The present paper raises the issue of cultural security in the programme-related ideas conceived by Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (hereinafter referred to as the Law and Justice or – to use an abbreviated term – PiS) in 21st century. In the present paper, the issues related to national identity and national culture were scrutinized, the former and the latter being two constituents of cultural security of the state.

Political programmes of the Law and Justice specified mainly the dangers to national identity in the context of European integration and of striving for the unification of European culture. On the other hand, in the realm of national culture, what was noticed was the phenomenon of neglecting the said issue and not considering it important from the point of view of security of the state.

**Keywords:** cultural security, security of the state, politics of memory, Law and Justice, Polish political parties

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Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie bezpieczeństwa kulturowego w koncepcjach programowych Prawa i Sprawiedliwości w XXI wieku. W ramach tekstu dokonana została analiza problematyki tożsamości narodowej i kultury narodowej jako dwóch składowych bezpieczeństwa kulturowego państwa.

Programy polityczne Prawa i Sprawiedliwości w głównej mierze określają zagrożenia dla tożsamości narodowej w kontekście integracji europejskiej oraz dążenia do unifikacji kultury europejskiej. Z kolei w obszarze kultury narodowej dostrzegano zjawisko lekceważenia tego zagadnienia i nieuznawania go jako istotnego z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa państwa.

**Słowa kluczowe:** bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, bezpieczeństwo państwa, polityka historyczna, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, polskie partie polityczne
INTRODUCTION

Since 2005, Polish political scene has been dominated by two political parties: the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO), both of which were founded four years before, at the moment of the collapse of the Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność). The first parliamentary elections in which the two said parties took part assured to them the spot in the parliament (back then as the opposition towards the coalition government formed by the Democratic Left Alliance – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, and the Polish People’s Party – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, respectively). However, that has been so-far the only case of the elections in which neither of the said two parties won; what is more, it was the unprecedented case where the two parties did not occupy the first/second position in the general election.

A stable and strong position of these two parties in Polish political-party system (Antoszewski, 2009) contributed to both parties gaining the possibility of creating the agenda of public debate as well as of determining the directions of political actions – either as the ruling party or as the strongest opposition party. One of the tools exploited for the sake of shaping the remits of debate within electoral competition were political programmes whose importance is particularly underlined by the Law and Justice. Hence, it is natural that the political programmes of the two respective parties arouse interest on the part of the researchers of the political life of the Third Republic of Poland.

The present paper can be subsumed under this tendency as well and constitutes an attempt at analyzing political programmes of the Law and Justice as related to the perception of the cultural security phenomenon. The aim of the paper is the specification of the significance of national identity and national culture for the cultural security of the state as conceived of in election programmes by PiS. The specific research problems were:

a. What dangers for national identity were recognized?

b. What dangers for national culture were recognized?

c. To what extent and in what manner should the state react when it comes to guaranteeing the cultural security of the state?

The primary basis for research will be political programmes of PiS published in 2003–2015. So delineated a period of research is justified by the fact that its limits coincide with the events vital from the point of view of the analyzed issues. The date commencing the scrutinized period coincides with the period of the intensified political debate on Polish accession to European Union, the
debate being accompanied with the referendum on accession as well as with the eventual process of Poland accessing European Union structures in May, 2004. The upper time limit is in turn determined by the last parliamentary elections, dating back to 2015.

As far as my research is concerned, I mainly availed myself of the qualitative analysis of the text, which takes heed of the occurrence or non-occurrence of characteristic content (as opposed to the content occurring most frequently). The said analysis investigates the intentions cherished by the sender and pays attention to the context of the occurrence of some specific content (Palska, 1999; Szczepaniak, 2012).

CULTURAL SECURITY

Cultural security is one of the areas in which the dangers for the state are recognized and analyzed. Taking interest in this area as a distinct field of study was determined by ridding of purely military conception of the security of the state and in turn embarking on post-Cold-War comprehensive approach whose theoretical foundations were the achievements of the Copenhagen School headed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). The theoretical assumptions put forward by the representatives of this school posited that security is to be regarded as an indivisible category, comprised by both external and internal dimensions, that is a military and extra-military one (Kaźmierczak-Pec, 2014; Marczuk, 2009). Therefore, cultural security may be identified with one type of security – next to such types as political, military, economic, social or, for that matter, an ecological one, all of them being regarded by Buzon as extra-military one (Zięba, 1999; Ziętek, 2013).

The essential aim of cultural security is not only protecting material cultural property or cultural heritage but also, broadly speaking, protecting the values being of the essence to national identity. It also encompasses protecting cultural distinctiveness related to ethnicity and national minorities, enabling cultural openness, a free flow of the values commonly regarded as essential, promoting national culture in the world and setting the conditions favorable to its development (Hrynicki, 2014).

