orthodoxy

Prawosławie i katolicyzm na Ukrainie w latach 1989-2014 - podejście ilościowe

Author: Tadeusz Dmochowski
Institution: Uniwersytet Gdański
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7609-6350
Year of publication: 2020
Source: Show
Pages: 36-60
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/npw20202502
PDF: npw/25/npw2502.pdf

Orthodoxy and catholicism in Ukraine in 1989-2014 - a quantitative approach

The complex reality of religious and institutional situation in Ukraine (three orthodox churches; two catholic churches), imposed on ethnic relations, has a significant impact on the balance of power in Ukraine, reinforcing existing divisions: between Ukrainians and Russians, between west and east Ukraine, between Orthodox and Catholics. Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is the most conservative force, with canonical and political ties (specially part of hierarchy) with Russia. It is the best organized religious structure in Ukraine with 12485 parishes and 10068 priests. Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (4536 parishes and 3141 priests) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1205 parishes, and 731 priests) are much more related to Ukrainian statehood and are supported by the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian political parties on their road to autocephaly and canonical independence from Moscow Patriarchate. The most aroused nationalist forces (the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”, Right Sector) are often associated with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (3734 parishes and 2594 priests), the main supporter of the Ukrainian nationalism.

Аналіз та деконструкція основних ідеологем доктрини «Русский Мир»

Author: Ксенія Зборовська
Institution: Інститут філософії імені Г.С. Сковороди Національної академії наук України
ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0949-3801
Year of publication: 2022
Source: Show
Pages: 95-114
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/so2022406
PDF: so/24/so2406.pdf

Analysis and Deconstruction of the Main Ideologists of the Russian World Doctrine

The article analyses the three prominent ideologues of the doctrine of “Russian world”: the myth that “Orthodoxy is the basis of an identity”; the myth of the openness and friendly attitude of the Russian people to other ethnic groups and religions, and the myth of the Eurasian/Russian civilisation that opposes the “rotten” West. The existence of these ideologues in the information and symbolic field of Ukraine and the world, manipulating them, and placing them in the actual context of the Ukrainian cultural space, lead to a distorted perception of relations between Russia and Ukraine and the war between them. The article attempts to reveal those distortions and semantic substitutions ontologically contained in the ideologies of the “Russian world”, which can be analysed as typical errors in the context of the argumentation theory. The study aims to develop a conditional “dictionary” of mythologists of the “Russian world”, which could be used during an all-out information confrontation. The author chose the myth “Orthodoxy – the basis of Russian identity” as the basic ideology because, firstly, most other ideologies derive from this thesis with the help of skilful semantic manipulations. Secondly, this myth is interpreted and used by Russian ideologues in various contexts. Based on the analysis of this and two other myths, the author concludes that the ideology of the “Russian measure” does not meet the definition of the criteria of clarity and unambiguity; the meanings of its key concepts are as variable as possible, depending on the context, used with the substitution of meaning in general formulations, which do not provide for clarification of non-standard use of the term; there is a substitution of identities, which makes it possible to manipulate the historical facts and memory of the people; such informal logical errors as recourse to force, alternative to fear, false Scotsman, wholesale bargaining, and source poisoning are always used by Russian ideologues in their argumentative practices. In the process of revealing the illogicality and paradoxical nature of these myths, it turns out that the very essence of these myths significantly contributes to the crisis of culture and politics, which speaks of the same ideologues who glorify the messianic role of Russia. This array of ideological myths cannot be called a balanced system of political dogmas but rather a rhizomatic system of manipulation, the fluidity of which provides its ability to evade counter-arguments and identify historical substitutions.

Miejsce ideologii oficjalnej narodnost’ w przestrzeni rosyjskiej myśli społeczno-politycznej lat 30. oraz 40. XIX stulecia

Author: Bartosz Hordecki
Institution: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Year of publication: 2018
Source: Show
Pages: 196-214
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/tpn2018.2.10
PDF: tpn/14/TPN2018210.pdf

The aim of the text was to locate the Ideology of Official Nationality in the space of Russian socio-political thought of 30s and 40s of the 19 century. The ideology, elaborated by count Sergey Semionovich Uvarov (1786–1855), was not only one among many legitimizing concepts, created mainly in regard to please Nicolai I. This doctrine occurred also to be a central narrative, organizing and polarizing Russian public discourse until the end of the Romanov’s monarchy. At first, the intellectual camps emerged during Nicolas I’s reign treated the Uvarov’s proposition as a central point of reference. Then next generations of the Russian intelligentsia referred to it, including the representatives of nearly all currents within the Russian socio-political thought before 1917. However, the core of the ideology of official nationality, i.e. so called the Uvarov’s triade (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality; Православие, Самодержавие, Народность) was burdened with an indispensible tension between the values entered into it. Namely, the reference to Orthodoxy (Православие) and Nationality (Народность) was expressing the integrative ambitions of Uvarov, who was searching for values which would enable to unify nearly all inhabitants of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, Autocracy (Самодержавие), despite Uvarov’s desires and beliefs, was not a principle able to inspire people infi nitely to prefer group rather than individual aspirations. In fact, the last part of the Uvarov’s triade – signifying a variety of modern absolutism – promotes a particular kind of egotism and social atomism.

Sytuacja prawna Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego i jej uwarunkowania społeczno-polityczne w latach 1944–1956. Problemy wybrane

Author: Danuta Waniek
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9645-1898
Year of publication: 2023
Source: Show
Pages: 189-219
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/npw20233610
PDF: npw/36/npw3610.pdf

Consolidation of the political system as a source of Russian political behavior in the international environment

The main purpose of this article is to recall and analyze from a political-legal point of view not only the little-known wartime history of the Polish Orthodox Church, but also attempts to bring order to the chaos that reigned in the Polish Orthodox Church after the end of World War II. This issue is most often taken up in intellectual circles associated with the Orthodox Church, or - less often - by experts in religious policy. The study presented here is an attempt to supplement this body of work with an own view of the policy of the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland towards the Orthodox Church, carried out in 1944-1958, which was seriously influenced not only by ideological and legal decisions, characteristic of the period of building revolutionary political changes, but also by long unresolved nationality issues.

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