The fundamental human right to dignity is the cornerstone of European legal culture. The right has been provided for in international, European, and national legal instruments. Its role as a benchmark reference for all other human rights has developed into a self-standing and self-executing right, especially under the new EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This evolution from the traditional role of the right to dignity is analysed in case study based on a real case before the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in 2015. The analysis brings forward a reflection about the need to respect the concept of dignity and how it actually is observed in the European context.

Human dignity as a constitutionally protected value

The Article discusses the issue of granting human dignity the status of the highest value in the Polish Constitution. What is more, it explains the grounds of the regulation of art. 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Additionally, it presents dignity as a foundation of the legal order. Therefore, de facto, every legal norm that functions in our legal system should comply with this regulation. The article calls attention to a danger of potential abuses pointing out some of the practices that can violate the human dignity in the future.

The article aims to draw attention to the linguistic rights of the Deaf in Poland and their legal source. Deaf people’s right to Polish sign language stems from their disability. This approach is incorrect. The title entitlement is the natural right of the deaf, derived from his dignity. In turn, the principle of human dignity is the gate leading to its “positivization”. On the other hand, recognizing the constitutional nature of the right to Polish sign language strengthens the legal basis of the deaf ’s claims against the state and justifies the legal protection of this language. The recognition of the right to Polish sign language allows the deaf to the full and equal exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of April 2, 1997.

Social Exclusion and Constitutional Determinants of Human Dignity

The purpose of this study is to refer (relativize) constitutionally determined human dignity to human rights and to demonstrate social exclusion against this background. The scholarly supposition that the category of social exclusion does not have an independent character and that deriving de lege lata the right to protection against social exclusion is premature was given the form of a research hypothesis. Its confirmation or falsification will be done in the shadow of the assumption according to which exclusion should be considered in a two-way fashion: as social exclusion and, separately, as legal exclusion. The introduction of the second category is a relatively new area of research that addresses this subject matter.

The Freedom of Association as a Form of Meeting Human Social Needs

The individual’s use of freedom of association has a significant impact on various aspects of human existence. Its existence determines the opportunity to meet needs and makes it possible to strive to achieve assumed goals together with other people. The interpersonal nature of this type of interaction has consequences. The article aims to demonstrate that the freedom of association affects not only the way in which an individual’s political needs are met, but also the satisfaction of social values and human development. The opportunities that the right to freedom of association brings are derived not only from the organizational forms that individuals can use but also from their individual needs, which this value aims to fulfill.

From Constitutionally Derived Accessibility, Towards the Right to Accessibility?

A scholarly assumption that relates to the non-stand-alone character of the category of accessibility, which is a certain normative abstract, was given the form of a research hypothesis. Confirmation or falsification of it will allow us to look at accessibility against the constitutionally determined human rights-related triad of values: human dignity, equality before the law and non-discrimination. This triad, in turn, will be given the status of an axiological ratio of introducing the category of accessibility, both to the multi-centric law system and to the on-going legal discourse on persons with special needs, including those with disabilities. Social determinants of accessibility in genere determine its legal essence. Therefore, striving to equip accessibility with the value of efficiency, would it be justified to place it within a normative framework of the right to accessibility if we were to find de lege lata reasons for it?