- Author:
Marcin Dąbrowski
- E-mail:
m_dabrowski@wp.eu
- Institution:
The Department of Constitutional Law of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8780-9715
- Year of publication:
2018
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
155-165
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2018.06.13
- PDF:
ppk/46/ppk4613.pdf
The essay describes the concept and evolution of a countersignature and prerogatives of the President of the Republic of Poland. The countersignature is a special signature (a consent) of a member of the Council of Ministers which is necessary to validate the President’s legal (official) act. Prerogatives are enumerated in a constitutional act as presidential competences, which do not require a signature of a member of the Government (a countersignature). The author claims that the institution of independent presidential competences was invented by Polish lawyers and used for the first time ever in the Polish Constitution of 1935. Further, the author describes the evolution of the institution of a countersignature and prerogatives in the Polish political system. It is said that nowadays the number of independent competences does not have such significant importance as it is claimed in constitutional law and in reality prerogatives do not strengthen the political position of the President significantly. His/her power depends on whole relations between the authorities described in constitutional provisions.
- Author:
Krzysztof Prokop
- E-mail:
krzysztof.prokop@uph.edu.pl
- Institution:
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3447-4592
- Year of publication:
2019
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
227-234
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2019.05.16
- PDF:
ppk/51/ppk5116.pdf
The article focuses on the constitutional aspects of defense and security of the Republic of Poland. It analyzes the provisions of the Constitution concerning defense and security, including the tasks and the competences of the state bodies in the area of defense and security, the principles of commanding over the Armed Forces in time of peace and wartime, their tasks in the field of defense and security. According to the author of article the constitutional regulation on security of the Republic of Poland leaves room for numerous doubts. They can be largely attributed to the lack of a distinct division of the state bodies’ competencies in the area of security and defense. The Constitution does not stipulate the rules on commanding over the country in wartime. Whereas solutions included in the statutes arouse doubts in terms of their accordance with the Constitution.
- Author:
Marcin Grzybowski
- E-mail:
marcin.grzybowski@uek.krakow.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1905-8942
- Year of publication:
2021
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
217-230
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.03.14
- PDF:
ppk/61/ppk6114.pdf
Legislative Aspects of the NRAs’ Status in the Infrastucture Sectors
Ownership and structural changes in the infrastructural sectors of the Polish economy in the last three decades, while maintaining the public interest (art. 22 of the Constitution) and the implementation of the “social” market economy principle (art. 20) of the state’s influence on these sectors, justify the need for a legal and constitutional reflection on the status of activities of regulatory bodies in these sectors. The accession to the European Union has placed said activities on the path of the Union’s integration policies, aimed at “horizontal” integration of the infra-structural sectors of the EU member states. A typical and most commonly used legal tool for implementing EU integration undertakings are sectoral directives of the European Parliament and the Council. The Polish regulatory authorities with their postulated attributes of independence, professionalism and objectivity, have found themselves in the field where two routes of the addressed impacts cross: the EU sectoral integration route and the route of implementation of national policy toward infrastructure sectors (steaming from the Polish Council of Ministers and from relevant ministries). The author, identifying the elements of such use, points out the constitutional and legal uncertainties (even: dilemmas) in regard to the relationship between the Council of Ministers (and the Prime Minister)/relevant ministries and the state sectoral regulatory bodies.
- Author:
Joanna Juchniewicz
- E-mail:
joanna.juchniewicz@uwm.edu.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7837-0963
- Year of publication:
2021
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
57-73
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.04.03
- PDF:
ppk/62/ppk6203.pdf
In search of an optimal model of the Council of Ministers – a hundred years of experience
Since Poland regained independence in 1918, there have been several constitutional acts in force (constitutions and the so-called “small constitutions”). Each of them contained provisions defining the scope of government activity, its structure, the mechanisms of appointing and dismissing cabinet members, as well as the principles of accountability. The paper outlines the way in which these issues have been developing over the past 100 years and to what extent the current solutions constitute the continuation of the solutions of the Constitution of 17 March 1921.
- Author:
Marek Woźnicki
- E-mail:
marek.kamil.woznicki@gmail.com
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7010-134X
- Year of publication:
2021
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
335-346
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.04.21
- PDF:
ppk/62/ppk6221.pdf
Some remarks about the Cabinet reconstrucion in Poland
The article provides the analysis of the current regulations about changing the organisation and composition of the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) in Poland. In light of the Constitution of Poland of 1997, the Prime Minister is responsible for the composition and overall organisation of the Cabinet and the allocation of functions between ministers according to the Branches of Government Administration Bill. In addition, the head of government has a certain margin of discretion in delivering the Cabinet reconstructions and the Machinery of Government changes. The Sejm plays a small role in this matter, however the consent of the parliament is necessary to change the Branches of Government Administration Bill.
- Author:
Bożena Dziemidok-Olszewska
- E-mail:
bozena.dziemidok-olszewska@umcs.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2944-5073
- Year of publication:
2022
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
15-29
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2022.01.01
- PDF:
ppk/65/ppk6501.pdf
Dualism of Executive Power in the Third Polish Republic – Constitutional Regulations and Political Practice
The aim of the article is a critical analysis of the rationalized parliamentary system established in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland with the strengthened position of both bodies of the dualistic executive. The study presents the regulations increasing the political role of the President and the government (prime minister) as well as the conditions and political effects of the adopted system. The premise of the article is to highlight the dysfunctionality of the constittional model of the executive and the practice of its implementation.