Cultural security may be also defined as: on the one hand – protecting one’s culture, which is considered as multi-generational achievement, against the undesirable influence of other cultures. Furthermore, cultural security may
be associated with the state ability to multiply one’s so-far cultural heritage (Czaja, 2004; Hrynicki, 2014). Grażyna Michałowska (1997) in turn believes that “cultural security in its national aspect denotes the conditions under which a society may conserve and cherish the values essentially determining its identity and simultaneously take advantage of the experience and accomplishments of other nations. Thus, it is a state of sort of necessary equilibrium; however, it is impossible to delineate it either empirically or theoretically”.

In the literature, when it comes to defining cultural security, what is noticeable is to tackle the said issue in two of its aspects.

On the one hand, cultural security is regarded as being associated with political security. The above-mentioned connection is manifested – among others – in defining dangers or protected values and attributing to certain phenomena the aspect of cultural security, the said phenomena shaping the policy of the state. On the other hand, some authors resign from the state-centered approach when defining cultural security. They identify the subject of cultural security with extra-state members, that is cultural and religious communities, which means nations, ethnic groups or the adherents of a given religion (Włodkowska, 2009). Wojciech Hrynicki (2014) conceives of that dualism of understanding cultural security in the following manner: “Due to the broad understanding, cultural security may be considered on two planes. It is of dualistic nature – it refers to the state realm (the cultural security of the state) and to the social one (the cultural security of individuals and of cultural communities –nations, ethnic groups and religious groups). Both these realms are inextricably intertwined – especially in the legal sense, because particular legal precepts assure the protection of those elements of culture that are of importance to an individual. The said precepts manage to do so by virtue of assuring the protection of cultural elements being essential from the point of view of the state”.

A slightly different typology, albeit also a two-element one, of cultural security was provided by Waldemar Kitler (2002), who claims that we encounter cultural security when we talk about “the state taking all possible actions aimed at protecting cultural good and also when we talk about making use of cultural heritage of the nation aimed at shaping desirable states of affairs in international environment and finally when we talk about strengthening national character”. Such a construal of the issue of cultural security opens the perspective of the research on politics of memory as run by the state with the intention of exerting influence on the international arena (Gawin, Kowal, 2005).
While defining the concept of cultural security, one can, following Jan Czaja (2013), enumerate its key areas such as:

- The protection of the values of symbolic culture (spiritual one) being essential to national identity (e.g., language, religion, literature);
- Protecting material cultural property and cultural heritage;
- A feeling of cultural security which concerns both the nation and individuals or ethnic groups;
- The openness of the culture being construed as maintaining the state of equilibrium between its internal development based on domestic values and the internalization of external elements coherent with the former;
- Running the external cultural policy aimed at promoting one's own culture and country as well as at setting the external conditions favourable to the development thereof.

To recapitulate the above considerations, what is to be considered as cultural security is the state's ability to protect one's cultural identity, cultural property and national heritage in the context of being receptive to global influences, which in turn allows for the development of culture by virtue of internationalization of the values coherent with one's identity (Czaja, 2004).

The concept which is significantly correlated with cultural security is cultural identity, oftentimes referred to as national identity. Grzegorz Radomski (2016) notes that the values critical for the question of identity are pointed out in all the definitions of cultural security and are primarily regarded as subject to protection. What I shall mean by the said identity is a bundle of properties representative of a given culture, which amount to their respective distinctness and make them different from one another and which make the people living under a specific culture identify with the values and thus simultaneously branding on their minds the feeling of their respective distinctiveness (Michałowska, 1991).

According to Agata Włodkowska (2009), in the national sense, cultural identity is a factor shaping the positive sentiment of nationalism, which combines a historical memory of the nation and favours the citizens’ identification with the state and its political goals. The said identity itself comprises: dwelling on a given territory, the commonness of cultural bonds (based on religion, language, institutions and history), as well as being emotionally attached to the place of common place of residence.

Thus defined cultural security is vulnerable to a series of dangers. In the context of Polish state, what can be subsumed under the category of dangers
are – among others – the decreasing feeling of cultural bond among people, the limited sovereignty of the state, decreasing level of financial means dedicated to culture and the growing cultural dependency resulting from assimilating strange values (Kośmider, 2014).

