There are still a  lot of things to be told about the history of Polish – Turkish relations. The preparations for the 600th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Turkey were the opportunity to fill blank spaces in this sphere. The book lays the ground and paves the way for further more detailed and illuminating research. The book is a  compilation of articles written by scholars, politicians and other experts from Poland and Turkey. The three editors, who are very knowledgeable in this topic, have jointly prepared a comparative analysis of Turkey and the EU. There are eight separate articles in the book. They put emphasis on the European Union and Turkey with regard to issues of the Middle East.

Turkey is a country that lies on two continents. It is o! en regarded as a bridge between Europe and Asia, or between East and West. This in fact implies that its inhabitants participate in two separate and somewhat conicting sets of political values. On the one hand, those are the values of western liberal democracy. As a country in which periodic elections are held and there is a competition between political parties, Turkey is a democracy at least in the procedural or formal sense. On the other hand, there are oriental values related to the authoritarian political culture that goes back to the Ottoman Empire and to political Islam, that are often regarded as incompatible with democracy. The in uence of these values on the Turkish political system has made some scholars to argue that a fully- edged liberal democracy is impossible in this country. Furthermore, the existence of these different sets of values had often in the past led to a political confrontation. For decades there has been a struggle in Turkey between the secular center, represented by the Kemalist establishment, and the peripheral political religious movements.

European Union is nowadays facing one of its biggest challenges and opportunities since its foundation. An answer, which will be sent to Turkey, will bring overwhelming repercussions in wide and large Muslim world. e far-sight approach of European Council can open new stage in evolution of European identity. The European Union’s aim is a safe, secure and wealthy continent, capable to peacefully cooperate with other states.

In its 90 years of modern existence, Turkish foreign relations with Russia reflect contentious issues with which the two republics have grappled during the twentieth century and following the collapse of great empires, civil wars and radical changes in the international political system. Moreover, it is safe to say that the degree of constructiveness of these relations is directly dependent upon macropolitical processes in Eurasia, and that the success of foreign political contacts reflects the level of political and cultural thinking of state elites in both countries. One of the most important directions of Russian–Turkish bilateral relations is inter-regional cooperation on the subject of the Russian Federation and Turkey. This paper analyzes the main directions and pace of economic cooperation development between Turkey and Russia’s constituent entities, and evaluates the prospects of these relations.

Turkey formally applied for membership in the European Union (EU) on April 14, 1987, but it took 12 years to get candidate status at the Helsinki summit of 1999. The year 2014 brought no breakthrough in the negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Public opinion polls show that many Turkish citizens have no hope of joining the EU. Waiting too long for membership in the EU is causing a lot of controversy in Turkey and is one of the most frequently raised issues in the political discourse. In the last three years, the Turkish political class and socjety became more and more sympathetic to perceived integration initiatives in the Eastern direction. Turkey has opened a new road in the form of accession to the Eurasian Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. What will happen if Turkey will support its way in this direction? How long can Turkey wait for admission to the EU? Where would it be better for Turkey? The Eastern Alliance or the Western?

In times of increasing significance for national policies which support international economic cooperation, a special role is played by state trade support institutions (TSIs). This paper investigates whether such TSIs can be said to operate effectively, through an analysis of one essential element of the support provided to domestic entrepreneurs, namely export recommendations. The recommendations provided by Polish TSIs in respect of Turkey is employed as a case study. The theory of comparative advantage along with a neo-institutional perspective provide the conceptual framing for this analysis, in conjunction with both desk research, document analysis, and selected economic indices. Factors such as trade potential, comparative advantages, and the competitiveness of selected product groups exported by Polish firms to Turkey were also taken into account. The findings largely indicate that TSI export recommendations are adequate, and the majority of the recommended industries demonstrated considerable sales opportunities. Nevertheless, some discrepancies were also noted, which should be an issue for further investigation by both researchers and TSI analysts. Furthermore, the case study in this paper demonstrates that the choices within economic promotion policy – despite its partition between variously-oriented TSIs - were made on the basis of economic rationality.

