The principle of the rule of law in the European Union’s external policy

Rule of law, whose core is „the access to an independent judiciary and judicial review”, fulfills in EU external policy two functions. Firstly, according to the art. 21 of TEU, all EU external actions have to be subdued to the rule of law. Secondly, promoting and consolidating the rule of law is one the objectives of EU external action. In most constitutional systems, a wide margin of appreciation is left as regards to foreign policy and judicial review is considerably limited. In case of EU, the Court’s jurisdiction over EU external policy is differentiated and reflects the old pillar structure. The question which arises here is whether it can be accommodated with the disposition of the art. 2 of TEU, which states that the European Union which is a single legal entity „is founded on the value of rule of law”, and with the principle of EU external policy coherence.

The Juridical power in selected postyugoslave states – Slovenia and Croatia

The government in the Republic of Slovenia is organized on the principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Judicial power is exercised by the courts. The judiciary is autonomous and independent. The courts administer justice according to the Constitution and law, as well as according to international agreements and treaties in force. Judges and lay assessors participate in the administration of justice in conformity with the law. In the Republic of Slovenia the administration of justice is carried out by 44 district courts, 11 regional courts, 4 higher courts: labour courts and social court, Higher Labour and Social Court, the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia. In addition to courts with general jurisdiction, there are 4 labour courts and 1 social court. There are responsible for ruling on individual and collective labour-related disputes and on social disputes. For second-degree ruling the Higher Labour and Social Court is responsible.

The rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU, as indicated in Art. 2 TEU. This provision recognizes that the rule of law is a core value, inherent to liberal democracy, and one which characterized the Union and its Member States. Taking into account this context, as well as the deficiencies of the EU mechanism to enforce the rule of law within the Member States, European Parliament called on the Commission to establish a new tool to address rule of law backsliding in Member States. In October 2016, Parliament addressed recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights (EU pact for DRF) in the form of an international agreement. The new mechanism should integrate and complement the existing mechanism, should be evidence-based, objective, addressing the Member States and EU. The author analyzes this initiative and tries to answer why it was not fully realized. Additionally, he presents a reaction to that initiative of the Council of Europe. There is no doubt, that realization of the EU Pact for DRF would inf luence the Council of Europe and weaken its role as a main European mechanism in the area of protection of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.

On the Eve of the Birth of the Modern Doctrine of the Legal State? The Attitude of Polish Liberals to the Idea of the Rule of Law at the Beginning of the 19th Century

The article analyzes the problem of the attitude towards the idea of the rule of law of representatives of the Polish elite at the beginning of the 19th century. The author presents the development of the idea of the rule of law in the introduction. He verifies the thesis that the ideological basis for the concept of the rule of law was the Enlightenment thought on the basis of which the liberal doctrine developed. He used it to seek an answer to the question about the characteristics of the model of government established by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland of 1815. The author attempted to prove that, since the Kingdom (existing until 1831) with one of the most liberal constitutions in the first half of the 19th century was in force, then this act met all the conditions required for the establishment of the rule of law according to the standards adopted in that century. These considerations conclude with remarks on the further evolution of Polish liberal thought in the 1820s. It began to differ from the liberal assumptions on which the German Rechtstaat doctrine was built. Paradoxically, Rechtstaat concept had much more in common to Polish liberalism in the earlier (proto-liberal) stage of its development in the times of the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815) than of the Kingdom of Poland (1815–1831).

