Religion and state played a very important role in organising social life in the Russian Empire. Apart from religious life tasks, the Church was also running schools, hospitals and shelters. It was conducting cultural activities and ran full records of civil acts: births, weddings and deaths. For centuries, the Church gathered great fortune, and was using it to take care of such a wide area of interest. Clergymen became true lords of their parishioners’ thoughts, whatever the persuasion. After the October Revolution in 1919, one of the main tasks of the new government was to fight with religion and clergy, both regarded as ideological enemies. Already in 1917, after taking over power in the country, several state decrees were issued in order to eliminate religion from the nation’s life. In 1918 a document was issued, depriving the Church of a right to be represented in the social life as a legal entity, as well as confiscating all the Church’s fortune and bank accounts. All religious schools, printing houses, cultural institutions, even objects serving religious purposes – books, icons, sacrificial tables – were nationalised. Convents were changed into prisons, faith in God was announced to be a relic of rightly passed old times, and believing meant risking repressions. The Clergy were considered a social group that was supposed to become extinct, a sort of “former” structure. Religious life went underground. During the war, between 1941 and 1945, certain reliefs were introduced, with propaganda purposes, especially to improve the international image of the USSR and its leader, Stalin.

Among many organs created throughout many years in order to control religion and the clergy, the most significant one was the Russian Orthodox Church’s Council. The article contains a detailed description of this organisation’s activities within the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.

The ROCC’s activities’ analysis shows that it was the organ of detailed state control over the clergy and all believers, which was being executed directly by its agents.

Relations with Eastern neighbours play an important role for both Poland and Germany. For Germany Russia is a key partner in this area, but Berlin–Warsaw relations have developed rapidly over recent last years. Representatives of both states co-operated to enhance development of relations with Eastern neighbours of the EU. One of the most important issues is a Polish–German–Russian programme. For Poland the most crucial part of Eastern Policy plays the Eastern Partnership. Intensification of the co-operation with six post-Soviet states was one of the priorities of the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union during the second half of 2011. The Polish–Swedish concept is also backed by Germany.

Up until the parliament and president election of 2005, the Citizens’ Platform and the Law and Justice were considered twin parties. The reason for that was, that both parties originated from the Solidarity movement and expressed similar values (the need to settle accounts with PPR, decommunisation, public figures’ inspection and general aversion to communism). Polish political scene’s observers in their analysis were frequently omitting some important differences shown in economical concepts and in the foreign policies of both parties. Not until after 2005 when the two camps got drastically divided, the differences in basic matters of both parties programme were emphasized. This also concerned foreign affairs. During the time when Donald Tusk’s government holds power for the second term of office, it is worth to bring up certain guidelines and a practical side of foreign policy conducted by the Law and Justice.

The article is devoted to issues that were classified in times of mass repressions in the Soviet Union (including Kyrgyzstan). This also applies to the first Kyrgyz intellectuals, who studied the Kyrgyz national epic “Manas” about the hero of the same name. The epic has a thousand year old history and it traced the religious motives of Islam. It was the occasion that major designers of the problem, manasoveds T. Baijiev, Z. Bektenov, T. Samanchin from the Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan were declared “bourgeois nationalists.” For promotion and study of the epic they were arrested and deported to gulags in Kazakhstan in 1949–1950 for penal servitude. Tashim Baijiev died there. The two others were later released, but they came back home as cripples. The epic “Manas” was banned from publishing. The ban was lifted a decade later. Scientists have been rehabilitated, but were unable to continue their work. Today, the epic “Manas” repeatedly reissued is considered to be a symbol of an independent and free Kyrgyzstan. Streets and squares of cities were named after Manas, there are his sculptures in Bishkek and scholars defend their candidate and doctoral dissertations on the subject. Those are the zigzags of relationship between intellectuals and the authority of Kyrgyzstan in the 20th century.

This article was written in order to present some very little known facts concerning the Socialistic Republic of Vietnam’s attitude towards a huge internal crisis in Polish People’s Republic that took place mostly in 1980–1982 period. Hanoi was at that time in the middle of a spectacular economic recession and feared that some Solidarity’s ideals might as well corrupt Vietnam’s working class. Ho Chi Minh successors also thought that their problems were connected with the anticipated Soviet intervention in Poland could cause another Chinese invasion aimed at seizing their homeland. The last war between China and Vietnam took place in 1979. To protect their supremacy in the Indochina Peninsula, Vietnamese communists had to learn as much as possible about the Solidarity movement and were eager to give Polish comrades full support in it’s suppression. It was however Hanoi’s imperative that the Polish government could handle the situation by it’s ownmeans. In that case the Soviet Union would be able to use it’s full military and political powers to contradict any Chinese attempts to place the Socialistic Republic of Vietnam under Beijing submission.