NATIONAL IDENTITY

The process of integrating Poland with the EU gave rise to many political debates related not only to the sovereignty of the Polish state but also to the issue of the cultural identity of the Polish society. The said issues were particularly strongly emphasized in the period of the referendum on accession dating back to 2003, when it was Poles who decided about Polish accession to the European Union. It was also underlined in 2004–2005 during the times of – respectively – elections to the European Parliament and to the Polish parliament. Back in those days, as Czaja notes, what started to matter more and more were the issues of identity and new global, economic, politico-social and cultural challenges (e.g., endowing the European Union with identity-bearing traits) that made the individuals, social groups, nations, states face the problem of confirming their respective identity anew (both in the local, regional sense, as well as in the nation-state or the international one; Czaja, 2001).

In the scrutinized period, the issue of national identity was a point of political issue between the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice (Lewandowski, 2016). The differences in style of their respective political thinking was correlated with their distinct perception of the phenomenon of European integration and the vision of united Europe. The Civic Platform, being subsumed under the Euro-enthusiastic parties (the period 2003–2006 excluded), did not resort in its rhetoric to a sharp distinction between national identity and European integration, or else – “European values”. As opposed to the Civic Platform party, the Law and Justice, party labelled as Euro-realist, being a proponent of Europe consisting of nation-states, that is sovereign European states cooperating on the internal level, presented an entirely different hierarchy in which national identity is absolutely superior to European values (Grzesik-Robak, 2008; Migalski, 2009).

According to PiS, national identity was defined by: the teachings of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition, and Polish patriotism (Balcer, Buras, Gromadzki, Smolar, 2016; Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina, 2014). That value needed protecting, and the protection was to be put into practice by the virtue of maintaining
sovereignty within European structures. This way of thinking was conspicuous during the first elections to the European Parliament with the Polish political parties taking part. It was back then when the Law and Justice used two slogans in their electoral campaign: “Dignified Representation in Europe” (Godna reprezentacja w Europie), and “Europe as the Solidarity of Nations” (Europa solidarnych narodów), with the latter one reflecting fully the nature of the views cherished by that party on the process of European integration and the shape of the European Union.

One of the then leaders of PiS, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, stressed that it is necessary in Europe to restore the type of thinking based on national interest and on casting doubt on the ideology of Euro-enthusiasm (Europejski program PiS, 2004). What is more, the declarations made by the politicians of PiS back in those days stressed the importance of the sovereignty of the states and the protection of national interests within the EU. On the other hand, the European Union itself was identified with the realization of the idea of Europe of nation states (Bronić w Unii polskich interesów, 2004). Back then, it was also emphasized that Europe should maintain its Christian nature, to show solidarity and be solidary and equal. During the campaign for the European Parliament in 2004, Jarosław Kaczyński said: „All those foundations were laid down by Europe itself. Its future is not a super-state but Europe of independent nation-states. We do not want to confront the interest of Poland and that of Europe. We are concerned with maintaining equality and cultural diversity; we want Europe with common-access free-market” (Europa Ojczyzn, 2004). The leader of PiS estimated that in integrating Europe “one needs to decisively struggle for national dignity of a big European nation which we constitute” (PiS ma wizję wspólnej Europy, 2004).

PiS iterated its views on the nature of its vision of the European Union in 2005 during the electoral campaign for the national parliament. However, back then there appeared an explicit reference to the issue of national identity. In the electoral programme of the Law and Justice dating back to 2005, the expression national identity appeared 10 times in 144 pages. In the preamble to this document, the authors, while enumerating challenges the Polish state faces or will face in the future, included the very issue of national identity itself. As they suggested:

“In this area, what is equally threatening are strong centralizing tendencies present in the European Union, the trends associating the hope for the future of our continent with the development of the super-state and with the creation of the new pan-European identity at the expense of nation-states and their respec-
tive identity. In social practice, the agenda of constructing the new European awareness would be reducible to imposing on weaker nations the identity of the strongest ones” (IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich, 2005).

While referring broadly to the problem of European integration, the representatives of PiS suggested that the policy run by the Union back then was dominated by short-term economic interests of the “old” member states, the interest having pushed aside the values that the founding fathers of the European communities had in mind. They added:

„The Union lacks a vision and is afflicted with the crisis of cultural identity. It is exactly that moral emptiness that St. John Paul II warned us against in his historical speech in the Polish parliament, reminding us of the words of the encyclical Centesimus Annus, that democracy without values gets easily transformed into an explicit or implicit totalitarianism” (IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich, 2005).

Continuing that thread, the politicians of PiS attracted public attention to the duty incumbent on Poland, again referring to the words by St. John Paul II on the need for Poland to bring the new spirit of Christian solidarity to Europe (IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich, 2005). That aspect was significant to the extent that what PiS representatives found unacceptable was the area of integration which involved the uniformization of cultural policy (the so-called 4th pillar of the EU), the said uniformization potentially resulting in developing the identity based on the “secular European religion” devoid of Christian roots (Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2011).

