COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FACTIONS IN THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND GROUPS INSIDE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN AFTER ALTERNATION OF POWER IN 2009

The article examines the changes in factional system of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) after electoral victory in 2009. During opposition period, DPJ factions were believed to be much less significant groups than their counterparts in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Nevertheless, after the DPJ assumed power, its intra-party groups, to a certain degree, started functioning as LDP factions. Over the years, their ideological leanings weakened and instead of realizing distinctive political vision, they started focusing on pragmatic struggle for power in the party. In 2009 – 2012 period, the competition between intra-party mainstreams and anti-mainstreams increased, challenging the unity of the DPJ. The significance of factional divisions was also clearly visible in the distribution of governmental portfolios by succeeding prime ministers. Although DPJ factions were still not as powerful as LDP factions, they played a much greater role than before in maintaining intra-party balance and structuring intra-party competition.

The aim of this article is to analyze political objectives and repercussions of the dissolutions of the House of Representatives by Prime Ministers Koizumi Jun’ichirō in 2005 and Abe Shinzō in 2014. In both cases dissolutions took place less than two years after the previous elections. The paper argues that the strengthened power of the heads of government after electoral and administrative reforms facilitated them to take advantage of Diet dissolution to overcome opposition by veto players. By appealing to the public Koizumi planned to privatize the Japan Post and Abe intended to postpone the consumption tax hike. In both cases the prime ministers used early elections to enhance their position in the ruling party. As a result, Koizumi managed to overcome pressure from postal employees and Abe gained leverage over Ministry of Finance (MOF) bureaucrats.

Determinants of short-lived governments in Japan: the example of Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide

Japan is one of the countries with the most frequently changing heads of government in the world. The aim of this article is to examine both the structural and individual causes of this situation by using the example of the short term in office of Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide from 2020 to 2021. While such factors as strong ministerial sectionalism in the government, factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), high frequency of parliamentary and ruling party presidential elections, as well as consensual political culture made it difficult for prime ministers to remain in office for a longer period of time, the electoral and administrative reforms of the 1990s facilitated the heads of government to stabilize the government’s social and party base of support. Nevertheless, the usage of the new institutional instruments to remain in power depended on the prime minister’s ability to create his/her positive image among voters. This article analyzes why Prime Minister Suga, despite leading a stable ruling coalition in both houses of the parliament and having extensive experience in decision-making process, was unable to maintain the government’s initially high popularity and resigned only one year after having formed his cabinet.