The article shows the stand China (People’s Republic of China) and the split by inner political fights USSR took regarding the American initiative to militarily force out the Iraqi aggressor from Kuwait, as well as regarding the American anti-Iraq operation, Desert Storm. Both communist superpowers agreed with each other only 2 years before the operation, thus ending the 30-year long schism and hostility. However, among others due to Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of new thought from one side and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and open policy from the other, supported by Chinese independent foreign policy, despite many mutual points within foreign policy, Moscow and Beijing held different policies regarding the American intervention (arranged officially with the UN’s mandate).

While agreeing about the necessary withdrawal of Iraqi armies from Kuwait, as well as the restitution of its sovereignty, China and USSR differed in the coalition’s (particularly American) support towards military intervention against Iraq. For Beijing the intervention was only an element of the supremacy battle between USA and Iraq. For Gorbachev, it was a part of Soviet–American cooperation in building a partnership, as well as creating universal standards of political

activities on the international arena.

The Soviet political scene however, was deeply diversified. The followers of the west and of the USA supported the Iraq intervention, but left-wing politicians were appealing to Soviet politics’ tradition and were against following America’s moves. They wanted to continue the anti-USA policy in the Persian Gulf region, to hold friendly relations with Islamic countries and to bloc American initiatives cin the region, which according to them served to monopolize the USA’s domination in the area.

The article shows an analysis of social protests in Armenia after it regained its independence. In 1991, the country had entered the path of political and economic transformation. However, like other post-Soviet countries faced many obstacles in the process of democratization. Currently Armenia is seen as semi-authoritarian or not fully democratic in a bad economic situation and the low standard of living of the population. During the last twenty years, there were many Armenia, mass public protests, some very violent, as in the years 2004 and 2008. The protests are of interest to many subjects of international relations because of the strategic importance of the South Caucasus region. This article attempts to identify (causes, specificity and consequences) of social protests in the Republic of Armenia.

During the time in question, the Polish state’s attitude towards ethnic Poles (the majority of the population), and towards national and ethnic minorities changed significantly. This was an important matter for the Solidarity movement members and all the documents they issued. It was also taken into consideration during the Round Table Talks. The Third Polish Republic began its history along with acknowledging national minorities’ rights. In 1989 the parliament called the National and Ethnical Minorities’ Parliament Board into being. The minorities’ rights were guaranteed in the constitution from 1997.

Numerous law acts regulating different life aspects of national and ethnical minorities are discussed in the article, especially the bill passed by the Senate on 6th January 2005 – About national and ethnical minorities and a regional language. The bill mentions 6 features distinguishing a national or an ethnical minority. On that basis, it was officially stated which groups are considered national and which are the ethnical minority in Poland.

The text discusses social organisations and mass information means, serving to preserve the minorities’ national identity.

National groups that were not acknowledged as minorities by the 2005 bill, were also introduced in the text – particularly Silesians and Kashubians. A polemic was developed with the document, by pointing out inequalities in treating different groups, that aspire to the minority status. It is really significant for the groups mentioned, since only the ones that were officially recognized as minorities can count on material and moral support from the state.

On the basis of numerous examples, the author presents the influence of natural factors shaping the safety of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and the States of Central Asia, as well as various actions undertaken by the authorities and international organizations to curb any rising threats and diminish their effects. It is pointed out that one of the major problems of the region is the shrivelling and drying-out of the Aral Sea. It seems that the irreversable processes which led to the ecological catastrophy of the region changed the climate, enlarged poverty, the spreading of diseases and gave rise to political tensions concerning the access to water supplies. Furthermore, the author underlines the influence of the past era, the Biological Warfare Laboratory on the “Vozrozhdeniya Island” and numerous containers with radioactive waste in Kirgistan near the Uzbekistan border. Another substantial problem is the occurrence of natural catastrophies and their considerable impact on the safety of the States of the Central Asian population throughout the years.

