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Navigating the gray zone: the theoretical dilemma of interest groups impacting public life through lobbying and the threat of corruption

  • Author: Mariusz Popławski
  • Institution: Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
  • ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5563-5308
  • Year of publication: 2024
  • Source: Show
  • Pages: 71-83
  • DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/npw20244406
  • PDF: npw/44/npw4406.pdf

From the very beginning of human civilization, the ones in power were impacted by the others, who tried to gain from a more favorable decision. In order to achieve that, one could have used the correct arguments based on rationality, which, for instance, could have had an economic background. That demands much effort, meaning we should know the person we are trying to convince, learn about the situation, and gather opinions, evidence, and all sorts of data that could be useful. Others could try something risky and illegal – all sorts of corruption, including bribes, embezzlement, nepotism, extortion, kickbacks, etc. The distinction between the two seems straightforward, but only on the surface. If we get deeper into the issue, things get way more complex, and we might find it difficult to draw a clear line since the gray zone keeps growing. The paper concentrates then on the joint history of corruption and lobbying to give us a broad picture of the issue. Secondly, various concepts of the definition are analyzed to understand where we are in terms of the search between the two phenomena. The article ends with conclusions and further research suggestions.

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