Po wyborach prezydenckich w 2010 r. na Białorusi relacje białorusko-unijne weszły w fazę ostrego konfliktu politycznego. UE przyjęła sankcje wizowe i gospodarcze wobec Białorusi. UE zawiesiła również udział Białorusi w programie Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Do eskalacji konfliktu doszło na początku 2012 r., gdy ambasadorowie UE wyjechali z Białorusi. W kolejnych miesiącach UE przeszła do polityki krytycznego zaangażowania wobec Białorusi, która przejawiała się utrzymywaniem kontaktów z reżimem na poziomie technicznym. W drugiej połowie 2013 r. nastąpiła niewielka poprawa obustronnych relacji. Szczyt Partnerstwa Wschodniego w 2013 r. nie przyniósł wyraźnego przełomu na linii Bruksela–Mińsk.

The aim of the paper is an attempt at evaluating the Eastern Partnership from the point of view of the socio-cultural dimension in a broad sense. Do cultural and civilisational factors influence relations between the EU and Eastern European and South Caucasus countries? Is the EU capable of further enlargement? The Eastern Partnership is experiencing significant turmoil (Russia-Ukraine war, unstable South Caucasus) which begs the question of the future of the policy. Moreover, the paper tackles the issue of the EU’s internal factors and their influence upon relations with Eastern countries.

The article seeks to assess the degree to which Poland exercises power and influence in the Eastern policy of the European Union (EU) from the early 21st century until now, focusing on the attributes of Poland’s latest contribution to the EU policies – the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The article examines also challenges and discussions on Polish strategy towards Eastern Europe. The authors prove that the main points of Poland’s Eastern policy are that the improper attention to it will result in loss of status positions in the international arena; Poland should not be limited by the role of the architect artist in Franco-German project in Europe; European perspective is the only incentive that can encourage the reforms in Eastern Europe; the failure to provide such a perspective would lead to social and economic instability in the region and the drift towards the participation in reintegration projects in post-Soviet space with Moscow; the Eastern Partnership should be considered as a step towards the joining the EU; Europe will take Poland into consideration only as a regional leader; Russian neo-imperialism is a challenge for Poland’s security and needs a strict reaction.

The subject of analysis is the assumption that the concept of soft power may be used as a theoretical basis for the interpretation of the EU influence on the less stable regions facing the spread of international conflicts. On the basis of current events and the high degree of instability in the region, it should be stated that such instruments are not efficient when it comes to Russia. In order to prove the above mentioned assumption, one needs to define the nature and specificity of the EU as soft power in the post-Westphalian international order. In the context of the use of such instruments, the analysis will also cover the manifestation of their implementation and efficiency in the EU policy towards Ukrainian crisis. Thus, it is essential to answer a few research questions. Firstly, what is the specificity of the EU in post-Westphalian international order? Secondly, what means does the EU have at its disposal and is it able to achieve its objectives and meet expectations which the international environment has towards it? Lastly, how can we assess the efficiency of the soft power instruments used by the Union in specific region of Eastern Europe, particularly during Ukrainian crisis?