In this paper I focus on the creation powers of the President in view of the current problems. I also attempt to find answers to some of the questions related to the issue whether, provided the Constitution of the Slovak Republic concedes the President of the Slovak Republic the power to appoint a constitutional official on the proposal of a collective body or a specific person, the President may refuse to appoint a public official, and what the position of the President is in this kind of appointment, thus what function he performs.

The position of the president of the Czech Republic after the introduction of direct presidential elections

In 2011, direct presidential elections were introduced in the Czech Republic. The Author examines how this changed the position of the President of the Republic. The prevailing opinion among constitutionalists is that direct elections are an element of creating a strong position of the president in a democratic system, and the president elected in this way should have broad powers and play an important role in the political system of the country. Analyzing the provisions of the constitution and the political activity of the presidents of the Czech Republic, the Author concludes that, contrary to this thesis, the Czech legislator decided to balance the strong legitimacy of direct elections with a limited catalog of competences. This happened because the change in the way the president was elected was a political project, and not the result of a substantive debate on the constitutional order.

Preventive Control of the Compliance of Laws with the Constitution – the Effectiveness of the Instrument in the Light of Legal Assumptions and Practice

The author analyzes competence of the President to initiate a preventive constitutional review and the legislative veto. The Constitution does not exclude the use of a veto if President has doubts as to the constitutionality of the act. He describes the Polish systemic practice preventive control more specifically indicates the specific actions of the current President, the subject of initiatives and judgments of the Tribunal. In conclusion author recognizes disadvantage of regulating the preventive constitutional review of statutes: there are no temporal rigors for proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. Practical preventive initiatives of the President concerned important issues and usually had a positive effect although the Tribunal sometimes adjudicated in these cases with considerable delay or groundlessly discontinued the proceedings. In systemic practice, the President’s legislative veto is a more effective instrument. A choice of measure of eliminating a “constitutionally suspicious” act, depends only on the President’s decision.