Article titled “Georgia’s arms industry,” presents a historical perspective of the development of the industry after independence of this former Soviet republic in 1991. Presented is the specificity of abandoned arm’s factories in Georgia, by the retreating Soviet Union, and the equipment produced there, as well as the difficult processes of modernization and transformation of the industry, led by the now independent Georgia, involved in the bloody conflicts of the 1990s. Discussed is also military equipment created after the Russian–Georgian war of August 2008. This war was a real detonator of changes in Georgia’s military industry, determining the number and types of equipment manufactured. The article is enriched with illustrations, showing specific types of military equipment and armament, produced by the Georgian arms industry.

Banks are one of the fastest growing economy branches in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Since regaining independence in 1991, the financial system of the republic changed almost entirely from state ownership, centralised decision making and settling of accounts, into a system defined by market forces, with a right to private ownership, decentralised management and loan allocation, which is favourable for effectiveness growth and the financial discipline of economy. During the first period of reforms (1993–1994) numerous bills and other regulations were passed to adjust the banking system in Kazakhstan to market economy requirements. Institutional reforms resulted in among others commercialising state banks, but also closing down commercial banks going bankrupt, and simultaneously consolidating banks and merging initial capitals. Key documents for today’s banking system structure in Kazakhstan are bills passed in 1995: The Republic of Kazakhstan ‘s National Bank and The Banks and banks’ activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan. These documents ended the forming of legal and an economical basis for banks in Kazakhstan, describing the central bank’s status – the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan – as well as lower level banks’ status.

Currently there are only two specialised banks operating in Kazakhstan – the Development Bank of Kazakhstan and the Zylstrojbank, whose activities are regulated by certain law acts. Among the commercial banks, the so-called Big Three is dominating: Kazkommertsbank, TuranAlem and Narodny. They represent 58.8% of all the banking system’s assets. The share of medium-size banks is 39% assets and the smaller banks are the subject of the biggest fluctuations – a result of their political situation.

The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term of office incites a search for answers what will the Russian Federation’s interior and foreign politics’ course be like. Modern Russia is awaiting crucial challenges regarding its place and status within the new reality connected with the shaping of the global information society. According to historical evidence, countries that adapt quickly to the new way of functioning might achieve a certain supremacy and therefore get profits coming from the newly created information civilization. States unable to conduct those changes will be pushed aside. That is why one of the main problems and challenges awaiting political decision-makers, especially those in developing countries, is how to conduct certain social, political and economical changes in order not to lose their position in relation to the top developed countries. For this reason during the last couple of years the idea of modernisation became a subject of arguments and disputes within the ruling elite as well as within the opposition, scholars, publicists and political affairs commentators. They all agree that present-day Russia needs modernisation, otherwise the state will become the outskirts of the world. If Russia wants to keep its international status, it has to be innovative and competitive and this can only be achieved by modernisation, Currently, a dispute is taking place within Russian political elites regarding the range and pace of changes. As for the Putin–Medvedev power duo, the first one occupies a conservative position, but the second one supports deep modernisation, that would include economy and political institutions.

Recently, much has been said and written about the “historical politics”. If you look at this issue through the prism of history, it becomes obvious that this is a new phrase in its essence. It is the definition of the old practice of using stories to form certain political and ideological ideas. Realizing it is not based on the lessons of history as such, but on certain paradigms or nation-state doctrines that are recognized as only true in some states and at certain times. This is why in different parts of Europe history finds different conclusions for each national reality. In Russian historiography, politics of government and the Church, arising from the official ideology illustrate this kind of perception of history, its understanding and use served as a creation of Alexander Nevsky’s myth. Manipulation of history creates a false consciousness, which leads to what is devoid of critical thinking of the political culture of the ruling elite and the population. Not learning from history, periodically humanity steps on the same rake.

The case of Poland–Russia war prisoners from 1919–1920 is being used by modern Russian propaganda to neutralise the impact made by Moscow admitting to the Katyn massacre. That is why the prisoners’ number as well as of those who did not return during repatriation is presented as a higher one than it is in reality. They are considered murdered or dead during Polish captivity, without presenting any historical sources that would indicate so. An intentional Polish policy to exterminate the prisoners is frequently said to have taken place. All this happens as the anti-Katyn campaign, inspired the highest Russian authorities. Polish research did not find any basis for those charges.

