Some comments in the matter of deconstitutionalisation of public prosecutor’s office

The article is an attempt to show that reasons of deconstitutionalisation of public prosecutor’s office are not obsolete. The author argues, that the omission regulations of public prosecution’s office in the Constitution of the Poland Republic was caused by the adoption of the concept of personal junction Attorney General and Minister of Justice, which could not be reconciled with the postulate of the independence of the prosecutors. The article presents the impact of the adoption of the concept of personal union of Attorney General and Minister of Justice on the course of parliamentary work on the assumption of the Constitution, in relation to the prosecutor’s office. The author concludes that the current model of the prosecutor’s office – establishing the separation of function Attorney General from posi- tion of Minister of Justice – does not justify the continuation of the state deconstitutionalisation of this institution. The lack of constitutional responsibility for the actions of the Attorney General and the incompleteness of the model prosecutor’s office as an agency of legal protection make, that the stipulation of constitutionalisation of public prosecutor’s office seems to be indispensable, although with regard for the current political situation, it is difficult to implement.

Model of the Polish prosecutor’s office in the interwar period

The article is an attempt to show the fundamental assumptions the model of the Polish prosecutor’s office of the interwar period. On account of ongoing discussions above the need of more further transformations of the institution of the prosecutor’s office in Poland, perhaps it would be useful to reach to the institutions checked in practice. The author is discussing the issue of situating the interwar prosecutor’s office amongst state agencies, principles of its organization and action , scope of its tasks and competence , finishing on the on analysis of the prosecutor’s status. The author is reaching a conclusion that in the discussed model of the prosecutor’s office is occurring a divergence between its theoretical assumptions and functioning in practice. Moreover, main assumption this model, i.e. personal union between the Minister of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor, was rejected by the Polish legislator in the recent time.

In this article, the author tries to point out the problems of the legal system and democratic society after 1989 in the condition of Slovak Republic and ultimately almost in all the countries of post-Communist period. The aim of this work is to point out the development of justice and judicial authorities in Slovakia since 1989 and its current state. The result should be the naming of all elements influencing the judiciary, decision-making activity of court in the context of the directive and the rules of the European Community. The next point is the description of the independence and connection of the judiciary and its offices to state power and related isues. Also, the autor describes to the establishment of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic as the highest office of the judiciary in the Slovak Republic, its competences, powers and functioning. In the same way there are listed other offices without which the judiciary as such could not function like Prosecutor’s Office of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Bar Association, Notary Chamber of the Slovak Republic and Slovak Chamber of Executors. At the end of the article the author evaluates the development of justice in the context of an ever-evolving democratic society.

Accountability of the Public Prosecutor’s Office – Institutional Approach

The purpose of the article is to consider the adoption of possibilities and the legitimacy of mechanisms of accountability of the prosecutor’s office as an institution, in particular by developing criteria for such an assessment that would lead to an increase in the level of efficiency of its functioning, as well as to an increase in the quality of services provided, assuming that the prosecutor’s office is perceived not only as an authority, but also as an entity providing public services. The above approach is inevitable in the era of spreading the idea of good governance, which is becoming more and more popular among the public authorities of modern, democratic countries. It can also be helpful in moving away from the dominant quantitative measurements, in favor of the prevailing qualitative approach of work results. The author analysed the dimensions of the prosecution’s responsibility at a level similar to political responsibility, characteristic for the assessment of the functioning of the legislative authority, and on the managerial level – reserved to the executive authority.

The Prosecutor’s Office and the Sejm

Author argues in the article that under the legal status preceding the 2009 amendment to the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Sejm’s control over the actions of the Minister of Justice – Prosecutor General found a direct basis in the constitutional norm, which entrusts the Sejm with the control over the Council of Ministers. Under the 2009 prosecution model, where the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice were separated, the Prosecutor General, directing the activities of the prosecution service, was an autonomous body in relation to Council of Ministers, President, Sejm and Senate. The reconnection of the functions of the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General by the 2016 Act gives the Sejm the possibility of parliamentary control of the Prosecutor General. Author indicates the instruments of parliamentary control emphasizing that the Sejm is entitled only to such powers of control that have been clearly defined in the Constitution and laws. Author justifies the thesis that the diversity of the models of functioning of the prosecutor’s office in Poland, as an institution beyond the framework of the classical Montesquieu classification, does not deprive the Sejm of the right to control the prosecutor’s office, which he realizes with the help of diverse means.

Prosecutor’s Office in the Visegrad Group Countries – History, Comparative Legal Remarks, Cooperation

The public prosecutor’s office is one of the most important state organs responsible for upholding the rule of law and prosecuting crimes. The efficient functioning of the office is one of the guarantees of the implementation of a democratic state ruled by law. After 1989, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, after independence from Soviet influence, the prosecution authorities began to reform, trying to adapt to the new conditions. The exchange of mutual experiences in this area has a special form in the case of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, i.e. the countries making up the so-called Visegrad Group, within which the prosecutors general meet each year to deepen cooperation. The purpose of this article is to present the principles of the functioning of the prosecutor’s office in the V4 countries and to compare them also from a historical perspective.