Czynnikiem determinującym charakter stosunków brytyjsko-kosowskich jest ogromna dysproporcja potencjałów obu państw we wszystkich możliwych sferach. Nieposiadające pełnego uznania międzynarodowego, słabe pod względem ekonomicznym Kosowo nie może stanowić partnera dla Wielkiej Brytanii, dysponującej niekwestionowaną pozycją na płaszczyźnie gospodarczej, politycznej i militarnej. Nie znajduje się ono również w centrum zainteresowań brytyjskich, a wzajemne kontakty zostały nawiązane niejako przy okazji wypełniania przez Brytyjczyków „moralnego zobowiązania”, a nie na podstawie racjonalnych przesłanek. W tym kontekście obowiązująca formuła relacji opiera się na założeniu brytyjskiego paternalizmu, który wyraża się oddziaływaniem na kierunki aktywności politycznej oraz rozwój gospodarczy i społeczny Kosowa, a także występowaniem w obronie interesów Kosowa przed społecznością międzynarodową (w szczególności na forum Unii Europejskiej i NATO). Natomiast mieszkańcy Kosowa poprzez korzystanie z udzielanej przez Brytyjczyków na bieżąco pomocy wojskowej, politycznej i finansowej oraz udostępnienie know- -how zaciągnęli wobec Wielkiej Brytanii dług wdzięczności, którego spłata jest tym trudniejsza, że ani jej termin, ani warunki nie mają wymiaru formalnego. Nie ulega jednak wątpliwości, że w przypadku wejścia Kosowa do Unii Europejskiej i NATO istnieje spora szansa, że kosowscy politycy będą głosowali w tych organizacjach w sposób odpowiadający życzeniom brytyjskim. Dalekosiężna polityka Wielkiej Brytanii zmierzająca do pozyskania przyszłego sojusznika wewnątrz struktur europejskich wydaje się zatem przynosić pożądane efekty, służąc równocześnie stabilizacji i rozwojowi tej części Bałkanów Zachodnich.

TURKEY IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AND LEBANON IN 1940 – 1941

After collapse of metropolitan France in June 1940, the French in the Syria and Lebanon swore allegiance to the Vichy Government. This situation was hard to accept by the British. According to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the occupation of these territories by enemy forces could have had most serious strategic consequences since it would cut of land communications with Turkey and would immediately threaten the whole of British interests in the Middle East. Due to that threat, London was forced to rethink its policy towards French Levant. One of the discussed measures was a proposition to involve Turkey in solving this problem. Turkey was bound with Britain with reciprocal security pact since October 1939. Moreover, the situation in Syria and Lebanon was also a threat for Turkish security. It was thought that these arguments would act in favor of Turkish involvement. Although in London everyone counted on active attitude of Turkey, there was no agreement as to its nature. While Churchill, Eden and the Chiefs of Staff were willing to agree on Turkish occupation of Syria and Lebanon, the Foreign Office was definitely against this solution. The first option eventually won. The first serious talks about Turkish involvement in Levant question took place in Ankara in January 1941, during the Anglo-Turkish military conversations. It was agreed then that if Turkey had entered the war, Turkish and British armies would have occupied Syria and Lebanon. The deteriorating military situation on the Eastern Mediterranean forced the United Kingdom to intervene in the French Levant in June 1941. Th e British government encouraged Turks to take part in that operation (“Exporter”). However, Turkish government rejected that offer. Turkey was still out of war and did not want to worsen her relations with the Third Reich.

