- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
- Year of publication:
2018
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
41-59
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2018.58.03
- PDF:
apsp/58/apsp5803.pdf
Artykuł podejmuje problem założeń libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości w zakresie teorii praw podmiotowych. Tekst stawia tezę, iż libertarianizm presuponuje Teorię Woli w analizie uprawnień. Argumentacja stawianej tezy przebiega na sześciu płaszczyznach: (1) libertariańskiego pojęcia praw własności prywatnej; (2) identyfikowanej przez libertarianizm funkcji praw własności prywatnej; (3) libertariańskiego uzasadnienia praw własności prywatnej; (4) wąskiego charakteru libertariańskiej teorii politycznej; (5) libertariańskich zasad sprawiedliwej dystrybucji praw własności prywatnej; (6) libertariańskiego modelu ładu politycznego. Artykuł wskazuje, iż poza tym, że Teoria Woli dostarcza analitycznego wyjaśnienia libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości na wszystkich tych płaszczyznach, jej konkurentka, czyli Teoria Interesu, nie jest w stanie wygenerować takiej artykulacji bez szeregu arbitralnych założeń ad hoc i dlatego pozostaje niekompatybilna z libertarianizmem.
- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
- Year of publication:
2018
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
7-17
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2018.59.01
- PDF:
apsp/59/apsp5901.pdf
In the present paper the author considers a challenge to libertarianism posed by G.A. Cohen. The charge issued by Cohen says that libertarianism defines freedom in terms of justice and justice in terms of freedom. The paper deals with an aspect of this charge as expressed by one of Cohen’s thought experiments according to which it is not the case that the answer to the question whether person B forces person A to do φ depends on whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not. Employing the Hohfeldian analysis of fundamental jural conceptions, the author demonstrates that if person B’s actions are legitimate, then making person A to do φ cannot, at pains of contradiction, be considered forcing. If person B is at a liberty to make person A to do φ, then person B cannot at the same time and in the same respect be at duty not to make person A to do φ. Yet, this is exactly what would follow if we adopted the stance that person B’s legitimate actions force person A to do φ. If they forced person A, then the expenditure of whatever labour needed to do φ would not be a voluntary expenditure and thereby would constitute a violation of person A’s rights to this labour. However, if person A’s rights were violated by person B’s actions, then via Hohfeldian Correlativity Axiom person B would have to be at duty not to undertake these actions. Yet, the whole reasoning started from the assumption that person B is at liberty to undertake them.
- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
- Year of publication:
2017
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
61–84
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2017.54.04
- PDF:
apsp/54/apsp5404.pdf
Artykuł dotyczy problemu możliwości prawnej istnienia dobrowolnego niewolnictwa na gruncie libertariańskiej teorii naturalnych praw podmiotowych. Praca stawia hipotezę, iż teoria ta zakłada możliwość prawną istnienia umów niewolnictwa i że możliwość ta wynika logicznie ze zbywalności oraz komposybilności (compossibility) naturalnych praw podmiotowych. Artykuł prowadzi dyskusję z przedstawianymi w literaturze przedmiotu argumentami negującymi taką możliwość. W pracy wykorzystano metodę analizy logicznej.
- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
- Year of publication:
2016
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
42–64
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2016.49.03
- PDF:
apsp/49/apsp4903.pdf
Przedmiotem badań podejmowanym w tekście jest jedna z głównych podstaw teoretycznych libertarianizmu: zasada autowłasności. Problemem badawczym artykułu jest pytanie: Czy zasada autowłasności jest aksjomatem? Metodą badawczą zastosowaną w artykule jest metoda disputatio. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań w tekście proponowana jest teza afirmatywna: zasada autowłasności ma status logiczny aksjomatu. Artykuł prezentuje wypracowaną siatkę pojęciową rozróżniającą samoposiadanie, auto własność i uzasadnienie autowłasności oraz rozwija linię argumentacyjną wskazującą, że choć prima facie to samoposiadanie, a nie autowłasność jest aksjomatem, to ponieważ samoposiadanie z konieczności implikuje autowłasność, to także autowłasność musi mieć status logiczny aksjomatu.
- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
- Year of publication:
2015
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
90–106
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2015.48.07
- PDF:
apsp/48/apsp4807.pdf
In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian theory of distributive justice. I demonstrate that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice as represented by Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick. However, the main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, as represented by Israel M. Kirzner. To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium.
- Author:
Dariusz Juruś
- Year of publication:
2016
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
91-101
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/kie.2016.02.07
- PDF:
kie/112/kie11207.pdf
In the paper I discuss theoretical differences between left and rightlibertarianism. (I will skip the specific and practical issues which differ left and rightlibertarians, including among others the minorities and immigration policies or affirmative action. I assume that practical solutions suggested by the followers of both positions stem from their theoretical assumptions.) I will focus on two issues which determine the fundamental difference between left and rightlibertarianism. These are property and equality. I compare standpoints of some leftlibertarians with the positions of rightlibertarians represented by Murray Rothbard, concerning property and equality. I conclude that the main and fundamental difference between leftand rightlibertarians concerns equality. Leftlibertarians are egalitarians whereas rightlibertarians are antiegalitarians. I also argue that egalitarian position is not compatible with the notion of full selfownership, which leftlibertarians advocate for.