The spiritual and moral aspect of national identity in the context of European integration was reflected in the brochure bearing the title Polska Katolicka w Chrześcijańskiej Europie (Catholic Poland in Christian Europe, 2005). That document stressed the necessity of introducing to the then designed European constitution a reference to God and Christianity as a proper measure for determining the identity of the Old Continent.

In that document, the representatives of PiS also noted the issue of sovereignty of nation states of integrating Europe. They stressed the necessity of protecting sovereignty of Poland when it comes to moral and cultural issues, treating this claim as an element of assuring national interest and the overall security of the state (Polska Katolicka w Chrześcijańskiej Europie, 2005). Despite the fact that in the referred document the expressions national identity and cultural security do not occur, the way of defining the problem related to the presence of Christian values and to them being endangered in the policies run by the European Union
allows for considering the said issues as essential ones from the perspective of PiS’ views on cultural security.

Facing up to the above-mentioned dangers and simultaneously striving for strengthening national identity, the PiS politicians suggested specific actions realized by the state institutions. In the electoral programme of 2011 they suggested:

“With reference to the accomplishments dating back to 2005–2007, we will prioritize again the significance of the politics of memory and of shaping patriotic attitudes. […] One of the means of building Poles’ taking pride in their own history and in the accomplishments in the cultural and material realm shall be social campaigns designed in such a manner that follows the pattern of educational programme Patriotyzm jutra (Patriotism of Tomorrow), directed at young Poles and based on the positive message (as other countries do). The said campaigns are going to embrace – among others – disseminating knowledge on the break-through events in the Polish history as well as on exquisite figures of the 20th century. Such campaigns will be also directed at those young Poles who emigrated” (Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska, 2011).

National identity was then to be strengthened also by the education system. It was believed that school graduates should be familiarized with the common reservoir of knowledge and be acquainted with common symbols, references and images that are key to Polish identity. The means thereto was to restore the proper rank to teaching Polish literature and history in public schools (Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina, 2014).

Still, in the programme documents of the Law of Justice, what was manifested was a criticism of the policies run in the realm of culture and education, the policies being realized in 2007–2015 by the ruling coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party, the policies being in turn judged as destructive. It is because it was believed that the said policies were directed at weakening national sentiments and national tradition. The actions taken by the already mentioned coalition PO-PSL in the area of education were explicitly evaluated by the programme Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina (2014) as “employing educational means for the sake of deconstruction of our identity”.

At this point, it was worthwhile to add that showing activity in the realm of creating patriotic attitudes, as suggested by Jarosław Kaczyński, was one of the characteristic postulates of that party throughout its existence on the political scene.
NATIONAL CULTURE

In the context of the issue alluded to in the title, the second significant element of cultural security of the state was national culture. The Law and Justice party declared that national culture is a source of national identity and the endurance of the nation is properly measured by the extent to which we take care of our national culture and cultural heritage (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005). Yet, according to PiS, not all the parties nor political circles operating under the Third Republic of Poland cherished the same views on that issue. In the 2005 programme of the party headed by Jarosław Kaczyński, what was noted was the matter of regarding the issue of national culture as a secondary problem. In this document, what was stated goes as follows:

“Public debate in Poland mainly revolves around economic or political issues. Those issues – however significant and urgent – occupy almost the entire attention of both political elites and of the public opinion. That being the case acts obviously to the detriment of other equally important problems being thus neglected; or else, one thinks that the attempt at solving the latter problems may be postponed. What falls prey to this sort of thinking is most frequently education and culture. […] Nonetheless, the consequences of this negligence in the sphere of education or culture, however intractable and invisible at the beginning, they gradually increase and may prove to be exceptionally dramatic and irrevocable at the end” (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005).

In 2014, the belief was still held that what is a key to strengthening cultural politics is “overcoming the tendency to treat culture lightly, as a peripheral area being unimportant from the point of view of the fundamental national interests” (*Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina*, 2014).

It is to be stressed that in those two enumerated cases, in 2005 as well as in 2014, the Law and Justice party was in opposition, which certainly facilitated the formulation of the accusation of not treating the issue of national culture seriously.

The programme by PiS also specified the necessity of state intervening vigorously into the realm of culture. The aim of the activities by state’s institution, as thought of by the PiS politicians, should be the care for the development of culture as the source of the existence of the nation. Furthermore, what should be the purpose thereof is grounding the sentiment of national identity as well as the protection of the accomplishments of
previous generations. Society consciously participating in the cultural life of
the nation reflects, as was promptly stated, the condition of this very nation.
Culture, on the other hand, is one of the most important factors determining
development and simultaneously providing the capital which would allow
Poland and Poles to face up to tough challenges future has in store for us
(IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich, 2005).

