- Year of publication: 2019
- Source: Show
- Pages: 1-8
- DOI Address: -
Article (whose first part was published in the previous volume of „Constitutional Law Review”) discusses the problem of constitutional judiciary in post-Soviet states. The author formulates a thesis that constitutional courts in post-Soviet states were supposed to create proper conditions for the primacy of the constitution in the system of normative acts and its direct effect on legal relations taking place in the state. It was expected to guarantee the freedom and rights of an individual. The radiation of the constitution onto the whole of legal, political, economic or social relations occurring in the state promotes the stability of the state’s political system, the protection of values important for the citizens. The author formulates a thesis that to make it happen, proper political conditions are necessary and within them – the control of the new normative acts in the context of their compatibility with the laws of higher legal force, including above all the constitution. This part of the text analyzes the functions of constitutional courts and their political roles in post-Soviet states. Conclusions regarding both parts of the text. First part of this paper was published in „Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2019, no. 2, pp. 137–164.
The aim of the article is to determine the scope of constitutional rights of the President of the Russian Federation and to bring issues related to the competences held by the head of the state in relation to the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities, including the nation and those that are considered by the Constitution as so-called “other”. Another goal is to investigate whether all competences granted to the President are used as intended and whether there is a need to change the scope of the rights granted, and if so, whether they should be extended or narrowed. The content of the article answers questions related to the above issues and allows to draw conclusions that the President’s wide range of powers undoubtedly determines his superior position in relation to other authorities, and the number and rank of powers held by the head of the state go beyond the classical model of the semipresidential system.
The issue of autonomous countries, for example through Scotland, is an interesting topic in the field of political research. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is an absorbing field for the deeper research. The analysis of the institutional and legal solutions adopted in the United Kingdom allows for the formulation of a research hypothesis that classifies Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as autonomous countries, as a result of the competences obtained as part of the devolution process. In the article, the author also responds to the research questions posed which features may indicate the position of the devolved regions as autonomous countries, and which do not allow them to be included in this category?
All American courts have a right to examine the conformity of legal acts with the Constitution as the basis for issuing a decision, creating a diffused system of judicial review. Court precedents and the stare decisis doctrine become the stabilizing factor of jurisprudence. However, it is not easy to make an unequivocal assessment of the role of the stare decisis doctrine for judicial review due to a number of factors that affect its significance. They include the formal lack of absolute nature of the court decisions, or the fact that the Federal US Supreme Court is not bound by its own rulings. The latter fact seems particularly important in the assessment of the subject matter in the context of considerable judicial activism and the way the judges are nominated and approved for, in principle, lifetime positions. In this publication, all the above-mentioned factors have been analyzed in order to assess the significance of the stare decisis doctrine for judicial review in the US as accurately as possible.
The Constitution of 1917 expressis verbis expressed the constitutional principles of the division of powers in Mexico. In practice, the executive branch had a dominant role. In the eighties, there was a slow economic and political transformation that shaped the formation of the democratic system of the state. The independent judiciary, in particular the position of the Supreme Court of Mexico (SCJN), began to play a special role. An important systemic practice after the 1994 reform was the settlement of constitutional disputes (controversias constitucionales) of executive organs with legislative bodies at both federal and state levels. SCJN became an arbitrator deciding on collisions. A question arises about the scope of influence of constitutional disputes on the political position of the President from the mid-nineties? Based on the analysis of the content of normative acts and taking into account their historical background, one can conclude that – despite the transformation – presidential power still exerts a significant influence on the judiciary in Mexico.
The traumatic experiences of World War II have highlighted the serious deficit of national and international measures to protect human rights and their ideological support to place human dignity as the main and indisputable pillar of a democratic state and supranational communities. Human dignity is nowadays one of the factors determining the court’s jurisdictional proceedings. This also applies to states that formally did not include it in the catalog of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. Qualitative, quantitative and comparative analysis of the functioning of the concept of human dignity reveals its various meanings and functions. They are determinants in assessing the activities of state authorities from the point of view of implementing the principles of a democratic state of law and the need to respect the rights of individuals. In connection with the richness of interpreting the concept of human dignity within the framework of constitutional values, one can not ignore the rich history of the doctrine of human dignity. It allows us to understand and define the nature of general concepts and give different meanings. Human dignity in many legal systems, including Israel, is a constitutional value, as well as the law that the constitutional norms guarantee. The issue of its regulation and definition in the Israeli legal order due to the specificity of the problem is an interesting issue, both theoretical and legal as well as practical.
The article discusses prerogatives and activity of the President of the Republic of Poland with respect to constitutional legislation. The first part of the paper deals with regulations which refer to the head of state’s participation in the constitutional legislation during the inter-war period. The second part of the article analyses legal provisions concerning that issue, which were enforced in 1947–1952 and 1989–1997. The third part contains a description of the President’s role in the procedure of amending the Constitution stipulated in art. 235, para. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 and the application of that procedure in practice so far. The fourth part is the summary of this paper.
The problem of limiting the political rights of people with intellectual disabilities under Polish law has been a matter of interest for the Ombudsman for a long time, consistently postulating legislative work aimed at eliminating the institution of legal incapacitation from the Polish legal order, and it is reflected in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and in the activity of the social organisations. The article indicates the need postulated in the doctrine of the constitutional law to replace the Polish model of substitute decision by instruments of supported decision-making by people affected by intellectual disability and the need to have the ability to use the political rights by an individual assessed thoroughly each time by an impartial body, including the fundamental right to elect his/her representatives, while applying some measures restricting the individual’s discretionary power under civil law.
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