In this paper I explore what the term “stoic fate” was supposed to mean in Edward Herbert of Cherbury’s De Veritate. Famously, the ancient stoics had divergent views regarding this question, hence early modern reconstructions of the concept could be based on different sources (and, consequently, could have different significations). My aim is to prove that the Herbertian sense follows that of Justus Lipsius. Keeping in mind that Herbert’s epistemology involved soteriological considerations as well, all this can not be regarded as a mere philological nuance, since although scholars tend to focus solely on the epistemological content of the work the whole project outlined in the De Veritate is grounded on the distinction between fate and providence.

The paper reconstructs John Locke’s critique of Edward Herbert’s conception of common notions presented in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Though aimed at the epistemological significance of the term, the critique seems to miss the point, since due to the Platonic character of Herbert’s philosophy, the notions have also a metaphysical and religious significance overlooked by Locke. Thus the attack is justified only in part: for Herbert, the rationality of nature is understood as an ideal and not as a certain historic state of affairs, as Locke seems to suggest. It is an interesting feature of the discussion, that both the common notions and their critique is aimed at justification of religious rationality. The difference between both philosophers seems to have its roots in different understanding of knowledge. For Herbert it relates to an ideal, conceptual structure of reality, whereas for Locke it culminates in natural histories of cumulative character.