The characteristic feature of the campaign is treating Polish prisoners’ fate in Russian captivity with silence. It was as tragic as their counterparts’ fate in Poland. With this in mind, Polish historiography’s silence regarding this issue is inexplicable. The lack of neutralising Russian propaganda should be considered a negligence with significant consequences.

Changes of the traditional Westphalian international system affect not only the content of world politics, but also of its subjects. If over three and a half centuries the states were dominant players in international relations and global politics (primarily interstate policies), then in recent years they were pushed from this position by transnational corporations, international private financial institutions, non-governmental organizations that do not have a particular nationality and large cosmopolitan intrastate regions. These have very different purposes, someI positive towards the maintenance of a stable world development; others (e.g., terrorist organizations) sees its task in the destabilization of the status quo. States were, and still are the most important actors of world politics, acting directly and through intergovernmental organizations. The development of the world political system at the end of the 20th–21st century casts a serious challenge to the base attribute of the state as the main party of international interaction – states sovereignty.

Among all other Baltic States, Lithuania had a tradition of diplomatic relations with the Holy See, which began after announcing the state’s independence on 16th February 1918 and were continued up until the annexation of Lithuania by the USSR’s on 15th June 1940. When it comes to a system, the state-Church relations in the Republic of Lithuania were most of the time described as balanced. They featured from one side a constitutional inscription about the state and Church being separated, and from another – the constitutional right of religious organisations to function freely, according to their own laws and regulations, as well as rejecting the possibility to

introduce any kind of state religion in Lithuania.

Apart from the constitution and bills regulating the Catholic Church’s status in Lithuania, another law acts describing state-Church relations are three conventions signed by the Republic of Lithuania with the Holy See on 5th May 2000. They are as follows: agreement on cooperation within education and culture, the convention on law aspects of relations between the Catholic Church and the state, and the convention regarding military priesthood.

Apart from the full Polish concordat from 1993, or Portuguese from 2004, the conventions with the Republic of Lithuania – right next to the Estonian convention from 1999, Latvian accordo generale from 2000 or the accordo with Slovenia from 2001 and with Croatia in 1996 and 1998 – should be considered one of the numerous classic partial concordats, signed with European countries during the pontificate of John Paul II.

Election is an inseparable element of the democratic system. Both the election campaign and the voting itself are the examples of the most spectacular political rituals. The voting ritual is connected widely with using certain symbols, myths and stereotypes.

Rituals play a significant role in society. Through the repeatability of actions and behaviour, they contribute to preserving the social order, as well as to inducing the community’s involvement. The ritual is a synonym of order, of generally accepted patterns. It also helps to keep social structures’ continuity. That way it creates a new reality, based on selected patterns and repeated actions. While analyzing the political situation in Poland, terms like theatre, spectacle, political arena or political actors are frequently in use. Politicians, through their behaviour, aim to attract the media’s attention – frequently by controversial behaviour and statements that are improper for a public figure. That way the political world changes into an arena of fight for power. This lowers the quality of political discourse, which is why a term tabloidisation of politics is frequently used.

Roles played by voters within any democratic system can be divided into two categories: rational and folk. The first one includes activities from the social and political area that bring certain results, the second – contains elements of magic. Unfortunately actions promised during the election campaign are far from realistic plans and agendas. The ruling class change into celebrities and actors with one purpose – to effectively play their role.

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THE article analyzes the main approaches to the definition of parliamentarism in foreign and Russian political science. Based on comparative analysis of the author comes to the conclusion that neither foreign nor Russian political science have yet developed a unified scientific approach to understanding the parliamentary system, but from the wide range of definitions can be divided into three main groups to consider these phenomena from different points of view.

The article „Strategic Culture of the Russian Federation” deals with the most important problems related to making the safety strategy of the Russian Federation. It does not also lack the reference to the Russian history since it constitutes an essential formation source of the contemporary strategic culture. A lot of space has been given to deliberations about the influences of the East and West cultures upon the formation of the national strategic culture. The image of the Russian Federation’s strategic culture that follows from the deliberations is ambiguous. It comes from a lack of consistent political, systemic and ecomic state transformations being consequently conducted from the basics. Unfortunately, Russian political elites, who gained influence upon the country’s destiny during the turbulent period following the collapse of the USSR, did not manage to lay strong democratic development foundations based upon the principles of democracy and the supremacy of the law. Nowadays Russia seems to be stuck between the authoritarianism and democracy, that is between the values of the West and the civilization of the East. It is also worth mentioning that the choice of the development direction to be made by Russia does not only determine its future but also the future of the whole European Continent or even perhaps of the whole international community.