- Author:
Łukasz Dominiak
- Institution:
Nicolaus Copernicus University
- Year of publication:
2014
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
7-21
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2014.44.01
- PDF:
apsp/44/apsp4401.pdf
In this paper, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium to analyse background conditions of our considered judgements about distributive justice generated by a thought experiment called “Three Children and a Flute”, proposed and interestingly commented upon by Amartya Sen in his book The Idea of Justice. I claim that, contrary to Sen’s conclusions drawn from the thought experiment, for the utilitarian and egalitarian visions of distributive justice to hold other things about distribution of resources and social life that we are not willing to accept must be true and that it is not the case then that it is a ‘difficult decision’ to make what pattern of distribution should prevail in the thought experiment. To boot, I hold that libertarian or natural pattern of distribution does not presuppose these background conditions that we are not willing to accept and which are presupposed by egalitarian and utilitarian distributive patterns. I conclude that taking into consideration the fact that there is a plethora of inconsistencies, counter-intuitive consequences and anti-scientific implications of the utilitarian and egalitarian solutions to the thought experiment, it is a natural pattern of distribution that prevails in the ‘flute dilemma’.
- Author:
Łukasz Święcicki
- Institution:
Uniwersytet w Siedlcach
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6346-2825
- Year of publication:
2023
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
61-78
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2023.78.04
- PDF:
apsp/78/apsp7804.pdf
Self-Government And Decentralisation In The Political Thought Of Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The aim of this article is to reconstruct and analyse the ideas of self-government and decentralisation present in the thought of a leading representative of anarcho-capitalist libertarianism, Hans-Hermann Hoppe. In the previous research on the history of political thought concerning local government, there is no study that would concern the attitude of libertarianism to local communities. In the study of libertarianism, in turn, as well as in libertarian thought itself, the issues of self-government, decentralisation or local government are rather a side issue, absent in the course of the main considerations. The counter-intuitive nature of libertarianism as a doctrine that advocates an anarcho-capitalist order, which excludes the existence of state institutions, also argues in favour of addressing the title topic. Contrasting the anarcho-capitalist view of self-government and decentralisation with the contemporary dominant understanding of local government may contribute to enriching the discussion within normative local government theory with new conclusions and perspectives. This article, due to the limited scope of the research, is only a contribution to further studies on the problem of self-government and decentralisation in libertarian thought.
- Author:
Radosław Marzęcki
- E-mail:
radoslaw.marzecki@up.krakow.pl
- Institution:
Pedagogical University of Cracow (Poland)
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2915-8878
- Author:
Marcin Chmielowski
- E-mail:
chmielowski@fundacjawip.org
- Institution:
Freedom and Entrepreneurship Foundation (Poland)
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6583-2260
- Author:
Kris Kaleta
- E-mail:
k.kaleta@hotmail.com
- Institution:
Manchester Metropolitan University (United Kingdom)
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3918-560X
- Year of publication:
2024
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
111-135
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202419
- PDF:
ppsy/53-2/ppsy2024208.pdf
The authors of this article attempt to describe in detail the determinants and structure of the beliefs and views of Polish society on a liberal to anti-liberal values continuum. The first research objective was to determine the extent of social and economic freedom that respondents expect in their relations with others and in their relations with state institutions. In addition, the authors wanted to identify the socio-demographic characteristics that significantly differentiate these liberal orientations, as well as the factors that independently determine the adoption of liberal views. The detailed hypotheses were verified based on an analysis of data collected in a nationwide telephone survey (CATI) conducted on a representative sample of 1,000 adult Polish citizens. The survey used an original questionnaire consisting of 31 quantitative scales, which were used to construct the Liberalism/Libertarianism Index (LLI) and to categorize respondents into “Polish Liberals” and “Polish Libertarians.” Higher index values indicate stronger and more consistent liberal attitudes in economic as well as axiological (social) terms. More liberal orientations were found to be held by respondents declaring higher incomes, younger, better educated, and less religious, although only age, some party preferences, and religious practices act as independent predictors of LLI.
- Author:
Norbert Slenzok
- Institution:
University of Zielona Góra
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4887-8416
- Year of publication:
2024
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
7-24
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2024.84.01
- PDF:
apsp/84/apsp8401.pdf
The paper deals with the view of contemporary world politics presented by American libertarians. Specifically, it examines the claims of Murray N. Rothbard and his successors with regard to the role of the United States of America in the international arena. The article argues that since the Cold War, the libertarian account of international relations has been staunchly critical of the US, while exhibiting a soft spot for competing powers, particularly the USSR and the Russian Federation. As the article submits, this asymmetry is supported by two flawed theoretical contentions: the liberal imperialism thesis (LIT) and the American hegemony thesis (AHT). Moreover, the article shows how anti-Americanism impinges on libertarian analyses of contemporary Central- Eastern European politics, in particular the war in Ukraine.