Artykuł stanowi próbę porównania obecności problematyki rządów prawa w dorocznych exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych RP z perspektywy 1990 i 2019 r. Impulsem do wzmiankowanej analizy wystąpień Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego i Jacka Czaputowicza były: 30. rocznica powołania rządu Tadeusza Mazowieckiego i – co się z tym wiąże – zapowiedź ustanowienia standardów prawnych charakterystycznych dla zachodnich demokracji liberalnych oraz, siłą rzeczy, bieżący spór wokół praworządności w Polsce. Okoliczności te sprawiły, że zagadnienie rządów prawa zajęło istotne miejsce w przemówieniach obu szefów dyplomacji. W artykule dokonano analizy wystąpień obu ministrów spraw zagranicznych. Kwestia praworządności pojawia się w nich w następujących kontekstach: krajowym (transformacja wymiaru sprawiedliwości i towarzyszący jej dyskurs) oraz międzynarodowym, obejmującym relacje Polski z innymi państwami (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem państw sąsiedzkich) i organizacjami międzynarodowymi (Rada Europy – przez pryzmat przede wszystkim Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, Unia Europejska, ONZ). O ile minister Skubiszewski w pewnym sensie wyznaczył w swym exposé „punkt wyjścia” polskiej polityki zagranicznej (w tym zobowiązanie do implementacji międzynarodowych standardów ochrony praw człowieka), tak Jacek Czaputowicz „punkt dojścia”, bowiem najistotniejsze cele wolnej Polski w sferze stosunków zewnętrznych zostały na przestrzeni 30 lat zrealizowane. Zmiana polityczna, jaką przyniosły wybory parlamentarne w 2015 r., sprawiła, że problem rządów prawa w Polsce stał się – także w polityce zagranicznej – na powrót aktualny.

This article critically examines the main features of respective socio-economic legal frameworks to determine whether they constitute the specificity of Polish and Hungarian populism. The principle of equality serves as a theoretical framework for the assessment of both types of social design. Based on this legal criterion, differences in the social visions of both countries emerge, unveiling the perspective of an exclusive and inclusive social design. However, the conclusion appears that it is not the social-economic model itself that determines the specificity of populism in both countries but its juxtaposition with cultural arguments. Polish and Hungarian populisms are thus defined primarily by social frameworks and secondary by the rhetoric’s cultural component. The combination of social issues with those of cultural kind forms the substantive background of populism in its Polish and Hungarian editions.

Pandemic Challenges Versus Changes in the Law and System Practice Selected European Countries

The article presents the changes that have taken place in the laws and systemic practice of states as a result of counteracting the crisis related to the Covid-19 pandemic. The author, pointing to pandemic challenges as well as actions taken by governments of states belonging to the Council of Europe, pointed out that the peculiar bluntness of changes could be most noticed in the construction and implementation of regulations on states of emergency. On the other hand, the issue of modifying the constitution was approached more carefully.

State sovereignty and the rule of law: the codification of private law in China

The main issue of this article is a comparison of codification of private law in the Republic of China (1912–1949) with the current fifth attempt to codify civil law in the People’s Republic of China, which is planned to be enacted in 2020. The aim of the paper is to prove that in both the most important factors for drafting new laws were not the internal needs of the state, but the necessity to regulate the position of the country on the international arena. The analysis is based on two main concepts: sovereignty and the rule of law, which are crucial for understanding this issue.

The article analyzes the specificity and distinctiveness of authoritarian regimes operating in a global network of complex and multidimensional international relations. The author of the article asks the question: to what extent the dynamically changing paradigm of authoritarian ideology is responsible for the occurrence of various types of tensions, rivalries, and antagonisms caused by authoritarian regimes, the effects and consequences of which affect not only national and regional political conditions but also cause severe international repercussions? The applied research method allows exposing the complex particularity of authoritarian regimes in the context of the multidimensional dynamics of recent geopolitical changes. It is crucial when a number of modern ideological trends often downplay the brutal nature of many authoritarian systems and even treat the “authoritarian model” – especially in the form of socialist autocracies – as a “specific historical phenomenon” trying to resolve many complex and multiple political and economic issues.

In this article, the author argues that the introduction of measures in Poland to remedy violations of the rule of law, particularly regarding the judicial system, does not require so far referring to the principles of transitional justice. The author loosely refers to Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of a dual state which is sometimes used to describe the political reality in contemporary Poland. In a dual state, there are two parallel realities, and apart from politicized organs there may also exist institutions that have not yet been captured by the ruling party, i.e. institutions that do not recognise the current, unconstitutional legal order. Therefore, according to the author, the assessment of the legal legitimacy of certain institutions or persons (including judges), after the restoration of the rule of law in the nearest future, may differ from the classic transition from a completely non-democratic to a democratic regime.