- Author:
Halina Zięba-Załucka
- E-mail:
hzieba@ur.edu.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1646-3141
- Year of publication:
2022
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
173-187
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2022.03.13
- PDF:
ppk/67/ppk6713.pdf
The Prosecutor’s Office and the Sejm
Author argues in the article that under the legal status preceding the 2009 amendment to the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Sejm’s control over the actions of the Minister of Justice – Prosecutor General found a direct basis in the constitutional norm, which entrusts the Sejm with the control over the Council of Ministers. Under the 2009 prosecution model, where the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice were separated, the Prosecutor General, directing the activities of the prosecution service, was an autonomous body in relation to Council of Ministers, President, Sejm and Senate. The reconnection of the functions of the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General by the 2016 Act gives the Sejm the possibility of parliamentary control of the Prosecutor General. Author indicates the instruments of parliamentary control emphasizing that the Sejm is entitled only to such powers of control that have been clearly defined in the Constitution and laws. Author justifies the thesis that the diversity of the models of functioning of the prosecutor’s office in Poland, as an institution beyond the framework of the classical Montesquieu classification, does not deprive the Sejm of the right to control the prosecutor’s office, which he realizes with the help of diverse means.
- Author:
Krystyna Leszczyńska-Wichmanowska
- E-mail:
krystyna.leszczynska@mail.umcs.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1459-9280
- Year of publication:
2023
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
139-152
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2023.06.10
- PDF:
ppk/76/ppk7610.pdf
The Constitutional General Guarantee of Equality and Actual Gender Equality in the Polish Council of Ministers in 1989–2019
The objective of the article is to analyze equal access of women and men to positions in the Polish Council of Ministers after 1989. The percentage of women in the Councils of Ministers established between 1989 and 2019 was at the level of 12.55%. Only in the office of Kopacz, the female ratio reached the value of 31.58%, i.e. the level of the so-called critical mass of 30%, which may constitute the threshold of the real influence of women on political decisions. The governments of Morawiecki (1st government) and Szydło were composed of 27% and 25% women, respectively. However, only 13% of women were in the subsequent (2nd) cabinet of Morawiecki. This proves that in the coming years in Poland, the perspective of gender balanced governments, which were created, among others: by the Prime Ministers of Sweden in 2014–2021 and of Canada since 2015, is unlikely to be realized.
- Author:
Joanna Juchniewicz
- E-mail:
asia.juchniewicz@gmail.com
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7837-0963
- Year of publication:
2024
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
11-20
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2024.03.01
- PDF:
ppk/79/ppk7901.pdf
Deputy Prime Minister as a Member of the Council of Ministers
The Vice-Presidents are optional members of the Council of Ministers. Their appointment to the government depends on the Prime Minister and also on coalition arrangements. Under the 1997 Constitution, there was no uniform model for the appointment of deputy presidents of the Council of MinistersThe vice-presidents do not have any independent powers. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Act on the Council of Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister may direct the work of the Cabinet in the event of the absence or temporary inability of the Prime Minister to perform his/her duties. The vice-president performs the tasks and competences within the scope entrusted to and on behalf of the Prime Minister. In the context of membership of the Council of Ministers, their position is equivalent to that of the other members of the government, and to an analogous extent they have duties and may exercise rights.
- Author:
Michał Krawczyk
- E-mail:
michal.krawczyk@uws.edu.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet w Siedlcach
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3923-3576
- Year of publication:
2024
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
79-90
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2024.04.06
- PDF:
ppk/80/ppk8006.pdf
The Scope of Competences of the President of the Republic of Poland in Matters Related to Poland’s Membership in the European Union
The amendment to the so-called the Cooperation Act granted the President a number of powers related to Poland’s membership in the European Union. In particular, the President was given the opportunity to give binding opinions on candidacies for key positions in the European Union submitted by the Council of Ministers. The article analyzes the provisions of the Constitution regarding the powers of the President and the Council of Ministers in the field of foreign affairs. An attempt was made to answer the question whether the amending act only clarified the provisions of the Constitution regarding the President’s prerogatives or whether it granted him new powers going beyond powers of the head of state, specified in the provisions of the Constitution.
- Author:
Krystyna Leszczyńska-Wichmanowska
- E-mail:
krystyna.leszczynska@mail.umcs.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1459-9280
- Year of publication:
2024
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
55-67
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2024.05.04
- PDF:
ppk/81/ppk8104.pdf
Reserve Procedures for Appointing the Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers should result from the President’s cooperation with the parliamentary majority. If this turns out to be impossible, the Constitution provides for reserve procedures, successively allowing other ways of forming the government (art. 154 s. 3 and art. 155 s. 1). The article presents constitutional issues regarding reserve procedures for the appointment of the Council of Ministers and an analysis of the applicability of these procedures in the event that the government is not created in the basic procedure (art. 154 sections 1 and 2). The article is indicates the role of the president and political groups represented in the Sejm in a situation where there is no parliamentary majority (2004), as well as when the parliamentary majority exists, but it is ignored by the president (2023). This statement may be important not only for the state of scientific reflection, but also for political practice.