Soon after the Soviet authorities had confessed to have committed the Katyn murder and had made public some of the documents connected to the case the Polish government made the legal claim addressed to the government of the Soviet Union to conduct the full rehabilitation its victims. The Military Prosecutor General’s Office of the Soviet Union commenced the investigation of the case (1990–2004). The issue seemed self-evident and yet it provoked and still is provoking a strong resistance on the part of Moscow – despite the documents whose meaning is evident and supports the claims of the Polish government. Moreover, in the first ten years of so after the claim its realization was legally easier than it is now. After 2004 there is a formal obstacle to it in the form of the closing formula of the investigation conducted by the Military Prosecutor General’s Office of – first Soviet Union and then – the Russian Federation. The Katyn Families attempts to conduct the rehabilitation of the Katyn murder victims in the Russian courts of law all failed which made the Katyn Families appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg. The case is still open (the appeal procedure) yet taking into consideration the Russian government’s stance its success is doubtful.

One of the most important decisions during the transformation of the government and the formation of the Russian Federation’s political system has been a creation of the institution of governor – a director of the regional administration appointed by the country’s president. The governor’s institution has become one of the marking elements in the Russian political system. Over time the governor’s authority position was submitted to changes. During the years of political transformation 1992–1996 the sources of regional power legitimization of the administration’s leaders have been various, some of them have been nominated by the president, others by inhabitants of the region. In 1995 a bill had been accepted, according to which all Russian federation leaders will be elected by inhabitants of each regions. The years 1996–1999 have been the full bloom period of the „gubernatorial” Russia, when regional administration’s leaders concentrated in their hands a very wide range of formal and informal competencies and of real authority. The governor’s position was changed after Vladimir Putin’s accession to power. New national elites perceived an excessive authority of regional elites and direct gubernatorial elections as the main source of the country’s instability and as the main threat for security of the state. Therefore a decision has been taken to leave the direct gubernatorial elections in favor of the governors nomination mechanism by the country’s president with the agreement of the local legislatures. The change of the election’s way has implied that administration’s leaders of the federation’s subjects have become part of the federal structure nomenclature, formed by decisions taken at the central level. The governor’s corps has become an instrument in the hands of the central power protecting its control on the sociopolitical and economical processes in the regions. In the last month we could observe a process of correction of the previous political course. Actually it can be heard that the role of citizens should be increased in the social control’s processes and one must go back to the direct elections of governors by Russian regions inhabitants. In January 2012 a corresponding law had been presented to the State Duma. An intended return to direct gubernatorial elections is an important element of the Russian Federation political system’s evolution.

This article is devoted to the stereotypes about neighbours in a national consciousness of Russians and Poles and their development during the last four hundred years starting from the polish campaign to Moscow in 1612. In this time it appears the first Russian stereotype of a Pole – a proud lord, catholic and crafty plunderer, whereas in the polish consciousness a conviction about the inferiority of the Russian culture and of the Orthodox Church. Even though the internal policy of Peter the Great was an act of impetuous Europeanization in Poland it was perceive as an Eastern tyranny. The imposed constrains and discipline were considered by Poles as faults, which formed an image of the Russian state and society enslaved by each consecutive authority. This authority was personified by bureaucrats, who have done many acts of repressions in the times following the partition of Poland. From this moment we perceive Russia as a land of deportations mainly consisting of Siberia. It is only in the times of Stanislaw Augustus that Poles have proclaimed Russians as an „eternal” enemy. In the face of defeats in all fields Poles have searched for a recompense in the moral sphere charging Russians with inhuman methods of waging war. Successive deportations in 1940–41 and 1944–45 with the Katyn’s crime of genocide have established an opinion about Russians as a cruel nation. In evaluation of military might of Russia Poles, contrarily to the Western nations, have never considered the Russian army as an invincible power. Soviet technical science was considered as non-existing, obsolete and acting by espionage and theft.