This article examines the role of Karimov regime and his opponents in influencing Turkish-Uzbekistani relations in the 1990s and its consequences for later developments. Following the description of the characteristics of Turkish-Uzbekistani relations, it will be discussed how far had the opposition leaders such as Abdürrahim Polat and Muhammad Salih an impact on the worsening of the bilateral ties between Turkey and Uzbekistan. This article then stresses Turkey’s attitude towards Uzbek opposition leaders which finally addresses the reasons for worsening of Turkish-Uzbekistani relations such as the bombings of Tashkent, Uzbek students in Turkey, Gülen Movement as well as the ideology of Pan-Turkism.

External determinants of Turkish foreign policy

The main purpose of the paper was to present external (international) determinants influencing the shape of Turkish foreign policy. The structure of the work is based on the scheme developed by R. Zięba, illustrating factors shaping the foreign policy of the state. Due to volume restrictions, it was decided to analyze the following conditions: evolution of the geopolitical situation in the region, the position of the state in the system of international relations and roles, and the range of contractual international connections (objective external determinants), as well as international perception of a given country and nation, and expectations and requirements formulated towards them by other countries (subjective external determinants).

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie politycznej drogi proislamskiej Partii Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju (tur. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), rządzącej Turcją od 2002 roku. Dyskurs tego stronnictwa sprowadza szereg procesów politycznych, społecznych i gospodarczych do konfrontacji „starej” Turcji z „nową”. Ta ostatnia z kolei stanowi immanentną cechę tożsamości ideowej AKP, która w okresie minionych piętnastu lat uległa istotnym przemianom. Zagadnienia te zostaną omówione w toku wywodu.

Summary On 12 December 2016, 316 deputies of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey submitted a constitutional amendment proposal which is mainly related to changing the parliamentary features of the system of government. The constitutional amendment bill was accepted by the Committee on Constitution of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with minor changes. Hereafter, the bill was discussed and voted on in the Grand National Assembly. The Grand National Assembly passed the constitution al amendment bill by 339 of 550 votes which is not enough for coming into force but holding a referendum by the President of the Republic2. The constitutional amendment law was promulgated by the President of the Republic on 11 February 2017, and the referendum was held on 16 April 2017. According to the official results declared by the Supreme Electoral Council, 51.41% of the valid votes are in favour, while 48.59% voted for no. Hence, the amendments were approved and are subject to coming into force. This article aims to point out the newly-introduced Turkish system of government by comparing the legislative and executive relations of the relevant constitutional systems which in this case are presidential U.S.A., semi-presidential France and super-presidential Russia. The other purpose of the article is to remark the formation of the judiciary branch of the American, English, German and French constitutional systems for the comparison of the regarding constitutional amendment law provisions. In this respect, the article comprises of a comparative legal/constitutional research in terms of legislative-executive-judiciary relations.

For the past decade in many countries in Europe and its close neighborhood we have observed different types of processes which can be named as “de-democratization”. The aim of the article is to analyze the state of elections as the crucial democratic institution which fairness and competitiveness have a substantial impact on the political regime. While Turkey as a “role model” for our analysis remains a main focus of the article, three European countries were selected for a comparison based on their relative similarity to Turkey – Hungary, Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia. The following questions are posed: Are elections in these countries free, fair and competitive? Can some types of electoral malpractice and irregularities be identified? How does the state of elections in terms of their fairness and competitiveness influence the political regime? The main hypothesis is that in the analyzed countries elections competitiveness limited by incumbents can become a factor deciding about the change within the political regime in the long run (loss of democratic quality) and also change the regime (to a less democratic one).

