Russian Geopolitical Advancements in the Black Sea Region: the Annexation of Crimea

The annexation of Crimea is not an ordinary event in contemporary international relations. Since WWII, there has been no precedent in Europe when one state under dubious premises has forcefully annexed a part of another state. This article scrutinizes the Crimean case in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and uncovers the rationale behind Russia’s aggressive policies in the Black Sea Region. To accomplish this task, several steps have been undertaken. Primarily, the recent speeches of Russian officials and Kremlin-originated documents have been analyzed. Secondly, the tactics favored by the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals have been explained and assessed (through applying frameworks of meta-geography and soft power security). Thirdly, the future prospects for Crimea with its gradual transformation in the counter- NATO fortress have been outlined.

ROSYJSKIE POSTĘPY GEOPOLITYCZNE W REGIONIE MORZA CZARNEGO: ANEKSJA KRYMU

Aneksja Krymu nie wydaje się być zwykłym wydarzeniem we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych. Od czasów II wojny światowej nie doszło jeszcze do precedensu w Europie, kiedy jedno państwo na podstawie wątpliwych przesłanek forsownie aneksowało fragment innego państwa. Ten artykuł ma za zadanie analizę aneksji Krymu w kontekście trwającego kryzysu ukraińskiego i określenie podstaw agresywnej polityki Rosji w regionie Morza Czarnego. W tym celu zostały podjęte następujące kroki. Przede wszystkim przeanalizowane zostały ostatnie wypowiedzi rosyjskich urzędników i oficjalne dokumenty Kremla. Po drugie, opisana i wyjaśniona została (poprzez zastosowanie metodologii meta-geografii i soft power security) ulubiona taktyka Kremla do osiągania swoich celów geopolitycznych. Po trzecie, przedstawione zostały perspektywy rozwoju Krymu uwzględniające jego stopniową transformację w antynatowską twierdzę.

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