Starting from the period following the November Insurrection the Russians consider that the absorbing of Poland has introduced into Russia a component which has slowly disintegrated the Empire. Apart from the Pole-catholic stereotype there is also that of a Pole-rebel. An attitude of Poles towards the Russian revolution of 1917 was generally negative, which follows from the fact that many landowners have lost their property and much more leaseholders their source of income. It was in a good tone to talk about the loses of large estates, which is a source for a general opinion about a gigantic Polish loss in the East. The Soviet Union has tried to recompense its defeat in the war of 1920 in the sphere of propaganda. In its opinion Poland was first of all „lordly” which was worse than „bourgeois” and as bad as „fascist”.

The aim of the paper is to answer the following questions : how should we understand the concept of forgiveness so that reconciliation between Russia and Poland becomes possible? – Should we continue to hold hard feelings in international relations or should we leave them behind? – If we should remember our resentments, then how should we understand the postulate of memory? – On the other hand, if we should forget, then how should we understand the postulate of forgetting? I underline that the international reconciliation is a long term process. It does not happen immediately. We could compare it to a healing of a painful and deep wound. There are two the most common ways of dealing with suffering, resulting from unhealed wound. Both are false. The first way rests on ignoring, neglecting certain events, historical facts from collective consciousness. Let’s call it ideology of oblivion. The second one rests on scratching a wound, reproaching painful, national blames. Let’s call it ideology of dwelling on the past. Every single ideology is biased and partial. It distorts some historical events and therefore it is false. Either it omits some matters of facts or it exaggerates them. In my opinion, promoting these two above ideologies is a great, political and moral mistake. Because, those methods never lead to reconciliation, never heal the symbolic wound. On the contrary, they will exacerbate the inflammation. What should we do to heal this wound in international relations? We ought to disinfect it. At this case, it means binding the postulate of remembering with the courage to being in the truth. Only truth can relieve us from the evil just like disinfection removes toxins from the wound. Only due to the truth we will be able to avoid the evil in the future. Because, social awareness of wrong doing in the past can persuade us to reflection and bring change in social behavior in the future.

The article is dedicated to the historical feature film „Squadron” directed in the year 1993 by Juliusz Machulski, being a painful clearance of the difficult past of Polish and Russian peoples. The movie represents a short episode from the history of the January Uprising of 1863 and shows extraordinary attitudes, being characteristic to the representatives of the two fighting nations.

In the history of the Polish–Soviet war in 1919–1920 the problem that evokes many emotions – an aftermath of Moscow’s publicisation propaganda – is the fate of the prisoners of war. The Russian side indicates, without documented justification, that more than 200 thousands Russians have become Polish prisoners of war, among them 130 thousands have been kept in POW camps. The Polish side recounts that number for about 150 thousands prisoners being kept temporarily in a captivity and the number of 100–105 thousands that were kept in POW camps. Almost 76 thousands Red Army’s soldiers have been repatriated, including 10 thousands of allied of Polish Army with the status of an internee. Almost never mentioned is the fate of Polish prisoners of this war, of whom there were more than 50 thousands, from which came back barely 32 thousands, including 5th DSP prisoners – none participants of war. This publication is devoted to the negotiations and the final solution of the fate of those prisoners who survived the captivity, their return to native countries and the propaganda concerning this issue. The treaty for the repatriation of war prisoners had been signed on February 24th, 1921 in Riga and according to it the repartition has been executed. The author has outlined the problems of the civilian’s repatriation and its repercussions a number of Poles in Russia.

It is indicated in the article, that Polish–Ukrainian and Ukrainian–Polish relations are described as difficult, complex, with painful historical memories, but also full of similarities, of ethos and of problems of everyday life. This situation is generated by the geographical location, national contact, cultures, traditions, attitudes, behaviours, social-politic values etc.

