Prawda czy dialog? Rozważania nad odpowiedzią Richarda Rorty’ego

Author: Marcin Kilanowski
Institution: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
Year of publication: 2014
Source: Show
Pages: 7-22
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/kie.2014.03.01
PDF: kie/103/kie10301.pdf

Richard Rorty postulates that we relinquish relying on the “Platonic” idea of something common to us all, something uniting us with others, and cease the search for both universal justifications and truths. Rorty fears, and backs his fears with examples from history, that referring to something uniting us may serve those who shall state that there is some right, true model of living, of collective cooperation, and that only one form of social and political organization is right for us. Because if there is a truth about human beings, about relations with others, then in accordance with the traditional way of thinking, we should act on it, and any opposing action, freethinking, should not take place. Each and every human being should act according to fixed – uncovered – standards, and those who disobey should be directed onto the right path. In short, one of Rorty’s firm beliefs is that the idea of human being, of truth, particular perspectives determine our choices – perhaps this is how Rorty’s intuition may be expressed within one sentence. But is such an opinion justified? In the hereby article I shall say it is not; whether we are universalists or constructivists, our choices may be of the same kind. At the same time, having the same metaphysical or constructivist beliefs, we may arrive at quite different choices.

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truth universality constructivism use dialogue Pragmatism interest

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