THE INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY PROBLEM OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND

The Principality of Sealand was founded on the abandoned military platform on the North Sea. Because of its location beyond the British territorial waters, it was not the point of interest of the British authorities. In 1960s and 1970s, the Principality have got its national emblems and constitution. Despite of this initial development, most of the citizens moved from the platform to mainland because of hard conditions of life. The most dangerous threat for the Principality existence was the declaration of widening British territorial waters zone up to 12 NM (Nautical Miles), but no British troops or navy ship tried to disturb Sealand’s sovereignty. Despite ‘not disturbed’ status, the Principality is not the state in the meaning of the international law. It has not got its territory nor people, because officially the platform is the Ministry of Defence property and all of Sealand’s citizens live in the mainland now. The Principality has not been recognized by any state or international organization, so it has no possibilities to take part in international relations. From the legal point of view, the Principality is not only a state, but even quasi-state, however, it could be recognised in the future as a virtual micronation, although it is not a legal category.

The upcoming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union is a source of tensions within the political system of the UK. Devolution is most likely to be affected by Brexit which can lead to conflicts between the UK as a whole and Scotland as its part. The Sewel Convention is a political constitutional norm establishing non-legal rules of cooperation between these two political bodies. Despite having been written in a statute, the Sewel Convention remains unenforceable by the courts. Nonetheless, the political consequences of diminishing it may be severe. The discrepancy between the political strength of Scottish nationalism, confirmed in the latest general election, and constitutional lack of Scottish “voice” in regard to Brexit may lead to a severe political crisis within the UK.

The article presents the main parties (i.e. the Conservative Party, Labor Party, Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party) results of the 2019 UK general election as well as an analysis of the most important issues (i.e. correct identification of voters’ expectations, simplicity and clarity of the messages, leaders’ personalities) which determined each party success or loss. The author proves that since Brexit was the primary focus of voters, the level of support for particular parties remained dependent on the solutions presented in this issue. This basis explains why the Conservatives in the whole UK and the SNP in Scotland won (and the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats lost) the battle of Brexit.

The subject of the article is trade cooperation between Great Britain and Kenya in the context of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. The article characterizes the commercial cooperation of Great Britain and Kenya and discusses the trends existing in this field in recent years. The main threats to this cooperation that Brexit brings are presented, as well as the actions that states must implement to counteract the negative consequences of Brexit and the opportunities that Brexit potentially gives to deepening trade cooperation between countries. In addition, the political climate change that has occurred between countries in recent years, which has a significant impact on the implementation of economic cooperation, including trade, has been outlined. The purpose of the article is to present and evaluate the challenges that the countries face in the context of Brexit, which they must overcome in order to maintain and deepen trade cooperation. The main research problem is whether Brexit will weaken or accelerate trade relations between Great Britain and Kenya? The main hypothesis of the article is that Brexit causes great uncertainty about the future of trade cooperation between Great Britain and Kenya. However, it gives the opportunity to dynamize this cooperation, and Kenya can become a model partner for the United Kingdom within the concept of „Global Britain” promoted by London. Kenya’s positive development trends make it an increasingly attractive trading partner for Great Britain. However, Kenya wants to take advantage of the UK’s search for trading partners outside the European Union.

The freedom of the press is one of the basic guarantees of a democratic state and, at the same time, a guarantee of political rights. After 2008, when the great financial crisis occurred, the Member States of the European Union began to significantly limit the rights and freedoms of citizens, including freedom of the press. The introduced restrictions are characteristic of a neo-militant democracy. However, they sometimes become a tool in the hands of antidemocrats. The aim of the article is to check how and why over the years, between successive crises, i.e., financial crisis, the so-called refugee crisis, the coronavirus pandemic, freedom of the press was restricted in Ireland and Great Britain. These are the countries in which initially the political and social effects of the economic crisis were not felt, but later rapid regression was observed. By using content analysis based on reports from the Reporters without Borders and Freedom House organizations, the study uncovers how and why the restrictions of freedom of the press changed. It locates the political structures of Ireland and Great Britain between the ideal types of neo- and quasi-militant democracy, depending on the goal of the restrictions. The research hypothesis is as follows: The restriction of freedom of the press in Ireland and the United Kingdom after 2008 shows that states are using the media system to pursue their particular interests by introducing solutions characteristic of quasi-militant democracies.