Constitutional transformations accomplished during 20 years in Central and East Europe, revealed many new links in Polish–Ukrainian relations, they gained an important international capacity in the nineties. In this aspect the cultural heritage of borderland is very important. On one hand one observes the cultural proximity of both sides, mutual infiltration of attitudes, political and socio-economical behaviours, on the other – the birth of mutual distrust, and even hostility and a self-perception by the prism of an experienced wrong. The borderland heritage is kept away from political elites forming the relations between both sides, also at a lower level it is the object of attention in scientific research. A real interest of cultural and civilisation’s problems of Ukraine is not revealed in Poland. It results in a certain degree from the international strategy of the state, including the marginalisation of Polish eastern problems. In forming a new European order one determines an essential place for the functional arrangement concerning Polish and Ukrainian relations. From this point of view it is important to reach a full normalisation in the aspects of border, minorities and cultural heritage. In the article it is indicated, that the formation of a new international reality after 1989 relations reveals in Polish–Ukrainian relations:

1. A strong attachment to past experience in both nations, makes the creation of neighbour relations difficult,
2. Among the barriers of Polish–Ukrainian relations the ethnic stereotypes are still important,
3. In the strategy of negotiations of agreements and Polish–Ukrainian alliances the European Union standards take priority before actual direct relations and cultural conditions of neighbours,
4. The concluded arrangements and political agreements between both countries have mainly a declarative character, and not too much attention is paid to execution of established bilateral obligations.
5. A social-politic position of Poles in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland is an important reflection of Polish–Ukrainian and Ukrainian–Polish relations.

In this article the author points out the ways of creating and sustaining coalitions of parties in the Ukrainian political system. He lists the major personality and institutional problems with the coalitions. The first include personal animosity between politicians and strongy personalization of the parties, while the second –transformation of the political regime taken not only by the parliament, but also by the Constitutional Court. In conclusion, the author notes that the Ukrainian political system is still dominated by the quasi-coalitions and the constitutional law’s modifications will not contribute to the party system institutionalization.

The article deals with a analysis of Homo politicus and Homo religiosis in postsoviet Kirghizia. On that political condition in the West and political ones in the East are compared. The authors draw a conclusion that reference point for modern transitional Kirghizia must be not political absenteeism but a junction of all citizens to policy.

In the article dedicated to the Kazakhstan’s information policy the author describes the arduous process, that went through and still pass her country, to catch up with work for internet’ access and in the development of mass media. The author observes the development of the medial law, that introduces new standards of freedom and tolerance in such a multinational state as Kazakhstan independent from the Soviet Union. She shows how the free market has changed the media and how the legislator was obliged to keep up with fast occurring changes. She describes in details the successive stages of mass media’s alteration starting with the post-soviet period, in which existed only the State media, up to the present, dominated by private media. Particularly underlined in this article is the multiculturalism of Kazakhstan, that is reflected by multiple editions and channels in languages of many ethnic groups such as Germans, Koreans or Russians. The next important issue considered in this work is the presently occurring digitalisation of society. She discussess widely the development of the Internet in Kazakhstan (called colloquially Kaznet) and the influence of blogs, social networks and forums on society. As one of the most important elements the author considers the ”electronic rule” for which the goal is the relationship between the citizens and the government, also for the eradication of corruption. The author points out the mistakes of native media, such as an insignificant participation of foreign correspondents or too small a participation of the Kazakh literature on the market. At the same time she proposes some solutions for the current problems of the national media.

The article is devoted to analysis of the role and place of intercultural dialogue in contemporary international relations, as well as a place of cultural dialogue in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan Republic. Dialogue between cultures, the oldest and most fundamental mode of democratic conversation, is an antidote to rejection and violence. Azerbaijan is a place where uniting different cultures and civilizations being situated at the crossroad between the East and the West, the North and the South. Our culture has been manifested with the values of Islamic and western societies for centuries. Today the Republic of Azerbaijan is committed to intercultural dialogue and cooperation, and strives to be an integral part of the developing world. World Forum on Intercultural dialogue on 7–9 April, 2011 in Baku is organized in the framework of the Baku process launched at the Conference of Ministers responsible for Culture in Europe and its neighbouring regions (December, 2008). The aim of the “Baku process” is to establish a platform in which todays challenges can be discussed in the spirit of intercultural dialogue and universal values.

This article is devoted to a process of a civic society formation in Belorussia. In this work the author has analysed thoroughly the regulatory legislation for activities of the non-governmental organizations. The distinction of barriers limiting the development of civic society turned out to be a very important task. Not only the general characterization of the third sector has been presented, but also the author has determined the dynamics of the development of non-governmental organizations in the years 1996–2010. Secondly those was the determination of the repression’s scale towards independent NGO’s and the discussion of methods used by the regime with respect to the independent civic sector. In this study the author undertakes also a characterization of the main non-governmental organizations and he reflects on the future perspectives of the civic society development in Belorussia.

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