The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation  as an organ of the financial and budgetary control

The subject of the present text is the Accounts Chamber as an organ of the financial and budgetary control. The paper analyzes its place in the system of organs of public authority and its independence as well as the resulting consequences for the efficiency of the work of the Accounts Chamber. The paper formulates the thesis that the Accounts Chamber is the key instrument of parliamentary control in the sphere of financial and budgetary issues which enables both chambers of the Federal Assembly to effectively realize the tasks they are entrusted with.

The Prosecutor’s Office and the Sejm

Author argues in the article that under the legal status preceding the 2009 amendment to the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Sejm’s control over the actions of the Minister of Justice – Prosecutor General found a direct basis in the constitutional norm, which entrusts the Sejm with the control over the Council of Ministers. Under the 2009 prosecution model, where the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice were separated, the Prosecutor General, directing the activities of the prosecution service, was an autonomous body in relation to Council of Ministers, President, Sejm and Senate. The reconnection of the functions of the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General by the 2016 Act gives the Sejm the possibility of parliamentary control of the Prosecutor General. Author indicates the instruments of parliamentary control emphasizing that the Sejm is entitled only to such powers of control that have been clearly defined in the Constitution and laws. Author justifies the thesis that the diversity of the models of functioning of the prosecutor’s office in Poland, as an institution beyond the framework of the classical Montesquieu classification, does not deprive the Sejm of the right to control the prosecutor’s office, which he realizes with the help of diverse means.