- Author:
Oxana Gaman-Golutvina
- E-mail:
ogaman@mail.ru
- Institution:
Higher School of Economics, Russia
- Year of publication:
2017
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
47-59
- DOI Address:
http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2017103
- PDF:
npw/12/npw2017103.pdf
The article presents an analysis of the problems and prospects of relations between Russian Federation and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). These relationships are discussed in broader political context of Russia's relations with the European Union. The author believes that in conflict situations the both parties are responsible. As an optimal strategy the author examines the possibility of linking the integration processes in the Eurasian region – the so-called "integration of integrations", that can become a framework for interfacing the national interests of Russia and the EU's interests. A special role in the normalization of relations in Eurasia the CEE countries are devoted to play – CEE may become a bridge between Russia and Western Europe.
- Author:
Karol B. Janowski
- E-mail:
karol.b.janowski@hotmail.com
- Institution:
Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania w Warszawie
- Year of publication:
2015
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
15-36
- DOI Address:
http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2015201
- PDF:
npw/09/npw2015201.pdf
In analyzing the mode in which Poland was settling its relations with Russia a deduction comes to mind that Poland remains under the spell of the syndromes which were either disposed of or dealt with by other European nations. Remaining is the challenge to solidify Poland’s position within the safety vault of heaven that is vouched by the West while establishing a pragmatic and rational and conflict free relationships with the East-Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries, particularly Latvia. Thus, required is the ability to comprehend the Polish national interests, that is the Polish raison d’état, in a realistic and rational manner within the limits of the existing geopolitical situation of the competition, securing sustained competitive advantages, entering into alliances or compromises and making a long-term option.
- Author:
Aisyah Mumary Songbatumis
- E-mail:
mumarysongbatumis@gmail.com
- Institution:
Vistula University (Poland)
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4144-2484
- Published online:
21 June 2021
- Final submission:
8 June 2021
- Printed issue:
December 2021
- Source:
Show
- Page no:
23
- Pages:
89-111
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202119
- PDF:
ppsy/50/ppsy202119.pdf
As Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 2004 presidential election, it marked the end of Indonesia’s democratic transition era and experienced a dynamic change in foreign policy. The new international identity that viewed Islam as an asset was introduced by SBY, emphasizing the importance of moderate Islam as opposing extremism. The phenomenon of Islamic influence was not only the result of democratic consolidation domestically but also external factors such as the aftermath of 9/11 that portrayed Muslims as potential terrorists. For this reason, Indonesian foreign policy attempted to diminish such misconceptions and tried to be a peacemaker or a mediator in Muslim-related issues globally. To contextualize the analysis, the study focuses on the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Pakistan. The mutual aspirations on the Palestinian statehood shared by both the government and the Muslim elements in society could be found, while religious sentiments were noticeable, as shown by the Muslim groups. In contrast, the influence of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan relations, especially regarding the Kashmir dispute, was absent due to the difference in views of the government and the Muslim groups and constraining factors, including Indonesia’s national interest priority.