18 czerwca 1941 roku Turcja podpisała z III Rzeszą układ o nieagresji. Wydarzenie to spotkało się z krytycznym przyjęciem ze strony Wielkiej Brytanii. W Londynie pojawiły się obawy o zmianę polityki tureckiej, której kurs do tej pory nastawiony był na bliską współpracę z aliantami.
Cztery dni później III Rzesza zaatakowała Związek Radziecki. Reakcja rządu brytyjskiego była błyskawiczna. Winston Churchill podjął decyzję o udzieleniu pomocy napadniętemu, puszczając w niepamięć prawie dwa lata ścisłej współpracy niemiecko-radzieckiej. Ten krok z kolei wywołał niepokój w Ankarze, która uważała, że polityka jej północnego sąsiada zagraża suwerenności i integralności terytorialnej Turcji. Obawiano się, że rodząca się współpraca brytyjsko-radziecka może odbyć się kosztem państwa tureckiego.
Z końcem czerwca 1941 r. brytyjska polityka zagraniczna stanęła zatem przed dwoma ważnymi wyzwaniami. Dążąc do utrzymania przyjaznych relacji z Turcją, Brytyjczycy z jednej strony musieli przeciwdziałać zbliżeniu niemiecko- tureckiemu, a z drugiej przekonać władze tureckie, że brytyjska współpraca ze Związkiem Sowieckim nie będzie stanowić zagrożenia dla interesów tureckich. Powyższe cele wyznaczyły główne kierunki działań dyplomacji brytyjskiej wobec Turcji na następne półtora roku.
W pierwszym przypadku odniesiono połowiczny sukces. Co prawda Turcja nie została objęta niemiecką strefą wpływów, ale dyplomatom brytyjskim nie udało się storpedować turecko-niemieckiej umowy gospodarczej, a zwłaszcza jej najważniejszego punktu, czyli przywrócenia eksportu chromu do III Rzeszy. Brytyjczycy jedynie opóźnili dostawy dzięki wyegzekwowaniu od rządu tureckiego przestrzegania zawartego na początku 1940 roku porozumienia, którego postanowienia obowiązywały do końca 1942 roku.
W drugim przypadku Brytyjczycy uczynili wszystko co było w ich mocy, aby rozwiać obawy tureckie. Najpierw w sierpniu 1941 roku przekonali władze Związku Sowieckiego do wydania oświadczenia, w którym deklarowano przestrzeganie integralności terytorialnej Turcji. Następnie wiosną 1942 roku, kiedy negocjowany był układ brytyjsko-radziecki, Moskwa i Londyn potwierdziły wcześniejsze zobowiązania. Należy jednak zauważyć, że dyplomacja brytyjska nie ustrzegła się przed popełnieniem kilku błędów, które mogły zwiększyć podejrzenia ze strony rządu tureckiego. Najpoważniejszym z nich było niepoinformowanie Turków o przygotowaniach do brytyjsko-radzieckiej interwencji w Iranie, do której doszło pod koniec sierpnia 1941 roku.

ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY? THE CASE OF TURKEY

This article aims to present Turkey as a very specific case study of a state that is as much a democratic republic oriented towards Europe as it is steeped in the culture and tradition of Islam. We begin by asking whether a fruitful coexistence of democracy and Islam is possible, and how it might influence Turkey’s development as a modern state. Next, we examine important issues in Turkey’s internal affairs and foreign policy. We end the essay with some conclusions regarding the future of the country in the European community.

INSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL A ND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TURKISH PRAETORIANISM

The term ‘praetorianism’ refers to countries in which the armed forces influence the political system. The army, as an institution, can develop its political power in two ways: in a “direct” and “indirect” fashion. While in the first case the armed forces take control over state institutions, the second is more sublime and is restricted to the building of more concealed methods of influence, such as blackmail. Additionally, the army itself, as the officers are not engaged into politics, shows a high level of political cohesion and military professionalism. Turkey is an example of a country in which a professional army, after decades of acquiring political experience and under favourable conditions, was and still is able to efficiently exert backstage politics. On one side, TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) has developed constitutional and legal means of influencing the government, and on the other, the high public trust in the armed forces allows it to, if necessary, effectively blackmail or even supplant disobedient cabinets.