The task of the state is also to provide a broad access to Polish cultural herit-
age, e.g., by digitalization and mass availability of all the literary works of Polish
classical literature; but also, by assuring a free-of-charge entrance to museums for
pupils and students alike. Improving the access to culture was supposed to occur
also by dint of protecting and strengthening the local institutions of culture (e.g.,
libraries) – also manifested by assuring the necessary infrastructure in the form

What is correlated in PiS documents with the issue of national culture and
its strengthening in the world was one additional area of actions for the sake of
cultural security. The politicians of this party subsumed the increase in its rank of
Polish culture in the world under the category of such actions that were labelled
as politics of memory (later on referred to as identity politics).

According to PiS programmes, the politics of memory was supposed to –
among others – serve to promote our own heritage and appeal to the social
awareness of Poles and influence an international debate (Paruch, Rydel, 2011).
It was also to serve the purpose of spreading a good and just image of Poland in
the international reception. Finally, it was to facilitate the permeation of Polish
culture into foreign countries (Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina, 2014). As stated, the
special role in this realm was to be realized by Instytut Adama Mickiewicza
(The Adam Mickiewicz Institute), which should become a vibrant equivalent of
similar institutions existing, e.g., in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden.
The said institute was supposed to collaborate closely with Polish facilities abroad
(Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska, 2011).

Stressing the importance of national culture was reflected in the opinions
held on financing thereof. In 2005, the Law and Justice assumed the actions of
endorsing culture by the state on the basis of solid and efficient state’s patronage
(IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich, 2005). This postulate was
expressly stressed in the election programme of 2011: “The Law and Justice
ceaselessly states that the spending on culture and protection of national heritage
– especially upon Poland entering the European Union – should remain under
the special protection and their growth should assist the economic growth” (Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska, 2011).

In the election programme of 2011, what was noticeable was allowing for situation in which financing culture would be done via extra-budget means. It was declared that the Law and Justice notices the need to specify both the legal bases anew and the conditions of organizing and financing the institution of culture – including sponsoring culture in order to increase the attractiveness of sponsoring valuable cultural projects (Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska, 2011). The authors of the analyzed document wrote what follows:

“Within our patronage, we will stimulate the actions oriented at the development of the material base of culture. Who should partake in it are self-governments being supported by the state – also the European Union means shall be employed. Private sponsors can come in handy too. […] One of the instruments stimulating the activity of the institution of culture in the acquisition of financial means from extra-budgetary resources will be the mechanism of co-financing of valuable projects from public and private means” (Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska, 2011).

However, there was still the proviso that national culture is the realm within which what is invested is human capital and the realm itself cannot be treated as a social or a commercial sphere, which in turn means that investing in it does not involve perceiving it solely in the light of potential profits.

SUMMARY

The problem – presented in the paper – of the occurrence in the public programmes of PiS of the issues related to cultural security (as far as cultural and national identity goes) allows us to formulate the characteristics of the trends noticeable in the analyzed documents.

It is to be noted that, in PiS’ opinion, what exerted the influence on cultural security was undoubtedly European integration, which was accompanied with premonitions related to its anti-Christian nature and striving for building super-state, which was supposed to have a bearing on emerging dangers for national identity. In the face of all of that, what became an essential task was:

• to assure sovereignty to the Republic of Poland – in both cultural and moral dimension;
striving for implementing the conception of Europe of nation states – as far as European dimension goes;
• taking such state actions that were aimed at strengthening national identity.

The latter of the analyzed dimensions of cultural security, that is national culture, which was also present in the programme documents of PiS, was also described as the one being constantly endangered. The first danger involved a negligent approach to the analyzed issue by the majority of elites of the Third Republic of Poland. As a result, as believed by the PiS politicians, the Polish national culture was poorly recognized by Poles themselves and barely recognized beyond the borders of Poland. What is important is also the fact that the documents of PiS appreciated the significance of politics of memory (national politics) in the international aspect, with the significance for the actions aimed at attaining cultural security of Poland.

Answering the research problems posed in the introduction to the present paper one must state – on the basis of the analysis of political programmes of the Law and Justice – that both national and cultural identity are the important elements of the conception of cultural security, as conceived of by the said political party. Maintaining a proper level of security calls for, according to the conceptions cherished by Jarosław Kaczyński’s party, the state actions for the sake of protecting national identity or for promoting national culture, which is also a distinctive feature of political thinking of the said party.

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