation of press law, joint and several responsibility of the press, contratyp of press criticism, satire, cartoons and press reports, the limitation of liability of the press, the question of exerting pressure on journalists and on press criticism, press publishing without registration, avoiding the publication of official announcements and arrest warrants, distribute materials of the case, a crime of an admission to the publication, as well as some questions relating to the proceedings for violation of press law.

The Material Scope of Immunities in the Light of the Notion of “Criminal Liability” in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland

In the article the author analyses whether the notion of ‘criminal liability’ contained in constitutional provisions relating to formal immunity should be understood in the same way as the identical term in art. 42(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The author answers affirmatively to such research question, relying on linguistic directives of interpretation (prohibition of synonymous and homonymous interpretation), as well as the need to safeguard the effectiveness of immunity. Alternative line of interpretation – presented in the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal P 31/12 and based on exceptiones non sunt extendendae argument – is rejected. From this one can derive a conclusion that formal immunity provides protection against i.a. liability for administrative infractions. The author observes as well that statutory provisions which precise constitutional regulations on immunity do not cover such situations.

Signs of Crimes in the Light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland

The article discusses the role of constitutional principles in the process of constructing and assessing the characteristics of crimes in a democratic state ruled by law. In particular, the text discusses the essence of the features of a prohibited act and indicates the scope of criminal liability under Art. 42 section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and describes the impact of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the principle of proportionality on the issue of the characteristics of crimes. The conclusions drawn from this analysis may become an indication for the legislator on how to construct the elements of prohibited acts so that these regulations are consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. These features constitute the basis for the accusation and also set the limits of the activities of law enforcement agencies. Their role in protecting legal order is therefore invaluable.