W artykule tym autor przedstawił postawy polityczne wśród Nowozelandczyków i Polonii nowozelandzkiej wobec wprowadzenia w Polsce stanu wojennego w 1981 r. W trakcie prowadzonego badania ujawniono następujące zjawiska, które towarzyszyły postawom politycznym wyrażanym w Nowej Zelandii wobec stanu wojennego w Polsce: nowozelandzkie związki zawodowe zajmowały stanowiska dychotomiczne wobec „Solidarności”; antykomunizm ówczesnego rządu nowozelandzkiego; konflikt polityczny w środowiskach polskiej emigracji politycznej; wysoką zdolność Polonii do mobilizacji politycznej. Przeprowadzone badanie stanowiło podstawę do potwierdzenia hipotezy, stanowiącej przypuszczenie, że Polacy jak i Nowozelandczycy w Nowej Zelandii ujawniali postawy antykomunistyczne w okresie wprowadzenia stanu wojennego w Polsce, a społeczeństwo nowozelandzkie wspierało Polaków w Nowej Zelandii w ich postawach antykomunistycznych i działaniach na rzecz wyrażenia dezaprobaty dla reżimu komunistycznego i rozwiązania opozycji demokratycznej skoncentrowanej wokół ruchu społecznego „Solidarność”.

Extraordinary measures in the event situations  of particular danger in cyberspace

In the article the Authors presented a problem of extraordinary measures in the event situations of particular danger in cyberspace. The analysis of this issue is made on the basis of constitutional and legal solutions (Act of martial law, Act of the state of emergency, Act of the state of natural disaster). The Authors refered to the concept of cyberspace and classified the risks in this area. The also assessed the appropriateness of the measures adopted by the legislature.

Research on the constitutionality of martial law. Remarks based on the  Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 16 March 2011

The Article concerns the power of the Constitutional Tribunal for examination of currently out-of-dated legislation. It was assumed that the judgment of Constitutional Tribunal of 16 March 2011 stating unconstitutionality of the State Council decrees of 12 December 1981 on martial law is of fundamental importance. Historical aspects of martial state may still evoke understandable political and ideological emotions, which however should be excluded from legal considerations. The Author reconstructs assumptions presented by the Constitutional Tribunal, and afterwards provides analysis from the point of view of constitutional standards in force. Moreover, the Author is interested in effects of recognition of currently outdated legislation as unconstitutional. The text and presented ideas are constructed to inspire further discussions.

Retroactivity of martial law decree in light of the Constitution of 1952  and 1997

This article refers to the issues of retroactivity of martial law decree in the light of the Constitution of 1952 and 1997. The starting point of considerations is to identify the legitimacy of the principle of lex retro non agit, which establishes an introduction to the issue of the retroactive provisions of the decree intoducing martial law on the territory of the People’s Republic of Poland in December 12th 1981. The point of assessing the legality of the decree are the provisions of the Constitution of the PRL, the Criminal Code of 1969 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The synthesis of the problems undertaken in this work was supported by jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court.

Is Polish Constitution adjusted to the times of crisis? Selected problems and de lege ferenda propositions

The subject of this article is the question whether the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 provides sufficient guarantees for the continuity of government and cooperation of public authorities in the event of sudden threats such as war, rebellion, natural disaster or terrorist attack. The analysis shows that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is prepared for standard emergency situations, but does not contain procedures in the event of the worst-case scenarios: necessity of state of emergency during electoral campaign; failure to gather a minimum quorum of 230 deputies for the needs of a session of the parliament; the death of top politicians in the state.

Regulation of emergency states in the Republic of Estonia and the COVID-19 pandemic

There are two types of emergency states distinguished by the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia: state of emergency and state of war. They have been sparsely regulated at the level of the Constitution, leaving detailed issues to statutory regulation. The decision in this regard requires the cooperation of parliament with the authorities of executive power, i.e. the president and the government. The threat to the health and lives of citizens posed by a coronavirus pandemic is not a circumstance justifying the imposition of a state of emergency, let alone a state of war as stipulated in §§128–129 of the Constitution. Thus, the Estonian authorities in March 2020 decided to apply the mechanism of §87 section 8 of the Constitution.

The Toruń Security Service tried with extraordinary zeal to dismantle underground structures, especially secret printing houses and distribution structures. For this purpose, informers were used and the information obtained from them was carefully collected. All found copies of leaflets, underground leaflets, posters, etc. were also carefully collected. By January 11, 1982, the Security Service in Toruń had collected a collection of 172 leaflets, into which (as well as subsequent leaflets), the prosecutor’s office initiated an official investigation. They continued until the fall of 1983. The article discusses the methods of operation of the Security Service in Toruń in order to crack down on the Solidarity underground. Searches, interrogations (sometimes brutal), informers and technical means (e.g. wiretapping) were used.

Throughout the period of the People’s Republic of Poland, the PAKP was part of the trend of religious loyalty to the state promoted by the communist authorities. In many respects, it declared support for the political, social and economic changes taking place after 1945. This was due to both its own organizational weaknesses and theological assumptions. It also supported the actions of the communist authorities against the emerging “Solidarity” and the introduction of martial law in Poland.

Ensuring the individual’s right to access to public information under martial law in the context of Ukraine’s European integration

The article deals with characterizing the constitutional human right to access public information in the context of Ukraine’s European integration processes. The author emphasizes that every individual’s right to information is one of the vital human rights. This right is enshrined in fundamental international instruments – the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as at the state level – in Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law on Access to Public Information. It is also noted that the law, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public order, may restrict exercising the right to free collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information. Under current martial law conditions in Ukraine, such restrictions are related to the spread of disinformation by the hostile aggressor state. The author describes the European Union’s measures in the field of information security and points out that the main body responsible for regulating this area is the East StratCom Task Force (ESTF), founded in April 2015. In particular, this body aims to counter Russia’s constant disinformation campaigns. In addition, it is noted that information security in Ukraine is being carried out by such public organizations as “Detector Media” and “StopFake”. At the same time, the Centre for Countering Disinformation provides state regulation. It is a body of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, founded in March 2021. It is stated that adopting the laws “On Media” and “On Advertising” played an essential role in the fight against disinformation in the information space of Ukraine. It is concluded that Ukrainians need to master media literacy skills and understand from whom they consume information. Ukraine should implement its media and copyright laws quality, harmonize its legislation with the latest EU acts, and increase state bodies’ institutional capacity in combating disinformation. At the same time, it is emphasized that under the pretext of ensuring national security, the State should not engage in propaganda and restrict freedom of speech.