Przedmiotem badań podejmowanym w tekście jest jedna z głównych podstaw teoretycznych libertarianizmu: zasada autowłasności. Problemem badawczym artykułu jest pytanie: Czy zasada autowłasności jest aksjomatem? Metodą badawczą zastosowaną w artykule jest metoda disputatio. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań w tekście proponowana jest teza afirmatywna: zasada autowłasności ma status logiczny aksjomatu. Artykuł prezentuje wypracowaną siatkę pojęciową rozróżniającą samoposiadanie, auto własność i uzasadnienie autowłasności oraz rozwija linię argumentacyjną wskazującą, że choć prima facie to samoposiadanie, a nie autowłasność jest aksjomatem, to ponieważ samoposiadanie z konieczności implikuje autowłasność, to także autowłasność musi mieć status logiczny aksjomatu.

Law as the center of life. Historical and philosophical remarks against the background of changes in constitutionalism

The main purpose of the article is to analyze the conception of constitution emerging from the ancient, early modern and modern political philosophy. On the ground of the so called constitutionalism, polis can be seen as the first holistic vision of the public sphere. It can be said that the idea of polis constitutes ethical relationship be tween the citizen and the state. The paper attempts to examine constitutional thought in a historical perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses of the modern concepts of constitution and constitutionalism, in the con text of the idea and the ethical philosophy of polis. The main thesis is that the idea of constitution (in broad sense) is derived from natural law categories, and there is an essential connection between the idea of constitution and the autonomy of citizens and their rights. In the post-enlightenment era we attach too much hope to the writ ten constitution, whereas the most important are public virtues and common values. The deliberative model of the state and the soul of politea – polis is much more import ant than written law and written constitution. It can be assumed that the authority of modern constitution (and the role of modern constitutionalism) depends on our abil ity to re-discover the values (the soul) of polis.

The article is a comparative study of constitutional references to natural law, with a particular emphasis on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The findings presented in the study are both of qualitative and quantitative nature. References to natural law, recognized in the constitutions of 48 countries in the world, relate almost exclusively to fundamental human rights and freedoms. Usually, the constitution-maker assigns the title “natural” or “inherent” to all fundamental rights of person or to some of them. In none of the Basic Laws, natural law has been included into formal sources of law, nor its hierarchical relation to positive law shown. No constitution specifies a definite concept of natural law. The authors of the constitutions, speaking generally about natural rights, have not wanted to engage in philosophical and legal disputes accompanying the category of ius naturale.

The purpose of this article is to present Hugo Grotius’s views concerning the idea of freedom. It must be pointed out that the idea of freedom was not the subject of a separate thought, except for the freedom of the seas, which Grotius dedicated a separate work. Theses on freedom were formulated in the light of other issues such as natural law or the essence and scope of state power. For this purpose, the first part of the article presents a historical background. In the second part, Grotius’s views will be presented in three contexts. First, freedom of the individual as power over oneself. Second, freedom in political terms, as a relationship of community. Finally freedom in the global aspect, as freedom of navigation, trade and migration.