TURKEY IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AND LEBANON IN 1940 – 1941

After collapse of metropolitan France in June 1940, the French in the Syria and Lebanon swore allegiance to the Vichy Government. This situation was hard to accept by the British. According to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the occupation of these territories by enemy forces could have had most serious strategic consequences since it would cut of land communications with Turkey and would immediately threaten the whole of British interests in the Middle East. Due to that threat, London was forced to rethink its policy towards French Levant. One of the discussed measures was a proposition to involve Turkey in solving this problem. Turkey was bound with Britain with reciprocal security pact since October 1939. Moreover, the situation in Syria and Lebanon was also a threat for Turkish security. It was thought that these arguments would act in favor of Turkish involvement. Although in London everyone counted on active attitude of Turkey, there was no agreement as to its nature. While Churchill, Eden and the Chiefs of Staff were willing to agree on Turkish occupation of Syria and Lebanon, the Foreign Office was definitely against this solution. The first option eventually won. The first serious talks about Turkish involvement in Levant question took place in Ankara in January 1941, during the Anglo-Turkish military conversations. It was agreed then that if Turkey had entered the war, Turkish and British armies would have occupied Syria and Lebanon. The deteriorating military situation on the Eastern Mediterranean forced the United Kingdom to intervene in the French Levant in June 1941. Th e British government encouraged Turks to take part in that operation (“Exporter”). However, Turkish government rejected that offer. Turkey was still out of war and did not want to worsen her relations with the Third Reich.

There is a village on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus, initially called Adampol, but now known as Polonezköy. The Polish village is located 40 km. east of Istanbul, and was established by Poles in the nineteenth century as a shelter for the country’s immigrant community. This bound the destinies of many Poles with Turkey in the nineteenth century. Once people described the village „Soplicowo on the Bosporus”. Although the Polish village in Turkey has lost much of its original character through time, it remains one of the most extraordinary centres of Polish immigrants in the world (Wyszynska, 2016). This paper analyzes the main problems in Polonezköy and investigates how Polonezköy takes an important place in bilateral relations between Turkey and Poland.

The relations between Georgia and Western Europe and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1453–1783

The article presents the history of contacts between Georgia and Western Europe as well as Georgia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between the mid-15th and the end of the 18th centuries. In the article, the role of the Georgian diplomatic missions is emphasized in the process of forging anti-Osman coalitions.

Internal Subjective Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

The purpose of this article was to characterize selected subjective internal determinants affecting the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey: the concept of foreign policy and the quality and activity of foreign service and diplomacy. The most important challenges that Ankara’s diplomacy was forced to address include the need for a clear statement on the side of one of the blocks fighting in World War II, reaching agreement with Greece, partially related to territorial disputes, arranging relations with the USA, Israel and Arab states, as well as conducting accession negotiations with NATO and the European Union. The assumption of power by the Justice and Development Party has started a new phase in Turkish foreign policy. The article indicates international initiatives undertaken by Turkish decision-makers after 2002, including the promotion of culture and language (Yunus Emre Institutes) and development assistance (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency).

Selected Factors Shaping Turkish Foreign Policy

The analysis of determinants shaping the foreign policy of modern states requires taking into account a whole range of internal and external factors, both of an objective and subjective nature. The use of the typology of foreign policy determinants should be supplemented with the characteristics of factors specific to a given country, most often included in the social or cultural sphere. The lack of this type of supplement not only impairs the analysis but also makes it impossible to obtain a full picture of the phenomena and processes studied. One of the countries in which the analysis of foreign policy conditions requires consideration of a whole range of additional factors is the Republic of Turkey. The Kemalist ideology, Turkish Islam and Kurdish separatism described in this article, have a significant impact on the shape of contemporary Turkish foreign policy, thus should be thoroughly studied by all attempting to understand Turkish foreign policy.

Neo-Ottomanism Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Its Impact on Ethnic Relations in the Country

Turkish foreign policy for many years has been based on the concept of strategic depth formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Nowadays, the concept remains a base of Turkish softpower diplomacy addressed to many countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main sources of the foreign policy are the traditional historical experiences of the Ottoman empire and islamic culture. This article analyzes the Turkish softpower diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nowadays, Turkey is focusing on the Ottoman past, as well as on the events of the 1990s: the civil war and genocide. By This way Ankara is gaining just Bosnian-muslim community support. The main question is why Turkey is leading the foreign policy in such a way? And what impact does this have on Bosnian contemporary ethnic relations?