Economic Sanctions as a Tool of China’s Hybrid Strategies

The article aims to analyze the role of economic sanctions in the People’s Republic of China’s overall approach to achieving its security objectives in the international arena. During the last two decades, Beijing used this instrument on numerous occasions to exert pressure on a varied group of actors. China’s current strategy toward a range of disputes and conflicts it is engaged in (the South China Sea territorial disputes most prominently stand out) is often described using the popular vocabulary of “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone conflicts”. Putting the conceptual complications aside, the author agrees that the PRC’s approach can be viewed as part of a growing trend for great powers to employ what can be called “hybrid strategies” toward its opponents. As part of a broader category of economic statecraft, economic sanctions form an important element of this approach. Considering current scholarship on both “hybrid” (or “grey area”) warfare and economic sanctions, the article answers the question of why the PRC increasingly resorts to hybrid strategies (including economic coercion) and identifies the main characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions. It also provides preliminary conclusions on their effectiveness.

REFERENCES:

• Allen, S.H. (2005). The determinants of economic sanctions success and failure. International Interactions, 31(2), 117-138. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620590950097
• Altman, D. (2018). Advancing without attacking: The strategic game around the use of force. Security Studies, 27(1), 58-88. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360074
• Ayson, R., & Pardesi, M.S. (2017). Asia’s Diplomacy of Violence: China–US Coercion and Regional Order. Survival, 59(2).
• Baldwin, D.A. (1985). Economic Statecraft. Princeton University Press.
• Blasko, D.J. (2019). The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/
• Brooks, S.G., & Wohlforth, W.C. (2016). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position. International Security, 40(3), 7-53. https://doi.org/doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00225
• Bush, N., & Xu, R. (2021). China’s Expanding Economic Sanctions Regime. DLA Piper. https://www.dlapiper.com/en/japan/insights/publications/2021/03/chinas-expanding-economic-sanctions-regime/
• Clifton, M.T., Bapat, N., and Kobayashi, Y. (2014). The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5), 541-558. http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm
• Closing argument. (2021, May 8). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/05/08/australias-debate-about-china-is-becoming-hot-angry-and-shrill
• Drezner, D. W. (2003). The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion. International Organization, 57(03), 643-659. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052
• Economy, E. C. (2018). China’s New Revolution. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution
• Farrell, H., & Newman, A.L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.
• Gady, F.-S. (2015). ‘Little Blue Men:’ Doing China’s Dirty Work in the South China Sea. The Diplomat. website: https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/little-blue-men-doing-chinas-dirty-work-in-the-south-china-sea/
• Harrell, P., Rosenberg, E., and Saravalle, E. (2018). China’s use of coercive economic measures. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/chinas-use-of-coercive-economic-measures
• Hostage diplomacy. (2021, March 8). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/03/08/only-america-can-break-the-deadlock-between-canada-and-china
• Hufbauer, G.C., & Jung, E. (2020). China plays the sanctions game, anticipating a bad US habit. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/china-plays-sanctions-game-anticipating-bad-us-habit
• Kalyanpur, N., & Newman, A.L. (2018). Mobilizing Market Power: Jurisdictional Expansion as Economic Statecraft. International Organization, 73(1-34).
• Laity, M., Nimmo, B., Jackson, L., and Thomas, T. (2015). Information at War: From China’s Three Warfares to NATO’s Narratives. https://li.com/reports/information-at-war-from-chinas-three-warfares-to-natos-narratives/
• Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2003). The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions. Journal of Peace Research, 40(6), 641-660. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433030406002
• Libiseller, C., & Milevski, L. (2021). War and Peace: Reaffirming the Distinction. Survival, 63(1), 101-112. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1881256
• Martinson, R.D. (2018). Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/15/
• McLean, E.V., & Whang, T. (2014). Designing foreign policy: Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 51(5), 589-602. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314533811
• National Security Strategy of United States of America. (2017). https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/
• Pape, R.A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions do not work. International Security, 22(2), 90-136.
• Poast, P. (2020). Competitors, Adversaries, or Enemies? Unpacking the Sino-American Relationship. War on the Rocks https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/competitors-adversaries-or-enemies-unpacking-the-sino-american-relationship/
• Poh, A. (2017). The myth of Chinese sanctions over south China Sea disputes. Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 143-165. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302744
• Qiao Liang, & Wang, Xiangsui (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf
• Rajah, R. (2021). The big bark but small bite of China’s trade coercion. The interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/big-bark-small-bite-china-s-trade-coercion
• Swaine, M.D. (2018). Chinese Views of Foreign Policy in the 19th Party Congress. China Leadership Monitor, (55).
• Swept up in a storm. (2021, March 31). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/business/2021/03/31/consumer-boycotts-warn-of-trouble-ahead-for-western-firms-in-china
• Weiss, J.C. (2019). How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy. Journal of Contemporary China, 28(119), 679-695. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580427
• Wisniewski, R. (2018). EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats: comparing capabilities and defining roles. In C. Morsut & D. Irrera (Eds.), Security Beyond the State. The EU in an Age of Transformation. Barbara Budrich Publishers.
• Wisniewski, R., & Hensarling, B. (2015). Power in 2025: A Global Ranking. R/Evolutions Global Trends & Regional Issues, 3(1), 122-157.
• Xiaolin, Duan. (2017). Unanswered questions: Why we may be wrong about Chinese nationalism and its foreign policy implications. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(108), 886-900. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2017.1337312
• Zhao, T. (2010). Sanction experience and sanction behavior: An analysis of Chinese perception and behavior on economic sanctions. Contemporary Politics, 16(3), 263-278. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2010.501639