Asymmetry of warfare, or more often asymmetric warfare, is an issue often referred to in descriptions of contemporary political and military relations affecting the state. It is even presented as an entity threatened by these hostilities. Meanwhile, these acts are a form of an armed conflict in which opposing sides have different military potentials. One of the potentials is the power of the state. We must wonder then how the state uses it. Is it not an entity who uses it in a way disproportionate to the situation of conflict? The paper argues that a contemporary state is not without sin and it is not just that it is not able to protect its interests from asymmetric threats. Warfare still is, which many forget, the basis for hostilities (war). In the author’s understanding (erroneous perhaps?) asymmetry does not only occur at the level of war, but it also happens in its key dimension – warfare. It has emerged not only through the change in the status of the fighting party, but also through the time of warfare and using the warfare terrain.

Following official announcement of oil embargo on Iran by the EU, official positions of Islamic Republic were introduced by political and military authorities based on “blocking Hormuz Strait under certain circumstances”; an issue of great concern in western officials. They warned about their military capabilities in the field of reopening Strait and maintaining security of energy transit lines in the Strait of Hormuz. They questioned the West military methods against Iranian military officials reopening the Strait of Hormuz.This study seeks to answer this question that “what are Iranian military capabilities to block Hormuz Strait?”, “If the Strait is blocked, when western military forces can reopen it?” “Iranian military capabilities which can be called ‘five pillars of military strategy’ based on cruise and ballistic anti-ship missiles, small speedboats, drones, small submarines, nautical mines and standoff missiles supported by air defense and electronic warfare (Jangal), allows Islamic Republic to block Hormuz strait in long term. However, previous to any military conflict with trans-regional forces, the main Iranian weapon is nautical mines to block Hormuz Strait”.

This article presents the results of research, which set out to clarify the importance and role played by the concept of using A2/AD capabilities in the military strategy of the Russian Federation. Analysis and criticism of the literature were used to solve the research problems. In order to guide the research process, a hypothesis was formulated, assuming that the Russian concept of using A2/AD capabilities is an operationalisation of a broader military strategy for defeating the adversary, as well as an effective deterrence mechanism. The research process established that the Russian concept of using A2/AD capabilities is a theory and operational practice, a broader military strategy of achieving multi-domain superiority over the adversary by conducting strategic offensive operations. Integrating offensive and defensive operational capabilities plays a key role in this concept, which guarantees possession of the strategic initiative and maintenance of dominance in the international security environment and supports the idea of creating Russian spheres of influence. It also prompts NATO states to counter the supremacy of the Russian Federation.