Evolution of republican laity in France as of adoption of the law of  December 9, 1905 about separation of Churches from the state –  selected legal issues

The article presents an issue of evolution of radical version of the French state laity proclaimed in the law of 9 December 1905 about separation of Churches from the state. The author recognizes that expression of a consent by the state to establishment of catholic diocesan congregations, apart from worship congregations, numerous forms of indirect subsidizing of religious communities with the use of public funds or implementation of constitutional standards with respect to the principle of laity emphasizing a guarantee function of the principle as regards the freedom of conscience and religion, constitute significant examples of mitigation of the French version of the separation. On the other hand, the author, indicated to recently observed cases of exacerbation of laity in some fields, which is well illustrated by implementation of a prohibition to wear religious symbols or garment, which are used by pupils of state schools for the purposes of ostentatious manifestation of their religious affiliations, prohibition to cover faces in public space or implementation of the charter of secularity in schools. Consequently, the author assumes that the contemporary models of relationships between the state and church in France is ambiguous, which makes one adopt a sceptical approach to any attempt to define it in a general manner.

Autonomy of Religious Associations as a Constitutional Principle and Right

In the existing body of literature on the autonomy of religious associations, little attention has been paid to the normative nature of the formula adopted in the Polish Constitution, including the relation of the principle of autonomy to freedom of religion and belief. In this article, it is argued that religious autonomy, as expressed in the Polish Constitution, should be understood both as a constitutional principle and as a right of religious associations. The right to autonomy is not absolute and may be subject to limitations, but the closer the connection between the area of autonomy subject to regulation and the spiritual identity of the community concerned, the narrower the scope of permissible interference. The protection of the most sensitive manifestations of religious autonomy is safeguarded by the constitutionnal prohibition of interference with the essence of freedoms and rights.

The Current Legal Status of the Communities of Old Believers in Poland

The paper discusses the legal status of two communities of ‘old believers’ currently existing in Poland – Eastern Old Believers Church and Old Orthodox Church of Old Believers. The first part of the paper focuses on the controversy surrounding the Presidential Decree regulating the Eastern Old Believers Church of 1928. The widespread opinion concerning the expiry of the norms of the said decree is being challenged in this part. The second part focuses on the characteristics of the Old Orthodox Church of Old Believers, including a discussion of the case underlying the separation of the Old Orthodox Church of Old Believers from the structures of the Eastern Old Believers Church. In the last part, the position taken by the state regarding the dispute between the two mentioned religious denominations will be assessed in the perspective of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Exorcisms

This article examines the determinants and consequences of the rite of exorcism from the constitutional law perspective. The study was limited to exorcism in the Roman Catholic Church due to its dominance in the religious composition of population in Poland. Exorcism is clearly a manifestation of religion, and it is argued that its performance should be subject to constraints justified by the need to protect the health and the right to humane treatment of the exorcised. Therefore, it is necessary to call for the establishment of legal restrictions, both preventive (mandatory medical consultation before performing the rite, mandatory medical examination for exorcists) and ex-post (ban on performing the rite on a given category of people). On the other hand, an absolute ban on exorcisms would violate the essence of the freedom to manifest religion and would not satisfy the requirements of proportionality.

The offense against religious feelings expressed in the text of Art. 196 of PC is strongly embedded in the constitutional liberties and freedoms and human rights of both the Council of Europe and the European Union. Freedom of conscience and religion, which originated in the wording of Art. 196 of PC remains in antinomy to other constitutional values protected by both international acts such as freedom of expression, freedom of artistic expression, the freedom to teach and freedom to enjoy cultural heritage. This requires balancing the content of these freedoms. At present stage there is yet no way to resolve the alleged doctrine of countertype of art.

The Constitutional Right to Change Religion

The right to change religion comprises two sub-rights: the right to join a religious community and the right to withdraw from it. The former requires that the consent of the individual and the religious group be a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing membership. Such a right is generally uncontroversial and respected in practice, whereas the right to leave a religious association is sometimes difficult to exercise. This is due to the fact that this matter is left to be determined by the internal laws of religious associations, resulting in fragmented regulation, unequal treatment, and insufficient procedural guarantees. The situation could be significantly improved by regulating the procedure for leaving a religious association in state law. However, a distinction must be made between the spiritual and legal dimensions of membership. The article is based on doctrinal research involving the Strasbourg requirements, national case law, and existing legal scholarship.

Commercial Marketplace or Marketplace of Ideas? Reflections on Protecting the Religious Freedom of Companies after the US Supreme Court Decision in the 303 Creative v. Elenis Case

Although the protection of religious freedom through freedom of speech is not a new concept in US jurisprudence, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Elenis case extended its application to commercial companies, holding that it is lawful to refuse to provide a service to third parties if doing so would compel the owners of the companies to make a speech that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs. Such a broadly defined protection of religious freedom raises concerns from the perspective of harm to third parties in terms of equal access to services in the marketplace (material harm) and harm to the dignity of third parties (dignity harm). The article offers a critical analysis of the Elenis judgment, in particular using the concept of complicity-based claims developed by D. NeJaime and R. Siegel.